Extremism and security coalesce

The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence's (ISI) most recent contacts with Maulavi Jalaludinn Haqqani's militant network add fuel to a smoldering fire around its trustworthiness at a time when India is accusing it of having dubious ties with extremist groups and of complicity in the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. If true, however, it would not represent the only incident in which security services have established close ties with or been infiltrated by extremists.

ISI sympathies for Afghan militants emerged during the Soviet occupation and have continued to some extent. With US encouragement and support, the ISI funded, trained and supplied mujahideen, including Haqqani, in their battle against the Soviets.

However, ISI interests went beyond the Soviet ouster. Afghanistan provides Pakistan with strategic depth in its conflict with India. As a result, few in Islamabad seek to sever connections with their Afghan brethren.

Since the Soviet retreat, the ISI has used Afghanistan to train Lashtar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad members. In 2001, US officials corroborated this evidence by confirming that several members of a Pakistani-supported Kashmiri militant group were killed by the 1998 US cruise missile strikes on al-Qaida training camps near Khost, Afghanistan (See "A Nation Challenged: The Spied; Pakistani Intelligence Had Tied to Al Qaeda, US Official Say," New York Times 29 October 2001, accessed on-line 31 July 2008).

During the 1999 Kargil conflict with India, the ISI contemplated re-deploying Pakistan's nuclear forces to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to negate a pre-emptive Indian strike (See Sagan, Scott D, "How to Keep the Bomb From Iran," Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 20006 v 85 issue 5 p 45-59). And in 2000, the US Secret Service tried to dissuade then-president Bill Clinton from traveling to Pakistan because the country's security forces were so badly penetrated, that extremists, including al-Qaida, would learn of the president's travel route from sympathizers within the ISI, according to the New York Times article.

Circumstances have not necessarily improved even though the ISI remains an important source of intelligence on extremism in the region.

Pakistan's tribal territories are largely out of government control and used as safe havens for Taliban and foreign fighters striking at NATO forces in Afghanistan. Recent reports indicate these attacks are better planned and coordinated than ever before. Although no public evidence is available, indications are that the militant training is being conducted minimally with ISI complicity if not direct involvement. Some NATO commanders also contend that the ISI is sharing intelligence on NATO troop movements with the Taliban.

ISI ties with extremist groups also include connections with al-Qaida. General Kilbaz Sherzai, an Afghan intelligence chief, external pagewonderedcall_made why Pakistan did not arrest Haqqani, whom he claimed was Osama bin Laden's friend, in 2004.

In 2005, Abu Faraj Libi, al-Qaida's number 3, acknowledged to his captors that he had forged links with an ISI-Afghan cell. The ISI also supported the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group with known ties to Taliban and reported ones to al-Qaida, by providing refuge to the group's Imam, Tokhir Yudalshev, and visiting with its now-deceased leader, Namangani, Ahmed Rashid writes in Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia( Yale University Press, New London CT 2002, p 216).

The ISI is not the only security service to either forge links with or be penetrated by extremists.

A Saudi National Guard (SANG) officer with Salafist sympathies, Al Utaibi, organized the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. SANG members also have been accused of collusion in the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh. These incidents are disconcerting because of the SANG's elite nature and close ties to the royal family.

After the 2008 bombing of the Serena Hotel in Kabul, the Afghan Interior Ministry arrested some of its own men for the attack. According to a 1 May article this year in the New York Times, once in custody, the prisoners also confessed to the attempted assassination of President Hamid Karzai in April and confirmed al-Qaida's infiltration of the Interior Ministry.

However, penetration is not exclusive to security services.

As many as 50 high-ranking Taliban were assigned to Afghan government posts in 2005. Following riots in August 2006, a new Kabul police chief with ties to organized crime and 13 others who appeared on the "do not employ list," were given command posts, according to a 23 August 2006 article in the New York Times.

Also in 2005, the former head of Kuwaiti security, Mashaal Jarrah, acknowledged the infiltration by two members of al-Qaida into the Kuwaiti parliament (See Terrorism Focus, v II Issue 17, 19 September 2005).

Rashid contends that Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) has effectively infiltrated the Uzbek government and has increasing numbers of sympathizers in the army, intelligence services and upper level bureaucracy. Considering the intelligentsia's growing infatuation with HT, particularly in Central Asia, it is quite plausible that a large number of sympathizers exist in many government posts in the region.

In angry, repressed and impoverished populations, religiously anti-western rhetoric resonates in all sectors of society. As a result, extremists and security sector personnel coalesce at many levels. Limited vetting, inadequate training and lack of concern for the conscript's individual needs encourages enlisted men to align with those who espouse better opportunities whether through extremism or corruption.

The security sector's unique culture also contributes to its own militancy. The lack of civilian control and oversight exacerbates already significant organizational autonomy and eliminates individual accountability.

In October 2002, Safarali Chalishev, head of Tajikistan's Interior Ministry Department for Battling Organized Crime, and Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Kim were convicted for murder, extortion, racketeering and drug trafficking, Rashid writes in his book. In a 15 January article this year, the New York Times reported that "dozens of ISI officers who trained militants had come to sympathize with their cause[…]."

Finally, security services' traditional homogeneity, as compared to military units, makes them susceptible to extremist tendencies from their own clans.

The security sector's autonomy and opaque nature complicates the identification, de-politicization and removal of those holding extremist sympathies. Thus, eliminating fundamentalist beliefs and keeping extremist sympathies from emerging is nearly impossible.

This situation is indicative of a broader problem that confronts western policymakers.