Russia: a Euro-Pacific Power?
16 Sep 2014
By Margarete Klein for SWP
This article is an excerpt of the Research Paper “Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? Goals, Strategies and Perspectives of Moscow’s East Asia Policy” originally published by the external pageGerman Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) on 8 September 2014. You can access the full PDF external pagehere.
Goals, Strategies and Perspectives of Moscow’s East Asia Policy
Russia has been working since the mid-2000s to expand the hit herto neglected East Asian pillar of its foreign relations. In view of the rise of China and America’s “pivot to Asia”, Russia risks politically marginalisation even as the region becomes increasingly important both globally and for Russia itself. If Russia wishes to survive as a major global power, it will have to establish a presence in precisely this “key region” of the twenty first century. The East Asian nations are increasingly important for the Russian economy too: trade with them already exceeds Russia’s trade volume with the post- Soviet states. Moscow’s new concentration on East Asia is also driven by domestic political motives, as its underdeveloped eastern regions can only be modernised in cooperation with the East Asian nations.
Russia’s new East Asia policy is pursuing ambitious goals. Seeking to establish itself as a “Euro-Pacific power” ultimately means regaining its role as a great power in the region. Initial successes are indeed visible, but the country also faces major obstacles that will prove insurmountable, at least in the medium term.
Militarily, Russia cannot avoid falling ever further behind the United States and China, efforts to modernise its Eastern Military District notwithstanding. In view of its lack of aircraft carriers and foreign bases, Moscow’s very limited ability to project power beyond its immediate border region curtails its possibilities to operate as a stabilising power, especially in South East Asia.
Politically Moscow is pursuing a dual strategy in East Asia. Firstly, it is developing its “strategic partnership” with China. But, secondly it has ceased to rely, as it did in the 1990s, solely on Beijing to act as its “door opener” in East Asia. As the bilateral balance of power has shifted against it, the Kremlin has come to regard that approach as counterproductive. China is not prepared to accept Russia as an equal partner in East Asia, and willing to grant it at best the role of a junior partner. In order to secure and expand its options, Russia is therefore seeking to diversify its political relations and to join the most important regional institutions. Initial successes have been achieved: participation in the East Asia Summit, membership of the Asia- Europe.
Meeting (ASEM) and closer political relations with Vietnam and Japan. Here Russia has profited from the changing strategic environment in East Asia, where China’s striving for hegemony and jostling with the United States give cause for concern to many countries in the region. But seen overall, Russia’s East Asia policy appears in many respects to be more a sum of bilateral relations than a coherent regional strategy. Another sign of this is that Moscow has yet to develop ideas of its own about how to involve the United States in its East Asia policy. Until that happens Moscow’s diversification will remain incomplete. The deterioration of Russian Western relations caused by the Ukraine crisis places the Kremlin under growing pressure, making it unlikely in the short to medium term that Moscow and Washington will develop an “Asian perspective” for one another or turn to forward looking mutual interests and cooperation opportunities. The Ukraine crisis has also thrown a spanner into the rapprochement with Japan.
At a more fundamental level, Russia’s East Asia policy lacks stable political, societal and economic foundations. Bilateral relations remain restricted to the highest political level and as such vulnerable to political mood swings.
The Achilles’ heel of Russia’s East Asia ambitions, however, is the economic sphere. Although complementarities with the East Asian economic space do exist, including geographical proximity, transport routes to Europe and its wealth of resources, Russia has largely failed to leverage these qualitatively for its modernisation efforts. While at first glance impressive, the figures for growth in trade cannot hide the fact that the import/export structure is consolidating to Russia’s disadvantage. In the first place its future appears to be as raw material supplier for East Asia. Nor has it to date succeeded even in strategically important areas such as energy and arms sales in turning economic cooperation into political influence.
Russia’s turn to East Asia also raises questions for Germany and the European Union, such as the extent to which this is associated with a shift away from the Kremlin’s traditional fixation on the Euro Atlantic space. When Moscow began expanding its relations with East Asia in the second half of the 2000s, the move was conceived initially as no more than a supplement to its policy towards Europe and United States, in the sense of a long mooted multi-vectoral foreign policy. But now during President Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, Russia’s East Asia policy is increasingly presented as an alternative to rapidly deteriorating relations with the European Union and the United States. But Moscow is quickly discovering the limits of this approach. Its political and economic position in the east is too weak to successfully play an “East Asian card” against Europe. The nations of Europe remain the Russian economy’s most important modernisation partners. Moreover, any turn away from Europe would risk Russia becoming sucked into a junior partnership with China.
In view of the tensions in Russian -Western relations, cooperation in relation to East Asia appears out of the question for the moment. But in the medium to long term the question will arise whether for example Russia, the European Union and the United States could work together there. Ultimately, on a more general level, they certainly share interests in a multilateral containment of growing Chinese power, in establishing a functioning regional security system, and in peaceful resolution of the North Korea conflict and the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. In order to explore the possibilities for practical cooperation in these fields, the political dialogue should first be intensified at both the expert level and the political.
Russia’s New East Asia Discourse: Backgrounds, Objectives, Roles
Geographically speaking, more of the Russian Federation is Asian than European. Despite three quarters of its territory lying in Siberia and the Far East, Moscow long neglected Asia in its foreign policy thinking and actions. Much too dominant was the relationship with its own sphere of influence, the post-Soviet space, and with the West as the most important modernization partner and central “other” in Russian identity discourse.
Only since the second half of the 2000s has Asia moved to the top of Russia’s foreign policy priorities, although the 2013 foreign policy concept, like its predecessors from 2000 and 2008, names the region only fourth place, after CIS, European Union and United States. [1] But in many ot her pronouncements President Vladimir Putin accords precedence to Asia. [2] Especially in Moscow’s foreign policy activities, a new eastward dynamism can be observed since mid-2000s.
This is reflected in expanded bilateral relations, strengthened participation n in multilateral regional institutions and the expansion of bureaucratic and academic resources. For example the Russian foreign ministry now has as many departments for Asia as for the CIS, while research centres for the Association of Southeast Asian Na tions (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) were set up at Russian universities in 2009 and 2010 respectively. [3]
In parallel to this, an intense debate on Asia policy began in Russia during the second half of the 2000s, and was given another boost by the Russian APEC presi dency in 2012. But it was conducted less by regional scholars than by high ranking politicians such as Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey Lavrov and foreign policy experts like Sergey Karaganov, Fyodor Lukyanov, Vyacheslav Nikonov and Dmitri Trenin. That is indicative of the fundamental character of the debate, in the sense of a realignment of Russian foreign policy. [4]
The regional focus here is East Asia. The Russian Asia debate and policy have traditionally looked above all to North East Asia (China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula), which is where both the most important trading partners and the biggest security challenges are to be found. But since the mid-2000s Moscow has also devoted greater attention to South-East Asia, meaning the ASEAN states. Growing trade relations play a role here, as do multilateral processes within and emanating from the subregion, which Russia uses as a gateway for a greater presence in East Asia in general. The study acknowledges this prioritisation andconcentrates on Russian East Asia policy. [5] Russia’s New East Asia Discourse: Backgrounds, Objectives, Roles relationship to the United States, as the region’s most important external actor, is also examined.
The origins of the new debate are to be found in two developments. The first of these is the already noted leap in the importance of East Asia, both globally and in relation to Russia. Geopolitically this is reflected primarily in the growing power of China and in the realignment of US foreign policy under President Obama. As well as asserting its regional power ever more confidently and playing a growing global role, Beijing it is also able to shift the balance of bilateral relations with Moscow in its favour. For the first time in its history Russia is now dealing with an eastern neighbour that threatens to become stronger than itself or has already done so. In the words of Dmitri Trenin this represents an “earthquake” in foreign policy thinking. [6]
In autumn 2011, Washington in turn initiated its “pivot” to Asia, which should be understood as an expansion of its political and military capabilities and its regional leadership role. Most Russian experts and politicians see the altered strategic circumstances as posing a central challenge for their own foreign policy, namely that Moscow could become even more politically marginalised in East Asia than it is already.[7] At the same time the Ukraine crisis has increased the importance of East Asia forRussian foreign policy. In a context of deteriorating relations with the European Union and the UnitedStates, good relations with key East Asian actors Japan, South Korea and ASEAN as well as China are crucial for the Kremlin to avert any appearance of international isolation.
In the economic sphere Russian politicians and experts like wise note the growing importance of East Asia. The region is lauded as the “powerhouse of growth” [8] or “vital center” [9] of the world economy.
In the longer term economic power is expected to shift away from the traditional growth engines of the United States and Europe, which have been lastingly weakened by the economic and financial crisis, gravitating instead to the growing economies in the east. [10] The East Asian nations have become increasingly important for Russia since about 2000, and their share of Russian foreign trade now in fact exceeds that of the post-Soviet states. Economically, too, the Ukraine crisis increases East Asia’s weight, with the threat of European and US economic sanctions spurring Moscow to intensify its search for economic alternate ves to the east.
Secondly, the new Russian focus on East Asia is motivated by domestic pressures. The Kremlin views the situation in its own eastern territories–Siberia, and the Far East –with rising concern. [11]Socioeconomic and security problems such as depopulation, high unemployment, low productivity and great dependency on raw material exports intertwine in a specific manner here. And the economic orientation of the eastern regions has changed since the Soviet era. These days they look less to Europe an Russia than to their East Asian neighbours. Therein lies an opportunity, but also a risk. Either there will be a “dual integration”, in the sense of Russia’s eastern regions successfully modernising through integration with the East Asian economic spac e and thus becoming an additional resource for a successful Asia policy. But it is also possible that Siberia and the Far East will collapse to become a “double periphery”, leaving these regions functioning as nothing more than raw material suppliers for East Asia and economically (and in future potentially politically) decoupled from the rest of the country. [12]
Many participants in the Russian East Asia discourse criticise Moscow’s failure to develop any coherent policy to address the region’s increasing w eight. They demand that better use be made of this neglected “reserve” [13] of foreign policy and call for a strategy to secure Russia a “worthy place” in East Asia, as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov put it. [14] Out of the statements of experts and politicians in volved in the discourse, it is possible to filter out fundamental objectives. The minimum objective is to prevent any further erosion and marginalisation of Russian power in East Asia, as this could lead to a loss of autonomy, for example through being forced into a “junior partnership” with China. The maximum goal discussed is a significant strengthening of the Russianposition in the region, in economic, political and military terms. [15]In fact a new moniker has been coined to describe this: Russia should establish itself as a “Euro-Pacific power”. [16]
Although the term is heard only in expert circles, it also highlights the Kremlin’s regional ambitions. Unlike the post-Soviet space, the issue in East Asia is not regional dominance. Historically Moscow has never possessed a firm sphere of influence there and today it certainly lacks the material and immaterial wherewithal to justify any such claim. What Russia’s leaders do strive for, however, is a position as an independent pole in a multipolar regional system, as an equal with the other major powers of East Asia. [17] Here models and structures from the international level are transposed to the East Asian region. At the same time it is hoped that a better position in East Asia will re inforce Russia’s claim to be a major global power. It is taken for granted that Moscow will only be able to maintain that status if it can establish itself as a decisive actor in what is seen as the key region of the twenty first century, the Asia Pacific. [18] This means that Moscow’s East Asia policy is not only about pursuing concrete political, economic (and security) interests affecting the region, but also the superordinate objectives of international status and influence.
To what extent is Moscow in a position to realize its amb itions? What capabilities does it possess, what strategies and instruments does it apply? Where have successes been observed and what factors hinder implementation? In order to answer these questions, in the following Russian East Asia policy is analysed in three dimensions: the military, the political and the economic. The criteria of the great power role are the yardstick. To what degree can Russia fulfil this in East Asia? A great military power is characterised not only by the capacity to repel dangers and threats on its own, but also to project power at a regional scale. Politi cally great powers exert decisive influence in all the central questions affecting the region, either de facto or through membership of regional institutions. They are capable of influencing the regional order and the interactions of other states, and their status is acknowledged by the other actors. Finally, as far as the field of the economy is concerned, great powers account for a significant share of the foreign trade of the other countries in their region and are in a position to exert decisive influence on economic relations and regional economic processes. [19]
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[1] “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official website, 12 February 2013, external pagehttp://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D
[2]In a programmatic essay shortly before the 2012 presidential election and a speech to Russian diplomats in July 2012, Putin in both cases moved straight from relations with the post-Soviet space to the relationship with Asia. Vladimir Putin, “Rossiia i menyayushchisiia mir” [Russia and the changing world], Moskovskie Novosti, 27 February 2012; “Meet-ing with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives in International Organisations”, President of Russia, official website, 9 July 2012, external pagehttp://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4145
[3] An ASEAN Centre was set up at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 2009 ( external pagehttp://asean.mgimo.ru) and an APEC Centre at the Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in 2010 (external pagehttp://www.apec-center.ru).
[4] The most important academic and policy advice contributions are: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), “Going East: Russia’s Pacific Strategy”, Russia in Global Affairs, 25 December 2010, external pagehttp://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Going-East-Russias-Asia-Pacific-Strategy-15081; “TheYear 2010: Was Russia Looking to the East?”,International Affairs (Moscow), 57, no. 2 (2011): 168–87; Oleg Barabanov and Timofei Bordachev, Toward the Great Ocean, or the New Globalization of Russia(Moscow, July 2012), external pagehttp://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Toward_great_ocean_eng.pdf ; Dmitry Trenin, “Euro-Pacific Nation”, Russia in Global Affairs, 24 March 2003, external pagehttp://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_639 . The central contributionsby leading politicians include: Sergey Lavrov, “The Rise of Asia,and the Eastern Vector of Russia’s Foreign Policy”, Russia in Global Affairs, 2006, no.3, 68–80; Alexey Borodavkin, “Russia’sEastern Policy: Summing Up and Looking Forward”,Inter-national Affairs(Moscow)57, no. 2 (2011): 28–32; DmitryMedvedev, “Russia Must Look East”,Financial Times, 2 November 2012, external pagehttp://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/11/02/guest-post-by-dmitry-medvedev-russia-must-look-east/#axzz2Iz3gSf00.
[5]As part of the post-Soviet space, Central Asia is bracketed out of Russia’s Asia discourse. And although India is an important “strategic partner” and Afghanistan a crucial security factor, South Asia plays only a subsidiary role.
[6]Dmitri Trenin, “Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India”, in Strategic Asia 2011–12: AsiaResponds to Its Rising Powers–China and India, ed. Ashley J. Tellis,Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough (Seattle and Washington,D.C., 2011), 227–36 (227).
[7]Sergey Karaganov, “Russia’s Asian Strategy”,Russia in GlobalAffairs, 2 July 2011, external pagehttp://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Russias-Asian-Strategy-15254 ; “The Year 2010: Was Russia Looking tothe East?” (see note 4 ).
[8] Dmitry Medvedev, “Excerpts fromTranscript on Meeting of the Far East’s Socioeconomic Development and Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Region Countries”, President of Russia, officialwebsite, 2 July 2010, external pagehttp://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/547
[9] Sergey Lavrov, “Towards Peace, Stability and Sustainable Economic Development in the Asia Pacific Region”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official website 5 October 2013, external pagehttp://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/D19A0531B380362544257BFB00259BE.
[10] “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” (see note1); “Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives in International Organisations” (see note2).
[11] “State Council Presidium Meeting”, President of Russia, official website, 29 November 2012, external pagehttp://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4680 .
[12] Natasha Kuhrt, “The Russian Far East in Russia’s Asia Policy: Dual Integration or Double Periphery?”Europe-AsiaStudies64, no. 3 (2012):471–93.
[13] “Russian-Chinese Section of the Valdai Club DiscussedRussia’s Strategy in Asia”, 4 December 2011, external pagehttp://valdaiclub.com/event/33780.html .
[14] Medvedev, “Excerpts from Transcript of Meeting”(see note 8).
[15] “The Year 2010: Was Russia Looking to the East?” (see note 4); “Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Repre sentatives in International Organisations” (see note 2).
[16] Dmitri Trenin first spoke of Russia as a “Euro-Pacificnation” in 2003. The term was adopted in the second half of the 2000s by experts close to the Kremlin, who united it with the concept of “power”. This anchored the term “Euro-Pacificpower” in Russia’s Asia discourse as a vision for its role in East Asia. Trenin, “Euro-Pacific Nation” (see note 4).
[17] Foreign Minister Lavrov emphasises that Russia seeks a “truly stable balance of power” in the Asia-Pacific region and must expand its role as a “important stabilizing factor” in the region. Lavrov, “Towards Peace, Stability and Sustainable Economic Development in the Asia Pacific Region” (see note9 ); The Russian Embassy in Canada, “The Interview of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov ‘Russia Will Become a Stabilizing Factor in the Asia-Pacific Region’”, press release, 6 February 2012, external pagehttp://www.rusembassy.ca/ru/node/656 . Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russian Perceptions and Policies in a Multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin”, International Relations of the Asia- Pacific 9, no. 2 (2009): 207–44.
[18] Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin (Basing-stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
[19] These criteria represent the outcome of a synthesis prepared by the author on the basis of the research literature on great and regional powers. While Russia does not fit into the category of (regional) “emerging powers”, studies on great powers often concentrate too strongly on the global level and lack detail on how they operate in regional contexts. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); Daniel Flemes, Dirk Nabers and Detlef Nolte, eds., Macht, Führung und Regionale Ordnung: Theorien und Forschungsperspektiven (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012); Detlef Nolte, “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics”, Review of International Studies36, no. 4 (2010): 881–901.