Potemkin Conservatism: an Ideological Tool of the Kremlin

This external pagearticlecall_made was originally published by the external pageCentre for Eastern Studiescall_made (OSW) on 3^rd February 2015, and is featured in the latest edition of the Center for Security Studies’ (CSS) Russian Analytical Digest.

Abstract

This article considers the Putin regime’s turn to a conservative ideology. It interprets this move as a political strategy to stabilise the regime and prevent any political mobilisation around a liberal agenda in Russia. It concludes, however, that the gap between these conservative slogans and the regime’s actual conduct will undermine its credibility in the eyes of Russian society in the long-term.

Introduction

At the outset of his third presidential term, Vladimir Putin openly declared that henceforth he would be guided in his policies by ‘conservative values’. However, in reality the Kremlin has been treating its own conservative ideology in a purely instrumental manner. Its resort to conservatism has been aimed solely at enhancing the legitimacy of the regime by claiming that it reflects Russian tradition. While it is the Kremlin’s genuine intention to maintain a strong, centralized state authority, the conservative social and moral rhetoric is in fact being used as just another ‘political technology’, i.e. a tool for manipulating public opinion, both at home and abroad. The invocation of this ideology means neither that the current rulers of Russia really adhere to conservative values, nor that that they have a long-term programme to implement them. We are in fact dealing with another kind of ‘Potemkin village’, the aim of which is to divert public attention from Russia’s real socio-political and economic problems, and to provide the authorities with arguments to implement repressive internal policies and an anti-Western foreign policy.

The Roots and Genesis of the Kremlin’s ‘Conservative Project’

Conservative themes are not entirely new in the Kremlin’s ideological armoury. They first appeared when Vladimir Putin came to power at the turn of 2000; recurring again after 2003. At that time, however, they did not dominate the Kremlin’s ideological message, but rather coexisted alongside other ideological currents. It was only during Vladimir Putin’s last presidential campaign in 2011–2012 that conservative themes were given a central place in his rhetoric, later coming to dominate the Kremlin’s official narrative and become the main ideological foundation of the regime.

The Kremlin’s resort to conservative ideology was a reaction to the emergence of an urban middle class that has articulated demands for systemic reforms: economic liberalisation, political pluralism, reduction of state interference in social life, more leeway for grassroots civic initiatives. The activation of this group resulted in a plethora of grassroots initiatives that aimed at creating mechanisms for holding the government accountable to the public, with their discontent with Putin’s return to the Kremlin expressed in massive street protests in 2011–2012.

Another reason why Putin raised the banner of conservatism was his belief that the susceptibility of part of the population to liberal ideas stems from an ideological void, which arose in the aftermath of the collapse of communism. Therefore, the authorities believed it necessary to present society with an attractive ideological alternative that could fill this void, and thus prevent the spread of liberal attitudes and beliefs. This offer was aimed primarily at Putin’s traditional social base—the poorer inhabitants of the provinces, employed in the public sector, industry and agriculture.

The Characteristics of the Kremlin’s ‘Conservatism’

When deciding to make use of conservatism for shoring up his regime, Putin invoked its radical version that had previously existed on the margins of Russian political and intellectual life. It was extremely anti-Western and anti-liberal, and called for the revival of the empire. As a result, the nationalist-conservative discourse has moved from the periphery to the centre of the Russian public debate.

A characteristic feature of the Kremlin’s ‘conservatism’ is its predominantly negative agenda. It defines clearly those phenomena and values that should be combatted, while its positive programme remains vague and inchoate. Its most distinctive feature is its rejection of the political, social and cultural models of the modern West. It preaches that Russia and the West represent fundamentally discrepant civilisations. These discrepancies are a consequence of the West’s abandonment of the values of Christian civilization, its rejection of traditional identities and its acceptance of moral relativism. Such characterization of the West allows the Kremlin to position Russia as a defender and mainstay of European civilisation.

On the positive side, the Kremlin’s version of conservatism advocates maintaining political and social stability, the revival of national identity, the cultivation of patriotism, as well as a return to the traditional model of the family, state paternalism and social corporatism. In particular, it emphasizes the need to maintain a strong, hierarchical and centralised state power in Russia. The epitome of this should be a charismatic leader, whose authority has a special, quasi-sacred character, despite the formal maintenance of democratic (electoral) mechanisms of its legitimacy.

This ideology presents society as being rooted in Russian tradition and naturally wedded to conservative values. It calls for the cultivation of the traditional model of a large family with many children, as well as the reinstatement of the Orthodox Church (and other traditional religions) as a source of moral principles. The Kremlin’s ‘conservatism’ contrasts ordinary Russian people with the elites. The Kremlin thus appeals to genuine social sentiments which combine anti-elitism, anti- Americanism and xenophobia. At the same time, Putin’s vision of the state model envisages the role of society as limited to passive participation in the processes initiated by the authorities.

The ‘Conservative Project’ in Domestic Politics

The Kremlin’s reaction to the political and social challenges was not limited to the ideological sphere, but also included a number of legislative and administrative steps. The Kremlin has taken comprehensive counter-reforming measures, leading to the further centralisation of power, restrictions on political activity and civil rights, intensified harassment of the opposition and greater power of the repressive apparatus. Under the banner of a ‘conservative project’, it extended the scope of repression beyond the political sphere, and used it against people who were not direct political opponents of the regime. It has penalised behaviours that go beyond the traditional (as the Kremlin defines it) canon of lifestyle and worldview. The broadly defined opposition has also been subjected to a propaganda campaign equating any criticism of the government with opposition to Russia as such, or even with treason. It has also strove to discredit the opposition by arguing that liberal democratic ideology leads naturally and inevitably to the spread of nontraditional lifestyles and moral decay. Finally, one of the government’s most effective tactics has been to brand any disagreement with the annexation of Crimea as being anti-Russian and unpatriotic (Putin has described opponents of the annexation as “national traitors”)—which puts any pro-Western agenda beyond the pale of official political competition.

An important element of the ‘conservative project’ is the introduction of disciplining measures against the Russian elite, under the slogan of ‘nationalisation of the elites’. The Kremlin has initiated a series of laws which have tightened supervision over the foreign assets and business activities of Russian officials and employees of state corporations, increasing the elite’s dependence on the Kremlin. Official propaganda pictures the elites’ contacts and business ties with the West as an instrument of their subordination to foreign political centres.

One of the goals of the new ‘project’ is to demonstrate that Putin’s policies enjoy the support of the majority of the general public, and that the people are opposed to the ideas of liberal reforms. To this end, it juxtaposes the ‘corrupt’ elites and ‘demoralised’ middle class with the ‘ordinary people’, the latter being allegedly faithful to traditional values, and therefore immune to anti-Putin slogans.

‘Conservatism’ as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

Putin’s ‘conservatism’ was devised not only with a Russian audience in mind, but also to be used as a tool of foreign policy. In Kremlin’s view, ideology has become an important element of international rivalry, which is acquiring a civilisational dimension, involving a choice between different socio-political models. Therefore, the Kremlin saw the need to come up with an ideological formula that would legitimise Russia’s aspirations to the role of an influential great power. Conservative ideology, attractive to those political forces that are opposed to Western post-modern liberalism and are hostile to the United States and the European Union, clearly fitted the bill. Invoking this ideology, Russian diplomacy and propaganda has been consistently promoting a narrative wherein Russia is presented as the main defender of a stable international order, traditional state sovereignty, and civilisational and political pluralism throughout the world.

Another part of the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ is the concept of the so-called Russian World (Russkii mir). The concept envisages the existence of a separate, multiethnic and multireligious Russian civilization shared by a community of people, who identify themselves not merely with Russian language and culture, but also with the traditions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The primary aim of cultivating this concept appears to be the weakening of the national identities of citizens of post-Soviet states and fostering their ties with, and loyalty to, the Russian state. The Kremlin has also invoked this idea in its propaganda to legitimize the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the ‘hybrid war’ against Ukraine, pointing to the religious, historical and ethnic ties which these territories have with Russia.

The ‘Conservative Project’: an Effective Tool Or a Self-Delusional Mirage?

The Kremlin’s adoption of a new ‘conservative’ ideology, and its implementation of this conservative political project, seems in the short term to have brought the Kremlin its desired results. In contrast, however, the long-term consequences may be unfavourable for the authorities.

For the time being the implementation of the ‘conservative project’ has inhibited the erosion of legitimacy of the regime. It has consolidated most of the elite around President Putin, suppressing the burgeoning symptoms of dissatisfaction with the direction in which the regime has been developing. The project has also expanded the Kremlin’s mechanisms for monitoring the elites and delegitimised any action which the opposition takes against it. It also helped to increase public support for Putin and justify the repressive measures taken against members of the elite and the middle class.

An equally effective means of mobilising public support for the Kremlin has been the aggressive, anti-Western foreign policy. The annexation of Crimea proved particularly efficacious, raising President Putin’s approval ratings and consolidating both the Russian public and the elites around the Kremlin. The invocation of conservative ideology has also helped to broaden Russia’s support in Europe among the radical, populist and Eurosceptic right. It also reinforced the Kremlin’s attempts to establish a tactical alliance with conservative Christian circles. The ‘conservatism’ proclaimed by the Kremlin has also been an effective tool against the ‘soft power’ of the European Union in post-Soviet societies.

On the other hand, among the mainstream of Western public opinion, the donning of the conservative mask by the Kremlin has contributed significantly to a loss of sympathy towards Russia, and in particular to its current authorities.

In the long run, this conservative ideology will not solve the problem of the fragile legitimacy of the Kremlin’s authority in the eyes of that part of the Russian elite, which had been expecting a gradual liberalisation of the system. The Kremlin’s sharp anti-Western policy shift and the annexation of Crimea are definitely not in its interest. Its concerns have been further heightened by the Kremlin’s efforts to redistribute the largest assets. Therefore, in the long run, forcing through the ‘conservative project’ carries the risk of destabilising the regime, by antagonising many groups within the elite and the affluent social strata, worsening their economic condition, and undermining their sense of security.

In addition, the Kremlin can hardly count on active mass support for its ideological project. The deeply rooted passivity of Russian society means that even those initiatives that are supported by society rarely motivate grassroots activity in accordance with the instructions of the Kremlin. Many of the conservative demands put forward by the Kremlin diverge from the real needs and aspirations of broader social groups.

The impact of the Kremlin’s conservative ideology may also be weakened by the fact that the ruling clan itself sees this ideology in purely instrumental terms. Many of the ‘conservative’ declarations are in fact feigned and used for propaganda purposes; the Kremlin’s actions do not affect the oligarchic nature of Putin’s system, nor do they translate into an increase in the influence of ‘the people’ on the mechanisms governing the state. The extreme materialism and ostentatious consumerism of the ruling elite stand in stark contrast to the conservation values proclaimed by the regime, something which has not escaped public attention. Due to its instrumental nature, the Kremlin’s ideology cannot build a lasting and genuine relationship between the government and society, which would protect the government against a loss of support caused by the deterioration of economic conditions in Russia.