Cuba's emerging leverage

When Russian daily Izvestia reported on 21 July that Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers had landed in Cuba, it set off a sprint in Washington as analysts and military leaders struggled to understand the situation.

At first, it appeared that Moscow had made a very serious gesture. Russia's perceived geopolitical maneuver in Cuba, many thought, was in response to the US' plans for an anti-missile shield defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

By 24 July, after three days of media hype and speculation over Russia's true intentions, Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Ilshat Baichurin, dismissed any intention for a strategic deployment in Cuba.

Two events quickly followed up this announcement. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin arrived in Cuba on 30 July for extended talks with Raul and Fidel Castro. A former KGB operative and known confidant of now-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Sechin was an active operative during the Cold War and enjoyed a deep relationship with the Castros.

Putin then followed up Sechin's visit with a 5 August announcement that Russia ought to "restore [its] position in Cuba and other countries."

Observers agree a military presence in Cuba is not in Moscow's best interests; rather, closer economic ties would behoove both nations. Sechin's recent visit underlines the latter observation and coaxes Washington into a more open posture toward Cuba, an island nation the next US presidential administration would likely prefer not to lose again to the Russians.

The country is seemingly in a position to leverage its newfound attraction in two powerful nations. If the Castros can capitalize on Cuba's emerging position with both countries, it might find a way to pull the right geopolitical levers to win badly needed foreign direct investment (FDI).

"Cuba has more to gain and more to lose," Dan Erikson, senior associate for US policy and director of Caribbean programs with the Inter-American Dialogue told ISN Security Watch, commenting on if a closer relationship with the US than with Russia would be advantageous to Cuba.

"On the economic level, if travel and trade with the US were normalized, it would boost the Cuban economy," Erikson pointed out. "But then on the other hand, the Cuban government's number one preoccupation has been to maintain control over the island, and that is much easier within the context of the US embargo," he said, adding, "Cuba prefers to deal with countries that shares its ideology or at least respects it."

Moscow's interests

"The ideological rationale for close relations with Cuba ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, of course, and there has been little interest in Moscow in reviving the relationship until now," Derek Averre, a research fellow with the European Institute's Center for Russian and East European Studies, told ISN Security Watch.

"However, Moscow is keen to support the idea of a sovereign Cuba which does not fall wholly under a US sphere of interest," he added.

The rumors of Moscow's interests in using Cuba as a military forward operations location (FOL), some analysts argue, were most likely generated to signal Washington over Russia's displeasure for ongoing maneuvering in what used to be the latter's close sphere of influence, not to completely disrupt its own relationship with the US or Cuba.

Moscow intends to close the gap with Havana that occurred when it ceased financial aid to the island and further widened in 2001 when Russia closed a listening post there.

The electronic monitoring and surveillance facility near Havana at Torrens was closed in October 2001, precipitating the removal of an annual US$200 million payment Russia gave Cuba for use of the 28-square-mile area.

It was one of Russia's largest signal intelligence listening posts in the Western Hemisphere, but one Moscow could no longer afford. The unilateral and sudden closure of this base incensed Cuban leaders. They were neither consulted, nor were there any diplomatic overtures made to include Cuba in the decision process leading up to the closure of the base.

Since then, relations between Moscow and Havana have been chilly at best.

With the recent installment of Cuba's new leader, Raul Castro, Moscow has decided to repair relations with the high-level and overt visit recently made by Sechin: a man feared in Washington and welcomed in Havana.

His visit to Cuba began the process of business deals in tourism, pharmaceuticals, civilian aviation and oil, including most importantly the discussion of a refinery operated by Russian oil firm LUKoil.

If conversations over strategic interests were discussed in private, Cuba has publicly made its position well known. It is happy to receive FDI from Russia but will not engage in any military-military relations.

Military realities

Both Cuba and Russia know that any military-military relations between the two countries will provoke an immediate and negative response from Washington.

The US has geopolitical pulleys in place to pressure Russia, vis-à-vis relationships in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in Russia's neighborhood, and can pressure Cuba with a direct withdrawal from what has heretofore been the slow opening of a diplomatic aperture between the two historical enemies.

Any FOL for Russia in Cuba would mean an immediate departure for the latter from Washington's good graces and the declaration of the restart of a geopolitical battle between Moscow and Washington, thereby erasing any gains made by Putin during his presidency.

"Cuba has no strategic value to a post-Soviet Russia which is a regional great power but no longer a global superpower and, furthermore, it runs counter to Moscow's attempt to play a constructive role in international relations," Averre said, adding, "A revived military relationship is highly unlikely."

Russian military assets in Cuba would be limited to the projection of soft power, signaling Cuba's de facto decision to fall into step with its old ally.

Due to the proximity of the US naval base in Key West, Florida as well as other naval and US Coast Guard assets in the region, any hardware Moscow places on Cuban soil would most likely stay grounded or in port or face a direct confrontation with a far superior fighting force supported by various nearby ports. Russia would invite conflict half a world away from home – not an ideal situation for any military.

The reality of an aggressive Russian military presence in Cuba is one that is negative for both countries. It is simply one neither country sees as beneficial to its long term geopolitical goals in the region.

Cuba in the middle

When US Congress approved some US$42 million in aid destined to Cuba on 22 July, it was a concrete signal. Relations between the two countries are likely to improve over time despite the staunchly anti-Castro contingent that retains a powerful voting block in southern Florida.

Raul Castro is well aware of this future. And while he is willing to play hard ball with Washington, he knows the potential FDI upshot from the US could be beneficial to his people, Cuba's economy, and ultimately his regime.

Raul is also aware that Russia is keen to improve relations. His three-day visit with Sachin erased any doubt that Moscow is eager to invest in Cuba's energy and medical resources. Havana has long been interested in becoming a refining hub in the region, and is eager to complete the LUKoil deal to have the Russian energy firm refine Venezuelan heavy crude for domestic use and, perhaps, export to the US.

Cuba is in the middle with each hand on two heavy geopolitical levers. By applying the right amount of pressure, the country can certainly benefit from both relationships. Too much pressure on either side, and Cuba risks losing one or both connections. In the end, however, the island nation will stick to its historical roots – maintain sovereignty and some dignity no matter what the cost.

"Cuba's attitude is 'We'll take your money, but that doesn't mean we'll do what you want,'" Erikson said, adding, "Frankly, I don't see Russian power projection in the Caribbean or in the rest of Latin America."