The End of CSDP Theology? Spain’s Shifting Security Policy and CSDP

This article was external pageoriginally publishedcall_made by external pageEuropean Geostrategycall_made on 28 February 2015. It forms part of external pageThe CSDP: National Perspectivescall_madeseries.

Multiple crises, shifting collective perceptions

In many ways, Spain epitomises the average European society nowadays. Given demographic and economic patterns, it faces fundamental challenges to its welfare system (a core foundation of political and social peace), and is struggling in the global race of competition. Although some macro indicators confirm that the country has improved its economic performance and is even experiencing a certain growth, six years through the economic crisis Spain finds itself in the midst of another crisis, of a political and even constitutional nature. Surging anti-establishment parties, such as ‘Podemos’ (currently polling second only to the ruling conservative Popular Party), deftly swim in the waves of popular discontent with austerity policies and with Spain’s tarnished elites mired in serious corruption scandals. Still an outlier in a worrying European discourse tinged by too many phobias, this ‘anti-system’ mood in Spain has so far not yet translated into anti-immigration or anti-European platforms, although a new euro-realism is part of the collective discourse.

When it comes to security perceptions, Spaniards do see a volatile international scene and their neighbourhood crumbling around them, from the masses of illegal migrants trying to enter Spanish territory –often dying in the seas- to the unspeakably gruesome images of ISIS beheading Westerners and their allies, to the escalating conflict in Ukraine and beyond. Generally, as much as is the case with big segments of the European population, such growing instability does not easily trump more immediate concerns of economic insecurity when it comes to policy priorities and resource allocation (e.g. defence budgets). But, as with everything else nowadays Spain, there might be a shift in collective perceptions regarding insecurity and perhaps the role of security and defence instruments. Tellingly, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks a external pagerelevant pollcall_made recently showed that a majority of Spaniards put jihadism as a top security concern; firmly support a military response to this threat in places such as Syria, Iraq and Sahel, and favour Spain’s participation in UN or NATO military missions overseas ‘in defence of liberties and against radical or terrorist movements’, beyond classic territorial defence tasks. How this would translate into actual decision-making, also with a new leadership, is still unclear though.

Broader Spanish neighbourhood priorities

These domestic patterns are relevant to understanding Spain’s shifting foreign and security policies and its current approach to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), NATO and overall multinational security cooperation. They are also relevant in terms of political back-and-forth and possible policy shifts.

Spain’s security policy over the recent years of crisis has been generally marked by competing lines of continuity (e.g. protection of vital interests in the North of Africa), strategic retrenchment (e.g. a certain reluctance to engage in massive, open-ended, faraway, Afghan-style scenarios) and re-positioning (e.g. the focus on the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea). Moreover, there are also attempts at policy innovation beyond established lines, for instance, through the hammering out of new agreements and potential security alliances, with defence components, anchoring far away partners from Latin America and Asia.

The foreign and security policy establishment is called on to attend to competing demands (domestic, financial and international), in a context of rising instability, East and South of Spain’s borders, and of upcoming changes with Spain’s political system, affecting stability too. There is therefore a widespread and heightened sense of existential insecurity among decision-makers and policy pundits, with a primary focus on the rise of jihadism in Spain’s immediate borders and ISIS-like scenarios, from Algeria, Libya, to the neighbouring Sahel. Immediately following in terms of security concerns, and often intertwined, come the overwhelming border pressures flowing from migration.

So, not that unlike other European countries, and after big interventions such as Afghanistan, Spain’s present security doctrine blends in a revived territorial component, border security and even home affairs, with a targeted interventionist approach overseas in those grey spaces in the broader Spanish neighbourhood, given the security risks they raise (e.g. the collapse of Libya as a fertile ground for ISIS-like jihadist movements). This approach to priority threats relies heavily on military deployments (e.g. through training missions and selective engagements) –it seems, now with popular support- and intelligence sharing.

So this neighbourhood emphasis that permeates other European countries also drives Spain’s main security policy efforts, with an overriding focus on the South. This partly explains Madrid’s sometimes lukewarm reaction to the EU’s or NATO’s perceived pivot to the East after Ukraine; its sustained caucusing with like-minded NATO members to develop a credible Southern Flank, as well as a noteworthy revamping of its traditional diplomacy of facilitation and mediation with the Arab world (e.g. through initiatives on Libya and its new non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council). Nonetheless, the neighbourhood priority does not per se rule out engagement in other far away scenarios, out of alliance considerations (e.g. Spain’s contribution of on-the-ground trainers in Iraq) or power projection purposes.

The clash of Spanish security instincts

Importantly, current Spanish security policy, in a context that sees the tearing down of established strategic assumptions and the erosion of multilateral frameworks, is shaped by clashing patterns and tendencies. There is arguably a clash of security instincts underway. The pro-European and overall pro-multilateral instinct remains strong, even if tempered by the new euro-realism resulting from the EU crisis. Spain has always been a strong pro-EU and pro-CSDP supporter, endorsing political initiatives to strengthen CSDP’s relevance. But, as in other countries, self-interests bear strongly in the calculations and there is a determined pan-Europeanisation of national security interests at work. Uploading security threats and challenges to the European level makes ever more political and pragmatic sense, especially in a context of stretched resources and spiralling challenges. This is coupled with a certain free-riding or benign neglect with respect to contributions to other scenarios not seen as vital (e.g. Eastern Europe).

From this prism must be seen Madrid’s sustained strategy for the EU and NATO to shift resources to the ‘Deep South’ (including the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea). Spain is pro-active in CSDP missions in that region, being a significant and sometimes leading contributor to, for instance, EUTM Mali or operation ATALANTA, although priority and niche criteria logically determine the level of commitment.

Yet as much as Spain pushes for Europe to assume core elements of its security agenda, and for regional actors to strengthen their own capabilities, another crucial instinct which the crisis has strengthened is that of self-reliance and individualism. Similarly to other key EU chancelleries such as Paris, London or Eastern capitals, there is a deep-seated scepticism in some Madrilian quarters towards the usefulness of common fora, whether the EU or NATO, in terms of delivering solidarity – something the Spaniards share with their Baltic or Polish partners (although the source of the vital threat is naturally different in Riga and Madrid). Hence, instead of betting on a single institution, alliance or rigid framework, a trendy strong Realpolitik thinking has it that Spain should re-create its own web of cooperative relations, both for better safeguarding security interests and for classic power projection reasons. This is not too dissimilar to the picture external pageOlivier de Francecall_madepainted in his analysis of Paris’ pragmatism towards CSDP. Such individualist approach to security is embodied in a newfound fancy for striking pragmatic bilateral deals (e.g. Madrid’s willing acceptance of US-led components of the planned missile shield and of jihadist-focused combat forces in its territory), or in the overtures for new forms of security and military cooperation with other mid-sized powers.

Lastly, many in Madrid approach power politics and the nowadays unappealing democratic agenda from a squarely security perspective which prioritises keeping relations with great powers and mid-sized regional actors, but somewhat overlooking components of human rights and democracy. Hence the reluctance to take on strong men, from Egypt and the broader Middle East, which purportedly protect a common security agenda.

Spanish caucuses on CSDP: theologians, doomsayers, isolationists and pragmatists

In these complex circumstances, within the establishment there are arguably four different visions on CSDP. They are not always neatly defined and stakeholders may emphasise one over the other, depending on the demands at stake (e.g. mission contribution, political coalitions, etc.). But these visions do underpin and shape decision-making, and are also relevant to understanding Spanish stances on NATO’s future and operations. We can break them down into four main families:

The Theologians. They adhere to the traditional view of CSDP and European Defence as an intrinsic part of the old vision of ‘Political Europe’, and thus support initiatives to revamp CSDP, enhance its political prominence ad foster its autonomous development from NATO (e.g. the EU OHQ project independent of NATO), also so as to decrease US dependency. Strongly pro-European, they adhere to a quasi-theological belief that the incremental Monnet approach for European integration is just as valid for the area of security and defence as is for trade, and hence that, in spite of setbacks, gradual steps will eventually materialise in a common defence.

The Doomsayers. This caucus sees CSDP as clinically dead as either a power project, a relevant framework for common action or a repository for serious capability development. This sentiment has increased parallel to the uncertainty looming on the future of the EU itself and given CSDP’s underperformance in recent years. Without necessarily advocating for a Spanish pull-out of CSDP development, the Doomsayers, also sceptical of NATO, see more sense in investing in bilateral and mini-lateral initiatives, and in an overall buttressing of Spain’s defence capacities.

The Isolationists (Hobbesians). The isolationists, many of whom are doomsayers too, disavow ‘big’ European security cooperation altogether, whether in EU and NATO, perceived as dysfunctional and, what is more important, neglectful of rising Spanish security concerns. Deeply imbued by Realpolitik views, they perceive the current regional disorder in Hobbesian terms and advocate for a strategic shift firmly back towards national interests and prerogatives. They fear NATO’s pivot to the East, which, for them, risks neglecting the Southern Flank (and thus Spain’s vital security interests), and are suspicious of pooling and sharing initiatives in the area of defence industry and capabilities.

The Pragmatists. For this group, CSDP and NATO are simply two sides of a similar project and strategic challenge –reviving European security and power in a non-European world. They favour investing equally in both, as circumstances require, fostering Spain’s active participation in smart defence or pooling and sharing initiatives. These internationalists are open to compromises regarding the external pageEast-South security cleavagecall_made, and are willing to promote more CSDP, NATO or bilateral synergies with other European allies, not limited to Southern partners – hence the strategic dialogue with Poland.

Outlook for Spanish role(s) on CSDP

In the near future, on CSDP proper, Spain will continue to support practical capability-focused initiatives. As regards the politics of CSDP, it has usually co-sponsored initiatives within Weimar Plus and in other mini-lateral frameworks. It will probably continue to do so. It will also test the waters for new minilateral synergies, including closer involvement as CSDP partners of non-EU countries (i.e. Latin American countries), where Madrid sees security and European power projection benefits. Moreover, Spain will endorse an eventual moving forward on Permanent Structured Cooperation, which it has been pushing since its inception, although it will probably micro-manage the definition of the entry criteria. Though supportive of pooling and sharing, beyond official pro-CSDP rhetoric, it is unclear whether Madrid will be as determined when it comes to crucial decisions on its defence industry and procurement programmes.

As is the case with the rest of Europe, predictability is bad business in Spain nowadays. As things stand, Spain will probably drift between outbursts of internationalism and initiative-promotion and a domestic focus on its political and economic challenges. The country will probably remain in a second tier of CSDP supporters, co-sponsoring and shaping initiatives, occasionally tabling proposals on its own, pushing for a greater role for the European Defence Agency (now with a Spanish diplomat at its helm), etc. The fact that presently no ‘Big Three’ member is willing to fundamentally re-launch CSDP as a power projection tool, with France external pagesteering awaycall_made from old ideas on l’ Europe de la défense, should leave more space for second tier countries. Spain and Poland could therefore become leaders or first tier by default.

But, again, some caution is needed here too. Spain has always had a traditionally cautious approach to big, spotlight foreign policy initiatives. Moreover, any CSDP tier, first or second, still fundamentally lacks a shared strategic outlook on what should be CSDP’s top priorities, so the comprehensive approach and training emphasis in Brussels has become a substitute for more ambitious strategic goals, shared by core EU countries. Much will of course depend on political developments in the core countries and maybe on the EU’s new leadership. Still, so far chances are that ‘CSDP Theologians’, in Madrid and those few scattered in other capitals, push for visions long out of sync with Europe’s real geopolitical and strategic developments.

Overall, the future shape of Spanish security policy, and which of the above instincts and clashing visions carry the day, requires an impossible juggling of too many uncertainties and factors. The outcome of Spain’s political crisis and what the preferences of new political forces are will be crucial. Several of the rising forces, such as ‘Podemos’, are officially averse to military interventions, NATO or balancing Russia. Yet, on the other hand, a likely scenario as of 2016 is that of coalition governments, with subsequent compromises. Other tipping factors will be the changing security perceptions of the public, currently favouring intervention overseas, and the overall directions of European security cooperation, torn by competing tensions East and South.

What seems abundantly clear is that European defence, CSDP and NATO nowadays desperately need less theology. In turn, the à la carte, nation-driven approach is hardly a recipe either for any sustainable common purpose and can actually become a slippery slope for European security fragmentation, on top of political fragmentation. In the present times of change, more purposeful pragmatism is needed for a reset of European defence.