The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats
20 Oct 2014
By Andre LeSage for Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)
This article was external pageoriginally published as Strategic Forum No. 288 (September 2014) by external pageNDU Press for the external pageInstitute for National Strategic Studies (INSS).
Despite its reputation for peace and stability in a troubled region, the East African country of Tanzania is experiencing a rising number of militant Islamist attacks that have targeted local Christian leaders and foreign tourists, as well as popular bars and restaurants. These attacks, which began in 2012, rarely make the headlines of international media. However, they should serve as a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers to increase short-term engagement with Tanzanian officials and support for Tanzanian security agencies to preempt the emergence of a more significant threat to U.S. and international interests in East Africa.
Thus far, the attacks in Tanzania have been relatively unsophisticated. They have involved crude homemade explosives, handguns, and buckets of acid; they have been focused on poorly protected targets of opportunity; and they have not resulted in mass casualties. However, as events over the past few years in neighboring Kenya have demonstrated, today’s seemingly minor and manageable threats can evolve quickly into something far more lethal and intractable. In Kenya, similarly unsophisticated attacks only a few years ago have grown quickly, resulting in the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013, when 4 shooters killed 67 people and wounded 175 more; the discovery in March 2014 of a massive car bomb in Mombasa that could have killed scores more; and the massacre of more than 60 villagers in Lamu County in June 2014. Events such as these have thrown Kenya into a cycle of violence pitting national security forces against clandestine militant cells.
This paper provides an overview of the current threat posed by Islamist militants in Tanzania by tracing their evolution in the Tanzanian political context, identifying the major Islamist movements active in the country today, and assessing the spillover of al Shabab– and al Qaeda–associated threats from Somalia and Kenya. The paper concludes with recommendations that the United States pay closer attention to the situation in Tanzania, build Tanzanian capabilities to address current threat streams, and work closely with the governments in both mainland Tanzania and the Zanzibar islands to counter further radicalization.
The Tanzanian Context
Globally, Tanzania is known for its rich cultural his - tory, political stability, and increasingly vibrant economy. Politically, the country earned respect from international observers as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and a key regional force in the struggle against South African apartheid. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first president who served from 1964 to 1985, promoted national unity of the country’s 120 ethnic groups and emerged as one of Africa’s leading statesmen. The economy is primarily based on agriculture, infrastructure remains poor, and corruption is a significant problem. However, foreign direct investment is booming in the mining and oil exploration sectors. In addition, tourism opportunities abound—including safaris in the Serengeti, climbing on Mount Kilimanjaro, and the luxury beach resorts of Zanzibar.
Officially known as the United Republic of Tanzania, the country was formed through the union of main - land Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands (Unguja and Pemba), which lie approximately 20 miles off the coast. Tanzania has a population of approximately 48 million, divided roughly evenly between Christians and Muslims at 35 to 45 percent each, with a large segment of traditional animists making up the difference. Tanzania is not dominated by a single ethnic group. The largest tribe—the Sukuma, located around Lake Victoria—constitutes less than 20 percent of the population. Other tribes, including the Nyamwezi, Haya, Gogo, Ha, and Masaai, individually comprise less than 10 percent of the population.
Muslims—primarily from the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam—are scattered across the country and interspersed with non-Muslims in all major Tanzanian cities. That said, the largest concentrations of Muslims can be found in Zanzibar—where Muslims make up 95 percent of the population of 750,000 people—and the mainland Tanzanian coastline. Islam arrived in Tanzania from Arabia, resulting in dynastic settlements along the coast by the 13th century, and then spread inland along pre-colonial trade routes. Zanzibar—including the more populous island of Unguja and the smaller, poorer island of Pemba—was critical to this process as it became the seat for an Omani sultanate by the mid- 1800s and a main base for the slave trade deep into the mainland. European colonization—the British on Zanzibar and the Germans on the mainland—did little to disrupt the spread of Islam. In fact, “the diffusion of Islam in East Africa generally followed the establishment of railroads, and was facilitated by the fact that the Germans initially employed Muslims as officials, police, soldiers and teachers.”external page[i]
Control of mainland Tanganyika shifted from Germany to Britain during World War II. The territory then gained independence in December 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Zanzibar did not achieve in - dependence until December 1963. Its first government, a constitutional monarchy led by the Sultan of Zanzibar, was overthrown in an extremely violent coup by the Afro- Shirazi Party (ASP), which quickly merged Zanzibar with Tanganyika in 1964 to form the modern Tanzanian state. This was followed by the merger of the TANU and ASP parties to create Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, or the Party of the Revolution).
Tanzania was established by Nyerere along the lines of state corporatism, which was originally considered a mid-point between capitalism and Marxism. In the corporatist state, all interest groups—trade unions, women’s organizations, ethnic organizations, youth organizations, and even religious groups—are directly controlled by the government. The ideas behind state corporatism were that interest groups would still be represented, but a strong government able to guide economic and political development would be firmly in control.external page[ii]
Tanzania remained a single-party state under the CCM until multiparty elections were allowed in 1992, but the CCM’s rule continued unbroken until today. Since the CCM remains deeply intertwined with state institutions and retains its organized system of party representation from the village level up to the national level, it has been difficult for Tanzanian opposition parties to challenge the party’s dominance. However, in the run-up to national elections in 2015, cracks in CCM’s control are beginning to show, and political competition is becoming fiercer and occasionally violent.
Although several political parties exist,external page[iii] the primary challenges to CCM rule come from two parties: Chama Cha Wananchi (CUF, or the Civic United Front) and Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADE - MA, or the Party for Democracy and Progress). While the CCM is able to draw support from all parts of the country, the CUF emerged in Zanzibar—particularly the poorer and more religiously conservative island of Pemba—and Muslims remain its primary supporters. Although the CUF is working to build stronger support on the mainland, Zanzibar remains its base. After losing closely contested elections in Zanzibar to the CCM in 1995, 2000, and 2005, violent demonstrations occurred after CUF supporters decried vote-rigging by CCM politicians. In an attempt to avoid future conflict, a Government of National Unity was created for Zanzibar following a referendum in July 2010, effectively to share power between CCM and CUF leaders on the islands. As a result, following the 2010 elections, the CCM retained power in Zanzibar under President Ali Mohamed Shein, with long-time CUF leader Seif Sharif Hamad as his first vice president.external page[iv]
The other main opposition party, CHADEMA, is building its constituencies on the mainland among young people and other disenchanted voters, and it won 26 percent of the national vote in 2010. CHADEMA, as well as the CUF, is hoping for a much stronger showing in the 2015 elections. Several CCM leaders are positioning themselves to succeed the current president, Jakaya Kikwete, who has served his maxi - mum two terms in office. In addition, public frustration with CCM leaders is elevated following a series of high-profile (and high-value) corruption scandals and the sacking of four ministers in 2013 for human rights abuses committed by Tanzanian security forces involved in anti-poaching operations.external page[v] Efforts by the CCM to undermine its challengers have led to accusations of state-sponsored repression of opposition politicians, civic leaders, and journalists, the banning of opposition demonstrations, and a dangerous rise in political violence. The abduction and torture of party leaders have been reported, and a handrenade thrown into a CHADEMA rally in Arusha in 2013 killed four people.external page[vi]
Despite the formation of the Government of National Unity before the 2010 elections, the question of Zanzibar also remains a critical issue. Following 2 years of work, a Constitutional Review Commission, chaired by Joseph Warioba, has recommended changing the structure of the republic to a federation or “three government system.” According to this propos - al, Tanzania’s new structure would include one overall national government and two state governments—one for the mainland and one for Zanzibar. The proposal, however, remains highly controversial. Failure to find a significant degree of national consensus on the issue could further divide Tanzanians on political, regional, and religious lines.
external page[i] Jodi Vittori, Kristin Bremer, and Pasquale Vittori, “Islam in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat in the War on Terror?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 12 (December 2009), 1077.
external page[ii] Ibid., 1080.
external page[iii] These include the Civic United Front, Party for Democracy and Progress, Tanzania Labour Party, United Democratic Party, and National Convention for Construction and Reform.
external page[iv] For details on the Government of National Unity, see Mohammed Bakari and Alexander Makulilo, “Beyond Polarity in Zanzibar? The ‘Silent’ Referendum and the Government of National Unity,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 30, no. 2 (April 2012), 195–218; and Archie Matheson, “Maridhiano: Zanzibar’s Remarkable Reconciliation and Government of National Unity,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 6, no. 4 (November 2012), 591–612.
external page[v] Hanno Brankamp, “CCM’s Identity Crisis: Comebacks, Constitution and Corruption in Tanzania,” Think Africa Press, February 21, 2014.
external page[vi] See Nicholas Kulish, “Violent Episodes Grow in Tanzania, an African Haven,” The New York Times, June 30, 2013; and The Citizen, “Chaos Threat Looms Ahead of 2015 General Election,” May 7, 2014.