Is Britain Back? The 2015 UK Defense Review

This article was originally published by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) on 5 February 2016.

The government of the United Kingdom (UK) published a new security and defense review in late November 2015, amid ongo­ing renegotiations with the EU over Brit­ain’s terms of membership and a debate on joining the bombing campaign against the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) in Syria (it had already done so in Iraq) following ter­rorist attacks in Paris the same month. The document combines a national security strategy with a strategic defense and secu­rity review (SDSR).

In recent years, some NATO allies and in­ternational security experts have criticized the UK for not contributing as much as it could to tackling the growing number of crises in and around Europe. Having long been considered Europe’s leading military power (alongside France), the image of the UK as a declining military power had taken hold in some expert and political circles, both domestically and internationally. In many respects, the new UK defense review is a response to these criticisms.

The Defense Review in Context

Following the May 2010 British general election, a coalition government was formed for the first time since World War II. Amongst many other things, the then Conservative-Liberal government intro­duced legislation to fix parliamentary terms for five years, and to carry out a review of British security and defense policies – the first full strategic defense review since 1998, following a defense white paper in 2003. They also committed the next British government to carry out another defense review following the 2015 general election (the Conservatives won a parliamentary majority in the May 2015 election).

The 2010 review was inspired more by fis­cal austerity than by strategic concerns: the financial crash, and the ensuing economic crisis, had caused the government budget deficit to more than quadruple between 2007 and 2009 (from £ 36 billion to £ 156 billion, according to the UK Office for Na­tional Statistics). The defense budget was slashed by around eight per cent in the five years after 2010, and the army was reduced to its lowest manpower level since the Na­poleonic era.

Some existing capabilities were decommis­sioned with immediate effect, such as the flagship HMS Ark Royal aircraft carrier, and some planned projects were cancelled, such as new Nimrod MRA4 maritime pa­trol aircraft. Other projects were delayed, including two new aircraft carriers (mean­ing the UK would not have carrier strike capability for a decade), or their acquisition orders were modified, for instance by switching from the Short-Takeoff-Verti­cal-Landing (STOVL) model to the cheaper conventional carrier version of next-generation F-35 fighter jets (this de­cision was reversed in 2012).

Because of the urgent focus on cost cutting, and a relatively rushed deliberation process, the November 2010 review had a cobbled-together feel and lacked strategic coher­ence. For example, it considered a large-scale military attack by other states to be a “low probability”, with terrorism and cy­bersecurity identified as strategic priorities. Nevertheless, acquiring two new aircraft carriers was classified as a priority capabil­ity investment, even though their role in tackling cybercrime or terrorism was not immediately obvious.

At that time, the UK was still heavily in­volved in the international counterinsur­gency effort in Afghanistan, having re­moved combat troops from Iraq in 2009 (some trainers remained until 2011). These long-term external operations had taken up the majority of British defense resources for almost a decade. Because of mixed re­sults in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the urgency of the domestic economic crisis, in 2010 the British public was weary and starting to become increasingly wary of in­ternational military operations. For exam­ple, although he had co-led the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, in 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron lost a par­liamentary vote to bomb the forces of Syr­ia’s Bashir al-Assad following their sus­pected use of chemical weapons.

However, between 2010 and 2015, a num­ber of new strategic and operational chal­lenges exposed some gaps in the approach contained in the 2010 SDSR. The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, which the UK led with France, showed the usefulness of having carrier groups and exposed a shortage of precision munitions as well as some intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnais­sance equipment. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and subsequent incursions into NATO airspace and waters not only showed that state-based threats also needed to be deterred, but also exposed a lack of maritime patrol aircraft.

A Fuller-spectrum Strategic Approach

The 2015 SDSR is more coherent and am­bitious than its predecessor. Because of in­tervening Russian aggression in Ukraine (alongside other crises and the rise of the IS) since 2010, it calls for the UK now to simultaneously tackle non-state challenges and deter state-based threats. For cross-border challenges, there is some continuity with 2010, as the 2015 document contin­ues to highlight the threats from terrorism, cybercrime, and serious and organized crime. Notably, the UK will double the funds allocated to cybersecurity to £ 1.9 billion over the next five years. In addition, a new national cybersecurity strategy and program will be developed during 2016.

Despite the urgent security crises in Eu­rope’s immediate neighborhood (Libya, Syria, Ukraine), the 2015 review empha­sizes – like the 2010 version – that the UK should keep a global outlook. The useful­ness and breadth of the country’s diplo­matic network and development program (the UK is the first G7 country to spend 0.7 per cent of gross national income on development assistance) are spelled out in the 2015 review, more coherently than in 2010, as examples of the UK’s global influ­ence and ways of building stability to com­plement other security efforts, including the use of military means.

Moreover, a desire to work more closely on security issues with African, Middle East­ern (like Bahrain), and Asia-Pacific part­ners (such as Australia and Japan) is spelled out more forthrightly than before. The UK intends to invest much more in “defense engagement”, and will establish defense staffs for training and capacity-building with partners in the Gulf, the Asia-Pacific region, and Africa during 2016.

Alliances are also heavily underlined in the 2015 review, with a strong emphasis on working through NATO, which the UK considers to be the “bedrock of our nation­al defense”. The UK intends to remain “NATO’s strongest military power in Eu­rope” and will continue to contribute to the Atlantic alliance’s defensive efforts in East­ern Europe, such as Baltic air policing and military exercises. In addition, the UK in­tends to deepen its bilateral cooperation with three key allies in particular: the US, France, and Germany.

These sections covering NATO and bilat­eral cooperation with key allies are fol­lowed by a section on security cooperation through the EU. The document states that the EU has “a range of capabilities to build security and respond to threats, which can be complementary to those of NATO”. Those capabilities include EU missions, both military and civilian, alongside devel­opment and security support. The UK would also like the EU and NATO to work together more effectively in tackling secu­rity challenges, such as countering hybrid threats.

Regarding military tasks, the 2015 review highlights two aspects in particular. One is the ongoing need for strong deterrence ca­pabilities, represented by the continuation of the Trident nuclear program. Another aspect is the ability to respond quickly and robustly to a variety of international secu­rity crises, i.e., to deploy strike capabilities overseas rapidly, ranging from special forc­es to aircraft carrier groups. Longer-term counter-insurgency deployments of the type that had characterized British military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere during the 2000s are no longer viewed as an operational priority. Instead, the main operational priority will be the capability of projecting military power globally quickly and robustly, alongside a greater emphasis on deterrence.

Spending and Capabilities

This fuller-spectrum strategic approach will need resources, and among the military establishment, there had been fears before the review that the UK would continue to cut its defense budget. This was because following the May 2015 general election, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, made clear that he wished to continue with deficit-cutting policies. However, to the surprise of some, London intends to increase defense expenditure by around five per cent by 2020, and promises to meet the NATO target of spending at least two per cent of GDP on defense each year over the same period.

Meeting NATO’s 2 per cent target is im­portant for two reasons. First, the target was agreed at a 2014 NATO summit host­ed by the UK (in Wales), implying that Britain should try to set an example to oth­er NATO allies. Second, according to NATO estimates, only three other Euro­pean members – Estonia, Greece, and Po­land – met this target in 2015, so London is and intends to remain in the vanguard of European defense spenders in the coming years. But at least two factors may chal­lenge the ability of the UK to meet the 2 per cent target in real terms over the next five years. This pledge is based on economic forecasts anticipating at least two per cent GDP growth each year to 2020, so any drop below this rate would imply a real re­duction (even if not a nominal fall) in the defense budget (bearing in mind that the real price of advanced equipment projects typically rises by around five per cent a year).

Another uncertainty is the economic fall­out following a possible British exit from the EU (sometimes referred to as “Brexit”) – the UK government has to hold a refer­endum on its EU membership by the end of 2017, and is expected to do so during summer or fall of 2016. Estimates vary wildly as to the potential economic conse­quences of a Brexit, but any resulting drop in GDP would impact real defense spend­ing. For example, a 2015 study by two re­spected German research institutes, the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the ifo Institute, calculated that a worst-case scenario Brexit could knock some 14 per cent off the UK’s GDP, costing the economy more than € 300 billion.

More specifically, London intends to invest £ 178 billion (€ 236 billion) in military equipment over the coming decade, an in­crease of £ 12 billion (€ 16 billion) over pre­vious plans. That money will be spent both on preplanned projects, such as maintain­ing the Trident nuclear deterrent and de­veloping two new aircraft carriers, and on closing some capability gaps that resulted from the austerity-driven 2010 review. For example, the air force will acquire nine new maritime patrol aircraft to monitor Rus­sian submarine incursions, together with fielding 24 stealthy F-35 fighter jets on the two new aircraft carriers within a total of 42 aircraft by 2023 (the UK remains com­mitted to buying 138 F-35s overall).

The navy will receive new combat ships, but only eight new Type 26 frigates are guaran­teed – admirals had hoped for 13 – with perhaps around five smaller and cheaper vessels filling the gap. Some British mari­time experts are concerned that the UK will not have an adequate number of sur­face combatants to perform an increasing number of missions in the coming years. The overall externally deployable strength of the combined British armed forces will increase from 30,000 in the 2010 review to 50,000 by 2025. Roughly 40,000 of these troops will come from the army. More spe­cifically, the army will be able to deploy at very short notice two 5,000-strong “strike brigades” equipped with new Ajax armored vehicles. Moreover, almost 2,000 addition­al intelligence officers will be recruited by MI5 and MI6 (the domestic and foreign intelligence services) and GCHQ (the sig­nal-intelligence agency) to track terrorists and cyberthreats.