From Shipmates to Mateship: Improving Maritime Security Cooperation with Indonesia

This article was originally published in "A Strategy towards Indonesia" (May 2015) in the external pageCentre of Gravity Seriescall_made, published by the external pageStrategic and Defense Studies Centrecall_made at the external pageAustralian National Universitycall_made’s College of Asia and the Pacific.

Executive Summary

• Mutual trust is the bedrock foundation of maritime security cooperation between Australia and Indonesia.
• Australia should offer to help establish Indonesia’s National Maritime Security Information Centre.
• A better coordination between the military and various civilian agencies involved in bilateral maritime security cooperation is required.
• Greater information exchange to build maritime domain awareness can initially focus on non-traditional security threats and later gradually expand into the aerial and sub-surface domains.

Introduction

Trust is the bedrock of any working relationship between Australia and Indonesia. A trust deficit arising from people smuggling, espionage allegations, and other disagreements has often chilled bilateral relations.[1]

Geography and common interests however dictate both countries cooperate on certain matters, while remaining attentive to the fragility of bilateral relations. Under such constraints, Australia and Indonesia should remain focused on one critical dimension of cooperation: maritime security.

Underpinned by the 2006 Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation Framework Agreement (also known as the ‘Lombok Treaty’), maritime security is central to bilateral security cooperation.[2]

With 40 per cent of Australia’s exports passing through Indonesian waters, the security of sea lines of communications (SLOC) and maritime choke-points in the archipelago is a key priority for Canberra.[3]

Given Indonesia’s renewed focus on maritime affairs under the Joko Widodo administration, momentum has arisen for both countries to step up maritime security cooperation.[4]

While bilateral defence training and exercises reached their peak in 2012 (since the mid-1990s), they were partially terminated the following year due to the trust deficit identified above.[5]

This suggests that both countries should maintain a healthy dose of scepticism on what cooperation can realistically achieve in near-term. Creating the National Maritime Security Information Centre Recognising Indonesia’s growing maritime focus (see Evelyn Goh’s paper), this paper offers a specific proposal to help build trust and support Australia-Indonesia security concerns. It recommends that Australia should offer to help establish Indonesia’s proposed National Maritime Security Information Centre (NMIC).[6]

Although the NMIC concept is still being sketched out, the general aim is to build Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)—providing comprehensive understanding of anything on, above, and under the sea and along the littorals that can impact safety, security, the economy, or environment.

Given MDA is often financially and technologically prohibitive, Australia would be an attractive partner for Indonesia to co-fund the NMIC and jointly develop its supporting information and communication technology infrastructure. This would be in keeping with Australia’s own national interests to maintain SLOC security vital for Australia’s seaborne trade.

If this went ahead, the NMIC could serve as the coordination centre not just for bilateral maritime cooperation purposes, but also for Australia-Indonesia joint maritime cooperation initiatives throughout the region. With respect to bilateral cooperation, the NMIC could enable an improved understanding of maritime non-traditional security threats such as illegal fishing, natural disasters, and maritime smuggling—all common interests of Australia and Indonesia. Illegal fishing is claimed to cost Indonesia up to US$25 billion annually, and it remains a significant problem in Australia’s northern waters.[7]

Natural disasters, especially cyclones, tsunamis, and earthquakes, continue to make headlines in Australia and Indonesia. Via this centre Australian and Indonesian officials could exchange information including on illegal fishing incidents, people smuggling, disaster relief efforts, and plan for joint activities. The NMIC can cue operational actions on the ground and at sea, such as designating which country should send the first search party to intercept an illegal maritime arrival, or coordinate a joint maritime task force for disaster relief operations.

At the same time, third-party participation should be encouraged, such as Timor-Leste and the United States. For example, Australia can support Indonesia expanding its capacity to train Timor-Leste officials responsible for maritime security. This would help share the burden of regional MDA and boost necessary long-term cooperation between Indonesia and Timor Leste. In addition, greater involvement by the US Marines in Darwin should be explored (such as a joint trilateral response to natural disasters in the region),[8] with the NMIC potentially hosting a US Marine liaison officer to ensure smooth coordination during a disaster crisis scenario. Complementing similar information centres already established in Singapore[9], one key advantage of the NMIC is that it would try to specifically improve coordination between the navies and civil maritime security agencies of Australia and Indonesia. While multiple bilateral cooperation agreements already exist to cover various aspects of maritime security, better efforts to ensure their implementation are required. Sometimes the various agencies involved in implementing these agreements do not coordinate their policies with each other, making cooperation less effective.

While the navy will likely play a crucial part in the NMIC, the role of civil maritime security agencies should be thoroughly accommodated. If established, the NMIC centre could facilitate joint activities between the newly established Indonesia’s coastguard, the ‘Maritime Security Agency’ (Badan Keamanan Laut, BAKAMLA), and the Australian Border Force (ABF) after it is established in July 2015.[10]

Growing mutual trust between Australia and Indonesia

Aside from its practical value, the proposed NMIC centre can grow mutual trust between the two nations facilitated through rotational postings of Australian officials. While high-level meetings have taken place between Indonesian and Australian leaders, foreign and defence ministers, and chiefs of defence forces, nothing can replace trust at the lower operational levels. These are the officials who come into contact in crisis situations. Personnel from the lower operational levels (captain/commander-level) can get promoted to higher strategic levels later (senior officials and ministerial-level) where they make important decisions on bilateral relations. Hence, cultivating mutual trust and familiarity in working together at the earliest possible opportunity can be worthwhile. For example, both countries could explore the possibility for attachments of Australian officials from the Border Protection Command (BPC) and ABF officials at the NMIC once it is established.

The next step of cooperation would be to look into the aerial and sub-surface domains of the MDA, in which the NMIC can play a substantial part. The Indonesian Air Force participates in ‘Eyes-in-the-Sky’ (EiS) airborne maritime surveillance cooperative patrols in the Malacca and Singapore Straits with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand; while there is the Australia-Indonesia Maritime Surveillance Exercise ‘Albatros Ausindo’. However, these activities tend to be single-service, despite the necessity for a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. Both countries need to consider involving their navies and air forces simultaneously in bilateral exercises. For example, the Indonesian Air Force could participate in the ‘Ausindo Corpat’ Coordinated Patrols, and the Indonesian Navy in the Exercise ‘Albatros Ausindo’ so both services can develop jointery in airborne maritime surveillance alongside their Australian naval and air force counterparts. So, instead of only ‘naval’ or ‘air force’ exercises,

Australia and Indonesia could conduct ‘maritime’ bilateral exercises.Cooperation in the sub-surface domain is perhaps the most challenging area due to its sensitivities. Both Australia and Indonesia are acquiring submarines and developing their undersea warfare capabilities, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Both countries could share selective technical experience in submarine design, maintenance and operations. Australia can propose to co-host a joint submarine conference involving the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Defence Science and Technological Cooperation (DSTO) and the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) with their Indonesian counterparts. As regional countries are acquiring more submarines, submarine search-and-rescue (SAR) cooperation will be critical in response to a submarine accident in regional waters.[11]

Australia could offer a submarine SAR cooperation arrangement with Indonesia, while future series of bilateral naval Exercise ‘New Horizon’ can assign greater emphasis on anti-submarine warfare.

Potential challenges and pitfalls

No opportunities can be exploited without their associated challenges. Lack of funding, sensitivities over national sovereignty, institutional stove-piping, platform interoperability issues, and information security concerns are some challenges that can discourage any lofty cooperation goal. For example, Indonesia might be wary of an Australian offer to help establish the NMIC due to the trust deficit. Jakarta might balk at NMIC arrangements that could be perceived as infringing its sovereignty, territorial or otherwise. Given Indonesia’s sensitivity over perceived intrusions into its maritime domain, Australia and Indonesia will first need to explicitly agree on the geographical extent of the NMIC coverage.

Indonesia could also be reluctant at cooperating with Australia when it perceives insincere intentions are behind the granting of assistance from the latter. On the other hand, a more cautious approach can limit overexpectations, and gradually cultivate mutual understanding on what each other is realistically capable and willing to do. In practice, cooperation should be buttressed on open mutual consultations about its potential pitfalls and risks, such as on dealing with public outcry lest some aspects of cooperation are regarded as domestically unpopular. While this is certainly a challenge, greater mutual trust can hopefully make the task less difficult.

Policy Recommendation

• In addition to building trust, Australia should offer to help establish Indonesia’s National Maritime Security Information Centre aimed at building greater maritime domain awareness and coordination between military and various civilian agencies in bilateral cooperation. Future cooperation should expand into the aerial and sub-surface domains of maritime security.

Endnotes

 

[1] To restore trust and resume cooperation, Australia and Indonesia signed a joint understanding on intelligence in August 2014. Daniel Hurst, “Australia and Indonesia sign spying code of conduct,” The Guardian, 28 August 2014.

[2] Particularly articles 13 and 14. See text ‘Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework of Security Cooperation,’ 13 November 2006.

[3] Andrew Carr, ‘Making waves: a new maritime approach,’ The Centre of Gravity Series: A New Flank: Fresh Perspectives for the Next Defence White Paper (Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2013), p. 8.

[4] Rendi A. Witular, “Jokowi launches maritime doctrine to the world,” The Jakarta Post, 13 November 2014.

[5] Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013: Defending Australia and its National Interests(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), paragraph 6.29, p. 59.

[6] The NMIC was first proposed in a Indonesia-Singapore joint naval seminar in Jakarta, 13 November 2012.

[7] Kanupriya Kapoor, ‘Indonesia holds 200 Malaysians in crackdown on illegal fishing,’ Reuters, 19 November 2014.

[8] Australian Government, Department of Defence, ‘Australia and Indonesia conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief tabletop exercise in Darwin,’ 7 June 2013.

[9] They are the Regional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia—Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC), the Information Fusion Centre (IFC), and the Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC).

[10] Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘Waves of opportunity: Enhancing Australia-Indonesia maritime security cooperation,’ Strategic Insights (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014), p. 4.

[11] Sam Bateman, ‘Perils of the Deep: The Dangers of Submarine Proliferation in the Seas of East Asia,’ Asian Security, 7:1 (2011).