Sarkozy's moment as commander-in-chief
By Andrew D Bishop for ISN
For Jean-Paul Hébert, a military budget analyst and the head of the Paris-based Interdisciplinary Research Center on Strategic and Peace Studies, Sarkozy's recent announcement illustrates his lasting ambivalence toward the French military.
"On the one hand the new president has clearly decided to take defense issues in his hands," Hébert told ISN Security Watch. "But on the other, his famous lack of interest in military affairs is raising both doubts and fears about his ability to manage France's current strategic reorientation."
This view has become increasingly common among French journalists and members of the Assemblée nationale (one of the country's two parliamentary chambers) who worry the president might have turned the recently finished writing of a new white paper on defense into an easy means to cut back on government expenditures.
The white paper, which Sarkozy is scheduled to release next Tuesday, 17 June, is the third in a limited series of security doctrines initiated in 1972.
Commissioned nearly a year ago by Sarkozy and originally scheduled to be released in March, the new white paper is expected to be modest on all points.
First, it is expected to serve as a legitimization for France's current and coming reductions in military expenditures. In addition to having already announced the closure of numerous military bases in France as well as abroad, Defense Minister Hervé Morin is expected to lead a string of cutbacks in military procurements.
Hébert believes, for example, that the French General Delegation for Ordnance will order less than half of the original number of new frigates and build only four out of the six new submarines that were planned. He also believes that the announced purchase of naval Rafale aircraft to be added to the country's current arsenal will be cut in half.
These numbers appear particularly striking when combined with repeated reports that some 55,000 positions will be cut from the Defense Ministry's job listing, 6,000 of them in the near future.
Less equipment, more pressure
The logic behind these reductions is two-fold. From a manpower point of view, the moves will mark the culmination of France's shift toward a fully professional armed corps. As for equipment, the government's aim is to make fewer but better purchases.
Overall, the new doctrine's logic is one of force-projection rather than traditional border defense.
"The times are over when Soviet troops were massed along the German border, and the architects behind the white paper know that," Hébert said.
"The aim now is to send fewer troops in the field and to get them back home more quickly. But the problem is that this also means putting more pressure on both the troops and the equipment."
Such a shift risks leading to widespread anxiety within France's military ranks. In fact, this might already be the case.
On 22 May, leading defense analyst Jean Guisnel penned a column entitled "The army's morale is at rock-bottom" after an internal investigation revealed that the average private's enthusiasm ranked 5.2 on a scale of one to ten.
But the military is not the only institution likely to be irritated by Sarkozy's strategic decisions.
Earlier this year, the French economic daily La Tribune reported that many, though not all, CEOs in France's arms production sector were anxious about the president's agenda for their industry.
Most recently, in addition, one of the country’s leading civil servants’ union – the Fédération nationale des travailleurs de l'Etat(FNTE-CGT) – called the president’s project a “social carnage.”
Sarkozy's worst enemies in this endeavor, however, have been members of parliament, whose main concern is that the government's cutbacks will anger their constituents and threaten their future re-election chances. This has been even more true of local representatives who have already had to face a tide of discontent with the recent announcement that the country's less critical barracks will soon be closed.
Paper postponement and politics
The government has already endured two setbacks with the white paper.
This February, just a month before the paper was due, the panel in charge postposed the publication until spring. This was interpreted by most observers as nothing more than a way for the government to avoid going public with its new plans in the midst of already difficult municipal elections, which its main opponent, the Socialist Party, eventually won.
More recently, in April, two Socialist MPs withdrew from the paper's coordinating panel in an effort to signal their opposition to what they perceived as the panel's eminently political spin in recent months.
Though it will not prevent him from soon releasing the paper, this type of protest is nevertheless an issue for Sarkozy.
Indeed, since his election last year, Sarkozy has sought to achieve what he calls "ouverture" (the opening) of his cabinet and ministries to leading figures of several opposition parties, thereby trying to appear as the leader of the whole nation rather than any one fraction of it. The controversy surrounding the white paper taints that image.
But the main problem with the Socialist MPs' withdrawal from the panel, however, is that their feelings have been shared by many of Sarkozy's closest allies. As one of parliamentarian, Didier Boulaud, told the French weekly L'Express in April, the sentiment that the president did not give the panel enough autonomy is not a partisan one. Instead, it cuts across the country's traditional political cleavages.
Sarkozy's military moves
What lies behind this unrest is the impression that Sarkozy has tried to go it alone on most defense issues these past months. From his decision to increase France's troop level in Afghanistan, which was energetically debated in parliament, to his plans to reconcile his country with NATO, Sarkozy has undoubtedly been active on the military front.
What is less certain is whether or not he has managed to become France's true commander-in-chief: someone who has the ability to bridge differences and lead the nation through difficult times.
Despite having one of the world's strongest military forces, most French seldom take much interest in issues relating to their country's defense. This apathy, however, is something Sarkozy could well see changing over the next few months if his reforms lead to a spike in unemployment or, worse, military casualties.