Lessons Learned from Operational Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping

This article is an executive summary of an external pageInternational Peace Institutecall_made report published 5 August 2015. The full report can be accessed from our Digital Library.

To staff and sustain its many operations around the world, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping must rely on a variety of partnerships, including operational partnerships among troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Operational partnerships occur when military units from two or more countries combine to deploy as part of a peacekeeping operation. Between 2004 and 2014, forty-one such partnerships occurred in eight UN operations, most involving units from European and South American states. The following are four types of partnerships, which differ based on command structure and the degree of integration of the operational sub-units:

• Attached: an independent operational unit from Country A works alongside and is under the operational command of a larger unit from Country B.

• Embedded: troops from Country A are integrated within existing operational units of Country B to form mixed units under Country B’s command structure.

• Co-deployed: distinct operational units from Country A and Country B operate as part of a multinational command structure involving officers from both countries.

• Composite: troops from two or more countries form bi-national or multinational mixed units that serve under a multinational command structure involving officers from two or more countries.

Partners can be junior, senior, or equal partners, as determined by the size of each country’s contribution. A senior partner is responsible for bringing the junior partner on board. Equal partners establish a division of labor where they either split the duties and personnel contribution evenly or rotate contributing the major share of personnel and command.

BENEFITS OF PARTNERING

Partnering benefits and challenges accrue for both the UN and the relevant TCCs. At least six benefits for the UN include the following: (1) a mission may fill a requirement for a unit; (2) a junior provider of a niche capability such as mine clearing, water purification, or medical services can serve the needs of the entire mission; (3) a junior partner can assume static tasks, such as guard duty, that allow a senior partner to take on time-sensitive kinetic activities; (4) the senior partner can take the junior partner on board and teach it the ropes; (5) the junior partner may graduate to deploying a larger unit on its own; and (6) the more TCCs in a mission, the more diplomatic support the mission leaders can summon when needed.

There are immediate benefits for the TCCs involved, depending on their role in the partnership. Fundamentally, junior partners get to deploy, and in a way in which they receive not only mentorship but also material and training from the senior partner. Equal partners also get to deploy in a manner that benefits and burdens both partners to roughly the same degree. In particular, larger combined units have greater operational autonomy, which is valued highly by deployed personnel. Senior partners could deploy alone, but partnering helps polish their reputations as leaders and allows them to turn over less attractive static or niche tasks to the junior partner. In addition, because unit or mission command in a UN operation often goes to the TCC with the greatest number of deployed troops, a senior partner benefits when the troop contribution of a junior partner fills out its contribution enough to reinforce the senior partner’s claim on command.

There are also overlapping political benefits for TCCs. They include (1) enhancing the cohesion and clout of a TCC’s region; (2) cementing relations with neighbors, affiliates, security guarantors, and rising powers; (3) earning recognition as a responsible and militarily active international citizen; (4) presenting a more attractive international profile to neighbors and beyond; (5) proving one’s worthiness to be a security and/or economic partner; and (6) enhancing the international or domestic support for a mission that engages one’s interests.

CHALLENGES OF PARTNERING

The challenges of forming a new operational partnership can be daunting. One is finding the right partner; although political motivations might determine specific partnerships, preference should be given to countries with similar linguistic, cultural, and military attributes, as well as some level of geographic proximity to facilitate combined training. A second challenge is preparing for the inevitable frictions that arise when troops live together in relatively isolated camps where stress and boredom are present. A third challenge is the complexity of performing complex and sensitive tasks with someone else rather than alone. Many issues have to be addressed before deployment. When deploying alone, a TCC resolves these issues itself. When partnering, it must consider its partner’s concerns. A fourth challenge is addressing exposure to the scrutiny that comes with partnering. Fifth, for senior and equal partners, deploying as part of a team is costlier and more time-consuming than deploying alone. Sixth, partnerships can fracture, and personnel may be harmed if the partners have difficulty communicating or have not sorted out in advance how to respond collectively when confronting high risk.

The UN also faces challenges. First, there is the possibility of reduced operational effectiveness of mixed nationality units. Second, partnering can lengthen the time spent for TCCs to prepare themselves for a mission. The current deployment process is slow, and partnering could delay a unit’s arrival in theater. Partnering can also cause difficulties for elements of the UN Secretariat when smaller partners want their own memoranda of understanding (MOU). These memoranda can take considerable time and effort to work out; some in the UN would prefer to have the lead state negotiate one MOU for itself and its partners.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To Enhance the Effectiveness of Partnerships

1. Prospective partners must choose carefully and be prepared to overcome social and military incompatibilities. Military incompatibilities may not be eliminated, but their negative impact can be reduced. Even language incompatibilities can be reduced over time.

2. As the TCCs become more militarily compatible, through combined training, for example, the impact of their social incompatibilities will be less significant.

3. Tending to the size of a combined unit can mitigate problems of operational effectiveness. Composite units (i.e., integrated operational units and integrated command structure) should not be formed below company level, and units operating in volatile environments should not be partnered below battalion level.

4. Frictions between partner personnel can be mitigated through command attention, leadership structures, and the encouragement of cooperative mindsets and trust-building.

5. The level of danger in a mission and the expectations of TCCs are critical to partnership success. Most TCCs in a UN mission are neither ready nor willing to act aggressively; if they have differing restrictive national caveats, then they should not partner in a mission or a section of a mission where they can predict their forces will be in hazard.

6. The challenges of partnership, while daunting, need not trump the benefits. Preparation and attention to detail are crucial. If the benefits of partnership are judged significant enough (even when they flow more to the partners than to the mission), then partnership makes sense for all, except predictably hazardous operations.

To Increase Partnerships

1. The UN and bilateral donors, such as the United States, should cooperate closely to raise general awareness of the opportunities for and the political and military benefits of operational partnerships in peacekeeping.

2. The UN and bilateral donors should continually share information on potential partnership opportunities among TCCs and how to help facilitate them.

3. Bilateral donors should continue to invest in pre-deployment preparations for partners, including assisting in relevant language training.

4. The UN and bilateral donors should strongly encourage and help enable the trend toward standby forces. Standby forces are already partnered and should be better prepared as a matter of course.

5. The UN or a member state should develop a short guidebook on operational partnership options and best practices.