Mark Galeotti on Russia’s ‘Turbulent’ 2014

ISN: In 2013, Vladimir Putin was beset by widely reported domestic challenges. How stable is Russia's internal political situation these days?

MGA: It is stable, but brittle. Stable in the sense that there is precisely neither opposition to Putin nor any coherent alternative--even the liberal movement has been divided by Crimea, in that even most of their number approve of the annexation. But brittle for the very same reasons: there are no social safety valves any more, nor is there any "loyal opposition" to provide an alternative that is nonetheless committed to maintaining the status quo. As a result, if there is some unexpected and serious blow - whether a health issue that incapacitates Putin or an economic crisis - there is the potential for either a rapid rise in public discontent that has no sanctioned way to be accommodated or, more likely, the fracturing of the elite coalition on which this regime rests.

What were some of the background factors that may have driven Russia’s actions in Crimea?

Essentially, it was a piece of opportunism. Having seen the Yanukovych regime fall, concerned about the potential fate of the Black Sea Fleet base in the Crimea if Ukraine drifted towards the West (something that was unlikely in the short- to medium-term, but which does seem to have been a genuine worry of Putin's), and conscious of the virtual collapse of the Ukrainian state, it seemed an easy move. At one stroke Kiev was warned, the fleet secured, and to Putin--and, frankly, the overwhelming majority of Russians--an historical wrong was righted, with all the dividends that brings for domestic popularity and legitimacy.

How has Russia (and specifically Putin) benefited from the annexation? Did it meet his objectives? Or has it created more problems than not?

Crimea was tactically brilliant, but strategically disastrous. It met Putin’s objectives, but he failed to properly consider all the wider implications. It has galvanized the West, brought a steadily-strengthening sanctions regime that will have serious political and above all economic implications, and is proving very expensive in terms of the direct federal subsidies needed for everything from providing basic services to bringing local standards of living up to Russian levels. It has created far, far more problems than it has solved.

For ordinary Russians, the impact is already noticeable, with prices rising more rapidly than wages (inflation is likely to hit 9% across 2014), many imported foods now unavailable (mainly because of Russian bans) and imports becoming especially expensive as the Ruble tumbles. However, the worst is yet to come. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has said that the country is losing $130 billion or more because of sanctions and falling oil prices, and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development is predicting that Russia will be in recession next year. Already that is leading to cuts in public services, even as the Kremlin continues to pour money into the military, developing Crimea and projects close to its heart such as expanding the RT foreign-language television network (its budget is growing by almost 30 percent in 2014).

How would you say Russia’s role as an international actor has evolved over the past few years?

Russia is now regarded not as ineffective but as toxic; it has shown that it can act, but above all as a spoiler. Its main tactic in eastern Ukraine, in Syria, and elsewhere is not to fix problems, nor even to build coalitions, but to create problems in the hope that this grinds down the will of the other party or parties until they decide that making some kind of deal with Moscow is the least-worse option. These are, in the short term, effective tactics, but this is the geopolitics of the protection racketeer and it wins no friends, earns no soft power. It has empowered those who say this current regime in the Kremlin is dangerous and can only be contained or, ultimately, confronted.

How successful have the Kremlin’s various propaganda campaigns been, particularly given their anti-Western, anti-US and anti-foreigner slants?

As with its wider policies, outside Russia itself, where the TV media in particular is all controlled or shaped by the Kremlin, Moscow's propaganda line is essentially intended not so much to make allies but to undermine the will and ability of other states to act against it. This ranges from encouraging anti-EU political parties in Europe to the efforts of RT and similar state propaganda channels to portray Western policy as self-interested and dangerous. An aspect of the effort to disrupt potential forces able to confine Russia also appears Putin's determination that its sovereignty--and sovereignty probably is the central aspect of his vision for the country--should not be confined by international institutions. He will use them when he can, undermine, filibuster and ignore them when he feels he must. Whether NATO will emerge from this crisis strengthened and reunited remains to be seen (the omens are at best mixed at the moment), but generally speaking, Putin does not believe that an international system he feels was created by the West to protect its own interests ought to constrain Russia.

What are some of the challenges that Putin will face in the coming year?

Ultimately, everything comes down to the economy. Even before sanctions and the slump in oil prices, it was clear that Russia was heading for lean times. Now, as the ruble tanks, the oil price shows no sign of recovering, and there is no hint of an early deal on Ukraine that would allow the West to relax the sanctions regime, the problem will be worse and sooner than anticipated. This will pose a series of challenges to Putin, but first and foremost how to distribute the pain. His social contract with the Russian people rests not on his nationalist rhetoric but the fact that under his rule (though not necessarily because of his policies) they have lived more comfortable lives than ever before, and had a reasonable prospect that life would continue to get better. If, as is likely, that changes then they will not be happy. Likewise, Putin's social contract with the elite has been that they are free to enrich themselves through embezzlement and corruption, in return for loyalty. If the former begins to become problematic, so will the latter. Finally, as resources shrink, intra-elite competition for them expands: will Putin, now surrounded by a much smaller and less inclusive inner circle, still be able to control these internal rivalries?

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