The Korean Quandary: Defence Reform

This article was external pageoriginally publishedcall_madeby external pageOffiziere.chcall_made on 22 August 2014.

As the South Korean military pursues implementation of its “Defence Reform Plan 2020″ (DRP2020), the country has become interesting to watch from a procurement standpoint. Whereas the Republic of Korea’s land forces were previously oriented around the use of mass infantry, the focus beyond 2020 will be on a smaller but better equipped and better trained force. This has resulted in a contract for external pageDaewoo Industriescall_made to produce a next-generation assault rifle external pageto replace the K2call_made as the ROK’s standard issue infantry weapon. The external pageK2 Black Panthercall_made (see the image on the right) was intended to become the ROK’s most prevalent main battle tank until external pageserious problems with the transmission and main enginecall_made were identified late in the procurement process. In the midst of this, the ROK Navy external pageis now enjoying the fruit of a 25-year development programcall_madeas external pageHyundaicall_made andexternal pageDaewoocall_made complete production of several external pageSejong the Great-class destroyerscall_made.

The insights DRP2020 offer into South Korea’s strategic priorities, however, may be cause for concern. At the time of DRP2020’s introduction by the external pageROK Ministry of Defencecall_made in 2005, the country’s military was comprised of approximately 690,000 troops. The DRP2020 envisions a significant reduction in personnel, primarily from the land forces, to bring total military manpower to 500,000 troops by the end of 2020. As of this writing, the ROK military officially consists of 560,000 troops, suggesting the Ministry of Defence is on schedule to achieve the envisioned personnel cuts. Officially, the reason for this reduction in personnel is South Korea’s aging population and declining birth rate, which together is expected to ensure that external page36% of South Koreans will be over the age of 65 by 2030call_made.

But a downsized military will have implications for the future of the Korean Peninsula. external pageA 2003 RAND studycall_made indicates that successful nation-building exercises have generally required a ratio of 20 soldiers per thousand civilians in the host country. Where this ratio is not met or exceeded, the military deployment fails to stabilize the host country. external pageJames Dobbinscall_made,external pageRAND’scall_made former head of international and security policy, external pagedeterminedcall_made that a ratio of 40 soldiers per thousand civilians is imperative to ensuring stability while nation-building is ongoing. Based on these recommendations, in the event of a regime collapse in North Korea, the ROK would require a force of approximately one million troops in order to secure a peaceful unification. This follows by applying the ratios identified in the two aforementioned RAND studies to the entire population of the Korean Peninsula, namely because regime collapse in the North and the prospect of unification could also result in civil disorder in the South.

In such a scenario, it is doubtful that South Korean authorities would take such drastic actions as those seen early in the American occupation of Iraq, completely demobilizing military forces. Rather, some elements of the external pageKorean People’s Armycall_made would be incorporated into the stabilization force, depending on the nature of the regime collapse in North Korea. Due to an aggressive expansion to its military forces in the 1980s and 1990s, external pageNorth Korea boasts a force of just over 900,000 troopscall_made. But ROK military planners certainly would not assume the full integration of its neighbour’s forces into a stabilization force. If the ROK is serious about unification, its defence reforms would reflect the need to maintain a sizeable land force in order to bring about that unification with a minimum of reliance upon former North Korean forces.

With a force half that required to ensure stability during unification, it is very likely that ROK leaders have abandoned hope that Korea will be unified in the next few decades. While disconcerting on its own, this perhaps reflects a gradual shift in ROK foreign policy away from the United States and its allies. In July 2014, external pagePresident Xi Jinping of Chinacall_made made a state visit to Seoul, just two days after Japan adopted reforms to its Constitution that are widely unpopular among the South Korean public. The year prior, external pagePresident Park Geun-hyecall_made traveled to Beijing, primarily to discuss the further deepening of economic ties between China and South Korea. Bilateral trade is already $270 billion per year, surpassing the volume of trade South Korea has with both the United States and Japan combined. Given the overwhelming importance of China as a market for Korean goods, and given China’s vested interest in the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, ROK leaders appear to have “cut their losses” and determined that unification will only occur at the behest of China.

Though this increasingly cozy relationship between China and the ROK is a negative development in Asia-Pacific affairs for the US, the DRP2020 is not all bad news. The reforms envision a greater capacity for expeditionary operations on the part of ROK forces. The mass infantry previously generated by South Korean conscription was best suited to territorial defence or a convoluted nation-building exercise in the North. Substantial forces were deployed in recent years in support of US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and smaller but no less valuable commitments were made to multilateral operations in Lebanon, Haiti, and South Sudan. But the procurement of new technology will allow the ROK military to intervene more quickly and efficiently in “hot spots” around the world. For example, theexternal pageDokdo-class amphibious assault shipcall_made produced for the external pageROK Navycall_made by external pageHanjin Heavy Industriescall_made will have the capacity to carry almost 750 marines onboard as well as numerous armoured vehicles. A complement of 15 transport helicopters carried by the vessel could be used to rapidly deploy troops from the Dokdo-class to locations further inland where a troop presence is needed. More generally, the ROK is pursuing a “blue water” navy, moving away from its traditional reliance on a force of coastal patrol vessels strictly concerned with dissuading North Korean or Chinese aggression at sea.

President Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping are greeted by students of Eunpyeong Elementary School at Cheong Wa Dae, South Korea (Photo: Park Hyun-koo / The Korea Herald).

The shape of things to come may be reflected in a 2011 incident involving a South Korean destroyer. After Somali pirates seized a Norwegian-owned and South Korean-operated tanker in the external pageGulf of Adencall_made, the external pageROKS Choe Yeongcall_made was deployed. This external pageChungmugong Yi Sun-sin-class destroyercall_made, supported by elements of the US Navy, saw to the rescue of the tanker’s crew, a boarding action resulting in the death of eight pirates and the capture of five others. Though not formally a part of external pageNATO’s Operation Ocean Shieldcall_made, the ROKS Choe Yeong had cooperated with its forces to pursue the shared goal of fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Such a mission would not have been possible for the ROK Navy to accomplish prior to the recent program of modernization. But this also seems to reflect the kind of mission the ROK military is preparing for beyond 2020 and suggests three criteria ROK military planners will now have in mind. First, commit only when South Korean interests are directly affected. Second, engage against asymmetric threats. Third, commit only to operations conducted under a multilateral framework.

All in all, DRP2020 undermines the ROK’s reliability as an American ally. As it now lacks the capacity to pursue unification without considerable external assistance, the ROK also risks subordinating itself to the role of a Chinese client state. This is the greatest failure of the US’ diplomatic efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. The capacity for the ROK to contribute to counter-piracy or stabilization operations elsewhere in the world will have to be consolation enough.