ME space race heats up

The test launch of a faux Iranian satellite earlier this month has again drawn attention to nascent efforts to counter Israel's dominion as a regional celestial power, Dominic Moran writes for ISN Security Watch.

Iran launched the dummy satellite into space on 17 August taking an important step in its quest for an autonomous satellite program. In an earlier test on 4 February, the indigenously fabricated Safir launch vehicle did not reach orbital velocity in what was apparently the second apparent launcher systems test ahead of this month's launch.

Analysts' responses to this month's launch have been mixed with some viewing it as an important indicator of progress. Others sought to present the test as a further indicator of the perceived dangers posed by Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear programs, while some have cast doubts on Iranian claims that the launch was successful.

Stockholm International Peace Research Center researcher Shannon Kile told ISN Security Watch that there is "no doubt" that Iran has made significant progress in space R&D in recent years, adding, "There was a launch a few days ago of something and it is not quite clear what it was."

Initial Defense Ministry claims that the country's first domestically produced telecommunications satellite, Omid, had been launched with the vehicle were quickly refuted by government officials.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad confirmed that Omid had not been launched in a speech last Saturday in Arak in which he was quoted as saying that Iran now had the "advanced technology to launch its first remote-sensing telecommunication satellite into space."

The speech came shortly after the head of the Iranian Space Agency announced plans for Iran's first manned space flight within 10 years. Iranian officials have repeatedly made statements regarding the development and capacity of space systems and related plans that have turned out to be grossly overoptimistic.

In February, Ahmadinejad presided over the opening of Iran's space center and second launch site at Emamshahr in a remote northern desert region. He retains at least titular authority over the Iranian space program as head of the governing Iran Space Council, which has authority over Iranian Space Agency activities.

Seeking autonomy

While the paucity of reliable, independent, extant information on the Iranian space program makes it all but impossible to ascertain actual progress, this month's Safir launch appeared to constitute a significant step on the path to an independent satellite imaging capacity which, if achieved, would be seen as a major strategic threat by western and allied Arab powers and Israel.

"I think their [Iran's] intentions are very, very broad," Yiftah Shapir, of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, told ISN Security Watch. "They want to be able to build their own satellites; they want to be able to launch their own satellites."

Iran is reportedly working on five satellite programs, though little information is available on the development status of several of these. Iranian claims in January 2006 that the Mesbah research satellite - developed with Italian assistance - would be launched within three months came to nothing and no launch further launch date has been announced.

Iran does have a presence in space through the Russian-made Sinah-1, launched from Plesetsk cosmodrome in Russia on 28 October 2005.

Asked if Iran now enjoys a significant imaging capacity through the Sinah-1, Shapir said, "No. the satellite that was launched has a camera, but […] it is not a camera that can bring you pictures good enough for any other purpose […] not a resolution that would allow you any military significance."

The fact that Iran was forced to turn to Russia's Polyot company both for the launch vehicle and satellite fabrication points to developmental problems with Iran's launcher and satellite fabrication which may, or may not, have been overcome in intervening years.

The Zohre (Venus), a telecommunications satellite, is being produced for Iran under the terms of a 2005 deal with Russia, but the launch date has reportedly been put off until next year at the earliest with the delay apparently caused by contractual issues.

Asked if there had been launch vehicle progress through the three Iranian launcher tests, Kile said, "Yes, they are definitely making technical progress." He cautioned that the Iranians were not necessarily going to have a system that was "able to deploy immediately."

"I think one of the issues people are looking at is: Is the technology Iran is developing now purely indigenous or are they getting outside assistance," he said. "The most likely source of outside assistance would be possibly North Korea but more likely Pakistan. The recent [ballistic] missile that the Iranians launched, the so-called Ashoura missile, may be a derivative of a Pakistani design."

Dual use potential

While the specter of an independent Iranian satellite program raises concerns in the west, the identity of the launch vehicle is itself a potentially important indicator of progress in Iranian ballistic missile development.

Kile notes that the launcher is "where everyone is concerned because that technology is dual use and could also be used directly in military applications with warheads."

According to some reports, the rocket used in this month's test is a derivative of the Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile, for which the Israeli Arrows anti-missile system is being developed as a direct counter, with US funding.

Referring to the second launch, Shapir said: "What they showed on television in February was definitely a Shahab-3. [However] at least one of the sources I read said that what was actually launched or tested in February was not a Shahab and that the footage that they released did not belong to the vehicle actually tested."

The use of a Shahab-3 derivation for this purpose can be seen as confirmation of the shelving of the Shahab-4 - an impression bolstered by the reported extension of the range of the Shahab-3B (C and D are also reportedly in mass production) to encompass the initial intended range of the Shahab-4. Again, speculation abounds.

"It looks like the Iranians are moving away from liquid fuel missiles to solid fuel missiles and that is a big technological leap," Kile said.

"If you are looking to have a military program solid fuel rockets are the way to go because you don't have to have all the fuelling trucks, you don't have to have all the associated infrastructure, you can fire them on much shorter notice," he said. "So if it is the case that Iran is indeed moving towards solid propellant ballistic missiles that would have important military implications."

It is important to note that there does not appear to be significant credible evidence of the militarization of Iranian Space Agency activities, which appear clearly aimed at this point at civil scientific R&D and the related deposit of space vehicles into Low Earth Orbit (160km-2000km).

The Iranian Defense Ministry was involved in the fabrication of the rocket launched in February 2007, which carried research created material created by the ministries of science and defense. The Defense Ministry has also made it clear that it sees the development of a satellite capacity as an important national priority.

With the potential relationship of Iranian missile programs to the country's nuclear intentions a key source of concern in western capitals, the utilization of the Iranian space program as a potential driver of ballistic missile development may attract unwanted international attention to the space program.

Asked what the strategic import of Iran developing a satellite capacity would be, Kile said: "It is not so much the satellite capability per se […] [but] if Iran were to eventually develop the capability to launch satellites into medium and high earth orbit, to have that capability means that you are also going to have the capability to manufacture ballistic missiles that can deliver a military payload to quite some distance, well in excess of 2,000km."

Developing programs

"Most countries in the Middle East have their own communication satellite which they bought, Egypt has one; Turkey has several; Saudi Arabia has [too]; the UAE has the most advanced communication satellite in the world." Shapir said, adding, "The Iranians have been trying to do the same for the past 30 years and the project is not getting off the ground."

Egypt launched its first imaging satellite, EgyptSat1, in April 2007 in a cooperative venture with a Ukrainian firm. The planned launch of a second reconnaissance satellite, Desertsat, by the end of 2007, has come and gone without further statements of intent.

According to reports, EgyptSat's multi-spectral camera is the first of its kind deployed by a Middle East state, transmitting black-and-white, color and infrared images. Some Israeli analysts believe the launch caused a significant shift in the strategic balance between the countries and in the wider Middle East.

Shapir disagrees: "It has a camera but I don't think it has any military significance. It is a research satellite with the goal of training engineers to be able to build satellites, to be able to conduct experiments in space."

The Saudis also appear to have long-term plans for achieving a significant presence in space with Saudisat 3, launched in April 2007, utilizing imaging technology provided by a South African firm.

Asked how advanced the Saudis are in satellite R&D, Shapir said, "They are building, with the help of some western companies, their own research satellite but this is very, very rudimentary."

Israel: building capacity

Israel is seeking to maintain its strategic edge in space, launching the Eros B in April 2007, whose imaging system is said to be capable of pinpointing objects as small as 70cm across, as opposed to EgyptSat1's estimated 4m across, and highly advanced TecSAR this January.

"Israel is much, much more advanced than any other countries in the Middle East with the Ofeq and EROS military imaging satellites," Shapir said.

Israel has far greater indigenous development capacities than its Middle East competitors and a clear preference for autonomous development of highly sophisticated imaging and satellite systems.

The Shavit launcher utilized by the Israeli program has encountered significant problems in the past leading to two launcher failures - including the loss of the multimillion dollar Ofeq 4 and 6 reconnaissance satellites.

In response, Israel's January launch of the TecSAR spy satellite was conducted from an Indian facility utilizing an Indian rocket. Shapir explained that the heavier weight of the Indian launcher allowed for the deposit of a far larger satellite payload than the Shavit is capable of deploying through the latter's retrograde westward launch.

The decision provoked significant discord in the Israeli space industry where opponents reportedly saw it as directly undercutting Israel's autonomous development model. This, despite the prior launch of the Eros A and B from a Russia cosmodrome, utilizing Russian Start-1 rockets.

Shapir went on to explain that space program cooperation appealed as an important way to cement warming relations with New Delhi in light of the Israeli military's refusal to buy proffered Indian helicopters and UAVs.

The TecSAR's synthetic aperture radar is reportedly capable of capturing and transmitting images of 10cm across and can operate in darkness and penetrate thick clouds. Israel's Defense Ministry plans to launch a further highly sophisticated imaging satellite, Opsat, by the end of 2009, details of which remain under wraps.

It is clear that the small Israeli reconnaissance satellite array provides Israel with a clear strategic advantage that the Iranian space program looks unlikely to bridge in coming years, including the capacity to intercept Iranian military and civil communications, potentially crucial in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.

With the world's focus understandably on regional flashpoints and conflicts and prospects for the Iranian nuclear program, the extension of regional tensions to space has largely been ignored, mired in a welter of competing claims and counter-claims.

Nevertheless, with several regional states channeling massive disbursements into long-term space R&D and communication satellite purchases and Iran seemingly on the verge of its first autonomous satellite launch, the regional space race promises to open a new front for regional tensions that look set to supersede changes on the ground.

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