Russia's trigger strategy

In the wake of the Georgian crisis, Moscow warns the West against fueling tensions in the Caucasus region while simultaneously appearing to favor a risky tit-for-tat response, Sergei Blagov writes for ISN Security Watch.

In the wake of the Georgian crisis and NATO naval deployment in the Black Sea, Russia has moved to demonstrate its presence in the US' backyard for the first time since the Cold War.

On 11 September Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that he had dispatched two Russian strategic bombers to Venezuela, pledging to hold maneuvers with those nations willing to expand military cooperation with Russia. Medvedev also stated that the Russian forces should be re-equipped.

According to Russian officials the two bombers dispatched to the Liberator military airfield in Venezuela were only equipped with dummy missiles for training flights. However, their high-profile mission to the Western Hemisphere, as well as planned naval maneuvers in the region, inevitably served to further increase tensions between Moscow and the West.

Earlier this month, Russian officials stated that Moscow would also send a "Peter the Great" nuclear-powered cruiser, one of the world's largest, to the Caribbean for joint naval maneuvers with Venezuela. The Russian naval force in Venezuelan waters would also include an anti-submarine vessel, aircraft and some 1,000 Russian military personnel.

Russian officials claim the drill is not directed toward any third side and not intended as a response to NATO naval deployment in the Black Sea. Moscow also denied plans of increasing military presence in the Caribbean.

Yet despite official denials, Russia's inroads into the Caribbean were still seen as an apparent response to a NATO naval build-up near its shores, and air force and naval missions to Venezuela a signal that Moscow did not intend to leave security challenges unanswered.

As Russian strategic bombers flew through Caribbean skies, in a move apparently designed set off alarm bells in Washington, ominous reminders of Cold War-era brinkmanship - especially the Cuban Missile Crisis - surfaced.

Even before the Georgian conflict and the latest tensions between Moscow and the West, Russian media outlets speculated that Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95M strategic bombers could be placed, or refueled, in Cuba in response to US plans for an anti-missile shield system in Poland and the Czech Republic. However, the Russian Defense Ministry has denied the reports.

In a bid to dismiss comparisons to the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 9 September Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia had no plans to re-launch its radar base in Cuba. However, two days later Strategic Air Force Commander Pavel Androsov said that Russian military experts had studied Cuban airfields and concluded that Russian strategic bombers could land there also.

In what could be seen as another warning signal for the West, on 10 September, the day Russian strategic bombers landed in Venezuela, Russia's top defense official announced that his country would prioritize its nuclear deterrent capabilities. According to General Nikolai Solovtsov, Russia's Strategic Missile Forces commander, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will be able to respond to a nuclear aggressor's strike.

According to Solovtsov, nuclear missiles remain a deterrent of crucial importance and a major factor of strategic stability, adding that nuclear countries have never been vulnerable to military pressure from the US and NATO allies.

The commander also stated that Russia may direct some of its ICBMs at the planned US missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. Under the current circumstances, Russia's talk about its nuclear deterrent capabilities is hardly intended to defuse tensions in relations with the West.

It was not a coincidence that Moscow opted to remind all about its nuclear ties with Iran, a major irritant in Russia's relations with the US. On 9 September, The Russian state-run company building Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant said it was nearing completion and the start-up of the first reactor would be "irreversible" by February 2008.

On the economic front, Russia has suddenly indicated interest in stronger ties with OPEC, although Moscow has refrained from any meaningful cooperation with the oil cartel for years. During last week's OPEC session, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin urged greater cooperation between the cartel and Russia.

By undertaking a series of high-profile gestures, apparently designed to intimidate, Moscow was probably seeking to demonstrate the West's inability to offer a serious response. Russian leaders could have calculated that the US and its allies, stuck in the quagmire of Iraq and Afghanistan, had limited options in pressuring Russia. However, it remains to be seen whether the Kremlin's strategy will work.
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