Ahmadinejad plans for victory

As neo-fundamentalism makes further inroads into every aspect of Iran's political and cultural life, Mahmood Ahmadinejad stands out as practically the only viable candidate for next year's pivotal presidential election.

On 24 August, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made a startling comment about Ahmadinejad's government that shocked many observers. In a private audience given to the president and members of his cabinet, Ayatollah Khamenei told them he supported their work: "In this final year, work with ‎the energy of the first year. Do not think that this year is the administration's final year; no. ‎Work like a person who is planning to work for another five years […]."

The comment was extraordinary because not only did it reveal the Supreme Leader's true feelings on the matter, but also because it showed a partisan engagement in Iran's factional politics, which Ayatollah Khamenei so far has tried to avoid.

Aware of the questionable nature of the comment, Ayatollah Khamenei's office issued a doctored version of the speech to the media the following day, editing out the controversial section mentioned above, with the media dutifully following orders.

"Ayatollah Khamenei has every reason to be pleased with this administration," an Iranian journalist told ISN Security Watch on condition of anonymity. "He has reversed many of the political and cultural changes made under [former President Mohammad] Khatami; re-introduced militancy in Iranian politics; stifled internal dissent; and has, perhaps unwittingly, made substantial gains in Iran's foreign policy sphere," he said. "Certainly, these should suffice for Mr Khamenei to overlook his [Ahmadinejad's] personal flaws."

The rival candidates

Aside from Ahmadinejad, there are three other potential conservative contenders who could make a bid for the presidency in 2009. These are former parliamentary speaker Gholamreza Hadad-Adel present Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghaliba. (There would surely be others, but only these candidates could present any serious challenge to Ahmadinejad.)

Of these, Hadad-Adel was forced out of the position of parliamentary speaker in a rather humiliating manner several months ago. During his tenure, he proved to be an exceedingly ineffectual speaker, and his claim to political fame is largely due to the fact that his daughter is married to one of Khamenei's sons - not a very convincing vote winner.

The second, Larijani, has a much better chance. As Iran's former top official on the nuclear case, he proved an adept diplomat and negotiator, scoring major points in his dealings with European diplomats last year. He also has familial and political ties with Iran's influential clerics.

But it would be highly irregular for the head of one branch of the government (i.e. the legislature) to resign from his job to take charge of another branch. It is also believed that the support Larijani received from the Ahmadinejad faction for his speakership in February was made with the tacit understanding that he would not make a bid for the presidency. In 2005, Larijani garnered only 2 million votes as opposed to Ahmadinejad's whopping 17 millions.

The last serious contender, Ghalibaf, is presently the most serious threat to Ahmadinejad. As mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf has done a relatively decent job in the areas of municipal governing and law and order, and according to a City Council consultant who spoke to ISN Security Watch on condition on anonymity, he has earmarked large sums of money for completing several municipal mega-projects in the next few months. (This is no doubt with an eye to the election.) He also has solid conservative credentials as a top former Revolutionary Guards commander, which can only help in his electoral bid.

On the negative side, Ghalibaf has some major shortcomings as far as conservative voters are concerned. First, he is "too modern" - meaning that both in his demeanor and his policies, he is not sufficiently fundamentalist. For instance, he regularly meets with reformist politicians and has taken a number of liberal (in the Iranian context) positions on some social issues.

To his detriment, he is also known mostly in Tehran. In the provinces and smaller cities, which account for over half of the votes, people know very little about him. Finally, he cannot galvanize the militants and young Basij Militia members the way Ahmadinejad can - a serious liability.

Bumpy road ahead

None of these necessarily mean that the next few months will be smooth sailing for Ahmadinejad. There are still a few factors that could wreck his plans for a re-election, though few observers expect him to lose.

The first factor is Khatami. The former reformist president has been urged by some of his supporters to make another run for presidency. Though, as of now, he is understandably very reluctant to do so, that could easily change. But the fact is that even if he does decide to run, there is simply no guarantee that the "silent majority" would vote for him again. In the last few years, most of Khatami's supporters seem to have concluded that holding office in Iran does not provide one with enough power to change the system in any measurable way.

In the last parliamentary election, Tehran voters, easily the most liberal in the country, for the most part boycotted the poll. The result was that conservative candidates won with the backing of a mere 13 percent of the electorate.

"If Khatami runs and most voters boycott the vote again, that would finish him as a major political figure in Iran," said the journalist.

Perhaps for that reason Khatami may decide not to run. "However, in the last 30 years, Iranians […] have proved to be quite unpredictable in their political behavior. They may still surprise the conservatives," he said.

Ten years ago, an unexpected landslide vote for Khatami completely changed the political landscape and nearly cost the conservatives their power. For that reason, there has been a concerted campaign in recent weeks to dissuade Khatami from running. Scores of hard-line MPs have petitioned the Judiciary to prosecute the former president for an interview he gave in which he had sharply questioned certain aspects of Iran's foreign policy. Other groups are urging the Guardian Council to disqualify him from the race.

The economy is another parameter that could undo Ahmadinejad.

Since he took office, inflation has officially gone up to more than 29 percent. The actual figure is probably much higher. This was a direct result of massive politically motivated government spending - thanks to the huge oil income windfall - and low interest rates. These policies - such as interest-free loans to newlyweds or cheap credit to small enterprises - which were directed at solving unemployment woes and securing the lower class support, have had mixed results.

While lacking any discernible re-distributive effects, they have convinced some voters of the government's sincerity. However, that has been offset partly by the rampant inflation; as such, it remains unclear how many of the 10 million social-justice-minded people who voted for Ahmadinejad in 2005 may do so again.

To minimize risk, according to the well-connected Alefnews website, the government plans to expend large sums of money in the coming few months in Keynesian-type projects in the provinces where most of its support is located.

The government's mismanagement of the economy is also legendary. Two years ago, Ahmadinejad disbanded the 60-year-old National Management and Planning Agency and handed over its functions to the governorates. His economic policy is ad hoc and mostly predicated on immediate results with no regard to the long-term planning.

This has given an opening to Ahmadinejad's old nemesis, former president Aliakbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose position in the hierarchy has been considerably bolstered since his election to the chairmanship of the powerful Assembly of Experts last year.

Right before the Supreme Leader made his ringing endorsement of the government last month, Rafsanjani had stated that the time for attacking the government's economic policy had arrived. The Expediency Council, which Rafsanjani also chairs and is currently filled with anti-Ahmadinejad personalities, declared recently that it planned to use its oversight over strategic economic policymaking to take the government policy to task if and when it strayed from prescribed policy. A number of task forces were set up to look into the matter with one proposing a "National Development Fund" to replace the Currency Reserve Funds, which is where much of the oil income is deposited and which has been the government's veritable piggy bank.

For now, the institutional opposition has been subdued. The day after the Supreme Leader's speech, Rafsanjani was forced to say that "we should all support this government." But this is temporary.

The international factor

Theoretically, a worsening international situation could potentially destroy the chances of an Ahmadinejad victory. But that's a rather unlikely scenario at present. If anything, regional and international developments could be considered as propitious for the Iranian president.

To Iranian voters, The US' inability to match threats by deeds and the West's general inability to punish Iran for pursuing its nuclear program must seem a vindication of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric concerning the hollowness of threats against Iran.

The recent war in the Caucasus seems to have also expanded Iran's room for maneuver, which in the next few months may also be used as political dividends by Ahmadinejad. (See Kamal Nazer Yasin, US, Russia: Tension opens new options for Iran, EurasiaNet).

While at this moment Ahmadinejad is without any serious rivals in sight and Ayatollah Khamenei appears to be satisfied with the general state of affairs, one can not entirely discount the possibility that the radical president may cause some domestic or even international problems for the Supreme Leader, as he has done repeatedly in the past.