An Interview with Paul Ingram, Executive Director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

BASIC is a transatlantic think tank with a specific focus on the global nuclear weapons debate. Could you tell us more about your mission?

BASIC is a small think tank with a big vision: a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. We are committed to our vision because nuclear weapons pose a continuing threat to international peace and security through brinkmanship, miscalculation, theft or accident. But barriers to progress - both to stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and to getting rid of the ones that already exist - still appear insurmountable. We seem trapped in a cycle of dependency on nuclear deterrence. The international commitments made to non-proliferation and disarmament risk becoming irrelevant. We need new thinking that overcomes the mistrust and fear.

By working solely on the nuclear weapons debate, we ensure that we stay focused on and engaged with this challenging issue. But we also remain adaptable as we develop new projects in new areas. We work in both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, with a specific expert focus on the UK, US, Europe and the Middle East. We aim to build confidence in a shared and sustainable security agenda by engaging with diverse perspectives in order to broaden the scope of the global nuclear weapons debate. Through our dialogue-based and inclusive approach, we seek to test traditional concepts of the role and value of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as a security safeguard, and to consider the collective security interests of non-proliferation and disarmament. We create space for new and diverse perspectives in the nuclear weapons debate by bringing in new disciplines and a next generation of forward thinkers.

BASIC has launched a new project called Next Generation. What's the rationale behind this and what are you trying to achieve?

The nuclear weapons debate has become cyclical, cynical and divisive: a political tug of war defined by limitations and deeply held assumptions, rather than by a drive for truly open-minded, creative dialogue. Grand statements are made in support of a world free of nuclear weapons, but there is clearly little confidence in moving in that direction and an expectation that others need to take the first steps. Decision-making over nuclear weapons is generally delegated to a community of initiated officials and corporations, which on occasion opens its doors to a handful of outsiders willing to speak a similar language and operate within the national security frame. Compounding this, within the nuclear community, nuclear weapons tend to be discussed as a stand-alone issue by a relatively exclusive group of technical experts who rarely question the salience of nuclear deterrence or the broader ramifications of their posture. This provides little space or incentive for the cross-fertilization of ideas, the exploration of broader context, and the participation of younger generations or the uninitiated. All of these are essential if we are to move beyond the Cold War frame that continues to dominate nuclear policy-making, and that hampers our ability to make progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Our Next Generation project aims to reframe the nuclear narrative by exploring how creative, multi-disciplinary collaboration can stimulate innovation and change. We host meetings, give presentations, and create factsheets and videos, to engage the next generation of forward-thinking global leaders and scholars. We do this to develop the debate on nuclear weapons in a manner that makes it more responsive to the concerns of others and achieves the goal of a world free of nuclear dangers.

Since 2011, BASIC has been running an independent, cross-party commission to examine the UK’s nuclear weapons policy and the question of Trident renewal. The final report was published this summer. What are some of the commission’s main recommendations?

This was an effort by BASIC to engage a representative sample of senior members of the British political and technical elite with deep and long experience relevant to the UK's nuclear deterrent in order to assess the evidence for change. We did not expect them to recommend a big shift in policy, but rather to clear a lot of the chaff from the debate and to distil the reasoning. We were not disappointed. The Commission met for over three years, received extensive evidence from a variety of sources and debated many of the issues extensively.

The Commission states that UK national security depends upon the health of the international system and reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. It agreed HMG needs to chart more credible paths towards global disarmament, in the context of a current crisis of confidence in the ability of the nuclear weapon states to disarm. It rejected several arguments in favor of renewing Trident, particularly as a general insurance policy against uncertainty or to back up our global influence, but agreed that Britain should retain nuclear weapons for deterrence against possible overwhelming threats from hostile nuclear-armed states and as a contribution to NATO. The Commission believed that the debate should therefore focus on the likelihood of these potential threats emerging, the utility of nuclear weapons in responding to them, how we can meet our obligations as a state brandishing nuclear weapons to the international community, and the most effective contribution we can make to the capabilities and cohesion of NATO.

The Commission did not spend a great deal of time assessing nuclear alternatives to the Trident ballistic missile submarine system, and felt under-qualified to challenge the view implied in the government's own Trident Alternatives Review that other systems were unproven and risky. It recommended a tightening of declaratory policy, that the UK would not threaten to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear weapons, or against the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons (at least with current available technologies). It recommends that nuclear weapon states discuss issuing simultaneous declarations that establish that the sole purpose of their arsenals is to deter the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. It also recommends the 2015 Defence and Security Review considers further changes to targeting and reductions in warhead numbers. Some Commissioners feared the four new submarines would be more reliable and therefore be seen as a step up in UK nuclear capability, and recommended that the government assess the case for three. The Commission was also divided over UK abandoning continuous patrolling, though there was agreement that there may be scope for greater coordination with the United States and France.

In your view, how did the Scottish independence referendum impact the debate on Britain’s nuclear deterrent? Has the ‘No’ vote halted a wider debate about Trident?

The debate on Trident received a huge boost from the Scottish referendum and received more coverage than it had in the last 30 years. The focus north of the border was on the symbolism of basing the British nuclear fleet in Scotland where the majority was opposed to nuclear weapons. There was, however, very little public engagement with the strategic arguments, and very little debate south of the border. There may be some opportunity to continue this process as we approach the General Election next May (held soon after the opening of the NPT Review Conference in New York). The new government will be giving the final go-ahead a year later for the construction of the new submarine fleet.

But debate is likely to be muted because the politics is not conducive to challenging the plans. The two main parties and the upstart UKIP right wing nationalist party are in favor of fully investing in the new systems, and the third party is currently in favor of a reduced system based upon the same technology.

But there are two clear caveats for anyone who might think the debate is over: First, the issue of cost is likely to be a heavy concern for the new government, and specifically for the Ministry of Defence going into the next ten years. Investment in Trident renewal comes at a very heavy cost to other capabilities. Second, whilst the margin for the No vote was bigger than some had been predicting (55% to 45%), it was still not decisive. The Scottish nationalists will undoubtedly be looking to push for another referendum in the next 10-15 years, well before any new submarines come into service, and so the uncertainty surrounding the project and the future of the Union remains.

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