Qatar and the UAE in a Changing Middle East

ISN: A lot of attention has been directed in recent years on the expanding influence of Arab Gulf states such as Qatar and the UAE. What form has this influence taken?

Lisa Watanabe: The Arab uprisings, the vacuum created by a weakened Iraq, Egypt and Syria, and US reluctance to become embroiled in conflicts in the region, have generated an opening for Arab Gulf states to expand their influence in the MENA region. Some states, however, have been more successful at this than others.

In the early phase of the Arab uprisings, Qatar backed Islamist movements, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, in the expectation that they would become major stakeholders in the changing region. Doha also provided significant financial assistance to the countries in transition. Despite this generosity, the loss of influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in North Africa, as well as among the Syrian opposition, has left Qatar relatively marginalized and it now appears to be adopting a more discrete role.

By contrast, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have increased their influence, particularly in North Africa. Like Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among the most generous donors of foreign aid and financial assistance to the North African countries in transition, especially Egypt. Both Arab Gulf states have provided a lifeline to the Egyptian economy. While Qatar’s foreign aid assistance has not translated into increased influence in Cairo, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have had more success. This is largely because both countries have become erstwhile supporters of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and share the goal of weakening the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. Their support for el-Sisi serves to strengthen the position of the already influential Egyptian army. The UAE has even insisted that the Egyptian army implement its foreign aid projects.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE also appear to be attempting to facilitate Egypt´s return as major regional player. Saudi Arabia, for example, supported the Egyptian initiative to bring about a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the recent Gaza conflict and worked to undermine Qatar´s role as a mediator. The recent joint Egyptian-Emirati air strikes against Islamist militias in Libya also demonstrate the UAE´s role as an important Egyptian ally, with the possibility of becoming more involved in Libya. Indeed, a geo-strategic alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE is emerging, with the potential to influence regional developments.

What effects are Qatari and Emirati influence having throughout the region? What role did each play, for instance, in the Arab Spring? What role is each playing in the war against ISIS?

Qatar played an important role in garnering Arab League support for the NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011. It also participated in the mission itself, sending fighter jets and allegedly deploying its special forces to Libya. Doha also helped to provide weapons to rebel forces and training to rebel fighters. Most of Qatar´s support went to Islamists, often connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. Doha´s response to the civil war in Syria was initially more restrained than its reaction to the Libyan uprising. However, it subsequently took a firm position in favor of the opposition, imposing sanctions against the al-Assad regime and allegedly supplying weapons to the Free Syrian Army. Qatar hosts the Syrian National Council (SNC) – an overarching opposition body – within which it had sought to promote the Muslim Brotherhood. It also backed and hosted the subsequent creation of the broader Syrian National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which the SNC joined. Doha´s support for the popular uprisings in North Africa and Syria have, as mentioned, been characterized by an effort to foster strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood movements. Yet, Doha´s support for the transitions has been much broader than this, including generous foreign aid and financial assistance, and fuel.

Like Qatar, the UAE participated in the NATO military intervention in Libya. It sent fighter jets to enforce the NATO-led no-fly zone, as well as to carry out strikes against targets on the ground. It is also reported to have supplied rebel forces with weapons. The Emiratis have also been generous donors of foreign aid and providers of much needed cash to the countries in transition, becoming a particularly important player in Egypt following former President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster. The UAE has allied with Saudi Arabia in its staunch support for President el-Sisi. The anti-terrorist narrative in Egypt serves the UAE´s objective of weakening the Muslim Brotherhood and curtailing Salafi jihadism in North Africa. The recent joint Egyptian-Emirati air strikes against Islamist forces in Libya may be seen in this light.

Both Qatar and the UAE perceive ISIS as a threat to both state and regional security, which explains their participation in the US-led coalition. Thus far, their involvement has included launching airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria. The UAE is also hosting French and Australian military forces participating in operations against ISIS. Both the Qataris and Emiratis may also view military action as a means of eventually removing al-Assad from power and installing a more inclusive regime in Syria, which would serve their interest in undercutting Iran´s regional influence. Acting alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE also provides Qatar with an opportunity to mend fences. Despite fraught relations of late, these countries remain important regional allies.

How would you characterize the long-term strategic objectives of Qatar, the UAE and the Arab Gulf states in general? How successful have they been?

While there have been tensions between the Arab Gulf states in relation to their regional policies, they nevertheless share the goal of preserving the domestic status quo and promoting regional stability. What this implies in terms of a foreign and security policy response, of course, may differ from state to state, which is why tensions have emerged between them, particularly between Qatar and other Gulf Cooperation Council members. Given that there have been no successful popular uprisings in Arab Gulf states so far, they do appear to have been successful in preventing widespread domestic unrest that could pose a threat to their regimes. Bringing about regional stability, however, has proven much more challenging. While Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have demonstrated a willingness to intervene (even militarily) in the region, they have been unable to bring about their desired outcomes. This is most noticeable in the case of Qatar, which overestimated its capacities and damaged rather than improved its image.

The long-term strategic objectives of Qatar and the UAE, and the Arab Gulf states are above all to ensure regime survival, which is interrelated with regional dynamics. For the Emirati ruling elite, which views the UAE´s Muslim Brotherhood affiliate Islah (Reform), as well as its Shia minority, as a potential threat to domestic stability and regime survival, weakening the Muslim Brotherhood in the region and Iran´s regional influence are priorities.

While the Qatari ruling family does not view the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to domestic stability and regime legitimacy, its members are still intent on avoiding challenges to their rule, which means containing the possibility of a popular domestic uprising. Of course, this sits uncomfortably with Qatar’s support for popular uprisings in North Africa and Syria. However, the latter ought to be viewed as part of a foreign policy strategy to increase Qatar´s regional and international influence, rather than an embrace of popular uprisings in an unqualified sense.

To what extent are the foreign policies of these states being driven by declining American interest in the region? What are the implications of this dynamic for other regional players, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia?

Both Qatar and the UAE rely on the US security umbrella in the Gulf region, having formed close relations with the US following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, Qatari and Emirati ruling elites are increasingly concerned about whether they can rely on continued US commitment to Gulf security. This reflects a broader concern of ruling elites in Arab Gulf states in general, which stems from a fear of rapprochement between the US and Iran in the event of an agreement on Iran´s nuclear program, a subsequent increase of Iranian influence in the region, and increased US domestic energy production that may render the Gulf region strategically less important for Washington. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been uncharacteristically vocal about its frustrations with US Middle East policy, which reflect a deep-seated concern that the US does not take its security concerns seriously and that the US may back Iran as a regional hegemon in the wake of nuclear deal. Indeed, should a deal on Iran’s nuclear program be reached, Iran’s role in the region would significantly change, with Teheran possibly becoming an important US regional ally – a position that Saudi Arabia currently occupies.

To what extent are Qatar and the UAE typical ‘small states’? What insights can be gained from approaching their foreign policies from this perspective?

It may seem counter-intuitive to think of Qatar and the UAE as small states, given that they are wealthy, resource-rich countries. Yet, their power is issue-specific and both states occupy weaker positions within asymmetrical relations with bigger allies, namely Saudi Arabia and the US. Looking at their foreign policies through the lens of the small states literature illuminates how their weak positions have affected their foreign policy strategies. Qatar, for example, over the last decade or so, has sought to adopt the role of mediator and to enhance its international visibility as a means of gaining some degree of autonomy, primarily from Saudi Arabia. The UAE has, by contrast, sought to stay close to its larger ally, Saudi Arabia, as a means of ensuring its security.

The Arab uprisings and their aftermath have, nevertheless, seen both small states act in ways that one would not expect of them. Qatar abandoned its previous position and image as a quasi-neutral mediator in an attempt to boost its influence and standing. Part of its strategy has been to differentiate itself from the more conservative Saudi Arabia. However, the extent to which it is able to break out of its previous role as mediator and at the same time wield influence has been limited. The UAE’s increased interventionism is also uncharacteristic of a small state, as is the influence it is wielding in North Africa. The key to its current success appears to have much to do with the fact that it has found common cause with two larger regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.