Taking missile defense by the Tusks

To an outsider, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk must look like a foolish risktaker. After many months of negotiations and an enormous investment of time and reputation, the Poles are suddenly playing hardball with the US over missile defense. Taking a dramatic u-turn from the strategy adopted by the previous Polish government, Tusk has upped the ante, taking a defiant stand ever since a March visit to Washington.

Now, with the Poles insisting that the US invest heavily in upgrading Poland's air defenses and the US hinting it could look elsewhere to base interceptors for the anti-missile system, Tusk could end up with nothing.

Yet, in reality, the prime minister finds himself in a nearly win-win situation, with a good chance of spinning whatever result, even coming up empty handed, to his gain.

If the new demands are met, which could amount to billions of dollars, then Tusk and his government will go down in history as those who pushed the Americans to the wall and finally got some substantial returns for Poland's close alliance with the US.

If the Americans walk away, then the majority of Poles will hardly care, never enthusiastic about the missile base to begin with and frustrated that the country, in their opinion, has not benefited enough from the supposedly "special" relationship with the US.

Many Poles have been bitter about the lack of new business contracts in Iraq and the US refusal to lift visa requirements for Polish citizens, despite the country's massive deployment of soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan and the resulting casualties.

"Most Poles will appreciate Tusk's toughness and will see it as a fulfillment of election promises for a foreign policy more independent of the US," Jacek Kucharczyk, research director at the Warsaw-based Institute of Public Affairs, tells ISN Security Watch. "So the chances of overplaying his hand are slim - the only problem for him would be to undersell the shield, i.e. agree to it in exchange for next to nothing."

It's doubtful any breakthroughs will emerge until later in the summer when four expert working groups, created earlier this month to study the situation, issue their conclusions. They have been tasked with judging the threats to Poland of housing the interceptors, suggesting how intelligence might be shared between the two countries, and analyzing the needs and costs of an upgrade to Poland's military.

In the meantime, the Poles have also been busy on the European front, with Defense Minister Bogdan Klich calling for a stronger military role for the EU, including having its own independent planning headquarters. He even spoke of the EU eventually having the equivalent of NATO's Article 5, whereby members must come to the aid of an ally if attacked.

And in an apparent move to put those words into action, Klich announced the country would join Eurocorps, the military force linked to the EU and NATO, Polish media reported on 15 May. Launched as an independent Franco-German project in 1992, Eurocorps, while not formally part of the EU, provides support to EU, NATO and UN operations.

Klich pledged a full brigade, around 3,000 soldiers, which would join soldiers from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. According to the Warsaw Business Journal, "the agreement of the president and prime minister on any topic is unusual and, in this case, is seen as indicative of Poland's commitment to European matters."

Some media have labeled Klich's proclamation a turning point in Poland's security policy, with the International Herald Tribune, for example, labeling the stance "a major shift in policy."

The newspaper also surmised that Poland had warmed to the idea of a strong European military after hearing comments such as those made in February by Victoria Nuland, US ambassador to NATO, who said "Europe needs a place where it can act independently." The US has long been wary that a stronger European military could dilute the power of NATO and Washington's central role.

Others might also view such comments as another negotiating ploy to use in the ongoing discussions with the US, a way of saying that Poland has other options when it comes to defense.

Yet the new government's support for a stronger EU foreign and security role is not a novel idea.

"This was always the Polish position," says Kucharczyk. "Even [euroskeptic former prime minister Jaroslaw] Kaczynski once proposed a 100,000-strong EU army, but the fact that Poland supported a strong EU was neglected because of our disagreements with major players [such as France and Germany] on a host of issues, such as Iraq and Russia. Since Poland was opposed to these key EU players on such crucial issues, it was assumed - incorrectly, I think -that it is against EU foreign policy in general."

Poland's drive to expand its influence in Europe will also be on full display this week as the country, along with Sweden, will present a new initiative on 26 May for dealing with the EU's eastern neighbors.

Apparently an effort to counterbalance a French plan to boost cooperation with Mediterranean nations, the "Eastern Partnership" initiative aims to upgrade relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and eventually Belarus.

The goal is to place relations more in a regional framework instead of confining them to the traditional bilateral action plans that are part and parcel of the European Commission's European Neighborhood Policy.

Initial indications are that the plan will call for visa-free travel and free trade zones for services and agricultural products. Reportedly, Poland and Sweden have also decided to push for a special coordinator for the region, similar to the role that has been played over the past six years in the Balkans by Erhard Busek, the coordinator of the EU's activities through the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

The reaction so far has been decidedly mixed.

While welcomed in some quarters - where the belief is strong that greater engagement with the East, including democracy promotion and economic development, serve the Union's last-term interests - others are more skeptical, saying the new initiative won't have its own funds or institutions. There are also worries that all these new high-profile plans - both for the South and for the East - will also complicate the EU's stated intention of developing a common security and defense policy.

In any case, the Polish initiative, the forcefulness of calls for a strong EU military and Tusk's missile-defense bet have made for a busy spring at the Polish foreign and defense ministries. And each in their own way will help determine whether Poland plays a central role in security policy on both sides of the Atlantic in the near future or remains on the periphery as larger players call the shots.