The South Sudanese Conflict and the Pirates of the Nile

This article was external pageoriginally publishedcall_made by external pageOffiziere.chcall_made on 1 February 2015. Republished with permission.

Not since the rule of the external pagePtolemaic dynastycall_made in Egypt, more than two millennia ago, has piracy on the Nile River been a significant issue. But the threat of piracy may soon emerge as a critical new aspect to the external pageSouth Sudanese conflictcall_made in 2015. Although the external pageUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugeescall_made will external pagecontinue to airlift internally displaced persons and refugeescall_made, the external pageWorld Food Programcall_made and other international aid agencies have external pageindicatedcall_made that barges on the Nile River and airdrops are cheaper alternatives to airlifting food aid and equipment. Barge convoys have not previously been possible due to the close of the border between Sudan and South Sudan following the latter’s declaration of independence in 2011, but external pagethis restriction was lifted by the Sudanese authoritiescall_made in early 2014 and aid may now flow freely down the Nile to conflict-affected communities.

This new traffic on the Nile external pagehas already come under attackcall_made. In April 2014, a barge convoy en route to the UN base in external pageMalakalcall_made, South Sudan, came under small arms fire. Rocket propelled grenades fired at the convoy reportedly wounded four crew members and UN peacekeepers, imperiling delivery of 65,000 kilograms of food rations, 372,000 litres of diesel fuel, and other important supplies. Although this has been the only reported attack on a Nile convoy to date, the security situation on this waterway affords ample opportunity for piracy in the future.

For example, rogue elements of the Sudanese Navy could potentially interfere with aid shipments on the Nile. Although much of Sudan’s maritime forces are stationed at naval bases on the Red Sea coast, the country does have approximately 16 inshore patrol vessels which could just as well raid supply convoys as defend them. For its part, the external pageSudan People’s Liberation Armycall_made (SPLA), which functions as the newly independent Republic of South Sudan’s military, does not possess any formal maritime forces. As some recent external pageeconomic and sociological research has indicatedcall_made, an increase in legitimate economic activity in a given area without a proportional increase in security presence can lead to a rise in criminal activity, particularly directed toward exploiting the increase in the aforementioned legitimate commerce. The lack of professional maritime forces on the Nile suggests that little could be done to save a UN barge convoy were it to be faced with a determined enemy.

Both the SPLA and the external pageSudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Oppositioncall_made (SPLM-IO) denied involvement in the April 2014 attack and it can also be said that both parties are still bound by external pagethe 1995 Agreement on Ground Rules in South Sudancall_made, which specifically prohibits attacks on humanitarian convoys. But it is difficult to ensure the Ground Rules are upheld by all the parties to an intra-state conflict, especially when governance is weak among both South Sudan’s internationally recognized authorities in external pageJubacall_made and the rebel forces. In the 2014 edition of the external pageFund for Peace’s Fragile States Indexcall_made, South Sudan is listed as the world’s worst failed state, where internal disorder is even deeper than that seen in Syria or the Central African Republic. Under such conditions, splinter groups are constantly being formed and disenfranchised members of the SPLA or SPLM-IO could readily undertake piratical activities if presented with the opportunity.

Perhaps the best means by which to stave off a pirate threat on the Nile is for concerned Western states to invest in enhanced maritime capabilities for Uganda. This landlocked East African state nonetheless possesses inshore patrol vessels to maintain security on those sections of the Nile River and external pageLake Victoriacall_made within Ugandan borders. The Marine Wing of the external pageUgandan People’s Defence Forcecall_made possesses eight riverine patrol vessels, each of which with a displacement of less than 100 tons. Given external pageprevious remarks by Ugandan officialscall_made regarding counter-piracy operations in the external pageGulf of Adencall_made and the role of Ugandan forces in support of the external pageAfrican Union Mission in Somaliacall_made (AMISOM), it is clear that there is a political will in Uganda to see an African-led response to piracy. Much as external pageCanada donated 105 armoured personnel carrierscall_made to the external pageAfrican Union Mission in Sudancall_made (AMIS) in 2005, inshore patrol vessels could be donated to the external pageUN Mission in South Sudancall_made (UNMISS) with the understanding that these will be primarily manned by Ugandan troops already familiar to some extent with policing the Nile.

Uganda external pagehas been accusedcall_made of interfering in the South Sudan conflict, supporting the SPLA while calling for reconciliation with the SPLM-IO. But the continued presence of Western diplomatic offices in Juba suggests Uganda is not alone in its support of the SPLA and external pagePresident Salva Kiircall_made. It would be unfair and impractical for potential donor countries to exclude Ugandan forces from a maritime component to UNMISS. Furthermore, inshore patrol vessels restricted to escorting barge convoys would not afford Ugandan forces any opportunity to further intervene in the South Sudan conflict, functioning primarily as a deterrent to those groups which might otherwise see aid shipments as targets of opportunity.

This would not address the threat posted to UN barge convoys as they pass through Sudanese waters, unfortunately. As mentioned previously, it is not only South Sudan’s section of the Nile that can be dangerous but Sudanese authorities would most certainly object to the presence of Ugandan forces so far north on the Nile. Without escorts for part of the voyage, attacks could still occur and the donation of the inshore patrol vessels to UNMISS or directly to Uganda might accordingly be seen by potential donors as a futile act. To make matters worse, in a crisis scenario whereby aid is airlifted to an Egyptian airbase rather than to a locale in Sudan or South Sudan, the barge convoy would also be unescorted on the Egyptian section of the Nile. Attacks by Egyptian-based terrorists or pirates would not be unthinkable. As recently as October 2014, Islamist militants launched a series of attacks in external pageEgypt’s Sinai Peninsulacall_made, external pagereportedly killing 33 Egyptian security personnelcall_made.

Clearly, the Nile is becoming an increasingly unsafe waterway, just as UN agencies are looking to minimize costs associated with delivering humanitarian aid. Yet barge convoys may be the safest option available when one considers the risks associated with airlifting or airdropping aid. In December 2012, external pagethe SPLA reportedly shot downcall_made a clearly marked UN helicopter conducting reconnaissance in the eastern external pageJongleicall_made region of South Sudan. In August 2014, another UN helicopter was shot down, likely by SPLM-IO forces although an external pageinvestigation into the incident is ongoingcall_made. UNMISS aircraft come under attack from time-to-time, making airdrops and airlifts risky indeed. In comparison, the April 2014 attack on the Malaka-bound barge convoy may seem to UN officials a relatively small price to pay in the fight against famine and disease in South Sudan. If that is the case, it is imperative that patrol vessels be obtained to defend White Nile ports in South Sudan like external pageRenkcall_made, Shambe, and Malakal. This gesture would prevent UNMISS from inadvertently contributing to the instability of its host country.