No Easy Solutions for Ending India’s Bodo Conflict

27 Feb 2015

Why does the State of Assam in India continue to experience outbursts of Bodo separatist violence? Anshuman Behera’s answer points to New Delhi’s decision to privilege military force over meaningful dialogue with the region’s militant groups.

India has recently experienced an upsurge in violence in Assam’s Bodo Territorial Area District (BTAD). Over the course of two days in December 2014, the IK Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S) executed 76 people that it believed were responsible for the death of three of its militants at the hands of Indian security forces. Prior to this, the same outfit was also responsible for the deaths of 41 Bengali speaking Muslims as punishment for not voting for Bodo People’s Front candidates in the 2014 general elections.

These are just the latest victims in a violent campaign that dates back to the early 1990s. Since then, militants agitating for a greater recognition of Bodo rights and identity have claimed several hundred lives and caused the displacement of thousands. The Indian government’s most recent response, ‘Operation All Out’, is currently hunting down NDFB-S militants and attempting to seize their illegal weapons.

So, who are the Bodo militants, what are their specific aims, and how close is New Delhi to resolving this decades-old conflict?   

Origins

The Bodos currently make up 40% of the tribal population of Assam, a statistic that makes them the state’s largest ethnic grouping.  Their fight for greater political autonomy and economic rights dates back to the post-colonial era, and was initially spearheaded by organizations like the Plain Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) and Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC). In 1967, the PTCA made the first demand for a separate Bodo territory known as  Udayachal. This was scaled back in 1987 after the ABSU’s call for a ’50-50 division of Assam’ gathered momentum. Six years later, both the BPAC and ABSU signed the Bodo Accord with the national and regional government. This endorses the formation and election of a Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) that covers the ‘contiguous geographical areas between the River Sankosh and River Pasnoi’. However, the accord failed to demarcate the boundary of the proposed BAC, which eventually resulted in increased agitation and the subsequent formation of militant outfits like the NDFB and Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT).

Formed in 1996, the BLT has three core objectives: the creation of a separate province within Indian Union of Bodoland; the creation of an autonomous district council on the south bank of Brahmaputra River, and the inclusion of Bodos living in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam in the external pagesixth schedule of the constitution of India. Once known as the Bodo Security Force (BSF), the NDFB was originally focused on the liberation of Bodoland from Indian expansionism and occupation and the creation of an independent socialist state. Both groups were responsible for the deaths and displacement of thousands of civilians throughout the 1990s.  

Things started to change around the turn of the century when the BLT negotiated a unilateral ceasefire with authorities in July 1999, followed by a formal surrender in 2003. This led to the signing of the second Bodo Accord and the formation of the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC), an organization that promotes ‘the economic, educational and linguistic aspirations and the preservation of land-rights socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos’. It also resulted in the BLT transforming into a legitimate political party— the Bodo People’s Front (BPF) – which currently dominates the BTC.

The NDFB initially shunned the ballot box and remained committed to advancing the Bodo cause with violence. This changed in 2005 when it also entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Assam and Indian governments. However, the organization split in half in 2008 after Ranjan Daimary, the NDFB President, was uncovered as the mastermind behind a series of bomb attacks throughout Assam. The splinter faction (known as NDFB-RD) continued its militant activities until it finally declared a unilateral ceasefire in 2011 following the arrest of Daimary and associates by Indian and Bangladeshi security forces.

Yet, this was by no means the end of NDFB-related violence in Assam. In November 2012, I K Songbijit, the head of the Bodoland Army (the armed wing of the NDFB-RD), formed a ‘nine member council’. Under its leadership, the now NDFB-S remains in an armed struggle with the national and regional governments, and is recognized by security forces as one of the most lethal militant outfits currently operating inside Assam. That’s because the group is increasingly funding its activities through extortion, particularly along the Bhutan-Assam border. In addition, the NDFB-S also makes demands for a share of development projects in BTAD areas, and also ‘collects taxes’ from tea estate owners.

Beyond identity

However, the Bodo insurgency is about more than safeguarding an identity and securing separate a homeland. Access to natural resources is also a major factor behind the Bodos’ struggle with Assam and New Delhi. During the colonial era, the British brought ethnic minorities known as Adivasis to Assam,  especially from Bihar, West Bengal and Odisha,  and assigned them small pieces of land in exchange of their work in the tea estates. As these Adivasis acquired more land over time, they came to be perceived as outsiders and enemies by aggrieved local Bodos. Conflict between the Bodos and Adivasis intensified in the early 1970s following the influx of Bengali-speaking Muslims from Bangladesh.  

Adding to the Bodos’ grievances are perceptions that the BTC is biased towards the region’s non-Bodo community. They point to the BTC Act’s failure to ‘disallow any citizens from acquiring land either by way of inheritance, settlement or by any other way of transfer’ as evidence that the body is safeguarding non-Bodo property rights at the expense of the indigenous community. And because the BTC is perceived as acting brazenly in favor of the non-Bodos, groups like the NDFB-S have opportunities to build on their support base and launch further attacks against their neighbors.

In response, the Adivasis have formed their own armed groups to counter the threats posed by Bodo militants. These include the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), the Birsa Commando Force (BCF) and several other groups. Beyond defending their rights and property from Bodo attacks, these groups also feed off disputes between Bodo and non-Bodo representatives on the BTC.  Many non-Bodos feel that they are not adequately represented by this administrative body, a situation which adds further fuel to sporadic outbursts of violent confrontation with Bodo militants.   

Difficult times ahead

So why have successive national and regional governments failed to address the Bodos’ grievances? Part of the answer lies in the continued use of force at the expense of meaningful dialogue. While security operations like ‘All Out’ might bring temporary relief from militant Bodo activity, they are not backed up by multi-party talks or negotiations. This means that the warring parties continue to lack a more nuanced understanding of either sides’  grievances and vested interests. Consequently, dialogue is needed that brings together all the stakeholders in the Bodo conflict. This must be accompanied by the disarmament of all militant groups and stemming the flow of arms into Assam from neighboring areas.

However, the challenges facing future multi-party talks should not be underestimated. Calls for a separate Bodo homeland will continue to face resistance from non-Bodo communities fearful of the potential impact it might have on their rights. Not pushing for an independent Bodo territory might increase the sense of insecurity felt by some ethnic Bodos. Resolving this dilemma not only requires constructive dialogue, but also innovative thinking. Yet, given New Delhi’s previous track record in dealing with this protracted conflict, neither is likely to emerge in the near future.

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