France: Afghan warning salvo

Though a vote on retaining presence in Afghanistan will likely be affirmative, France's re-think of its mission there may not bode well for coalition allies, Andrew D Bishop writes for ISN Security Watch.

What is France doing in Afghanistan? That is the question French parliamentarians will try to answer next week as they gather to vote on - among other issues - their country's continued involvement in the failed South Asian state.

The vote, which will be cast by both French senators and deputies during an extraordinary parliamentary session scheduled to begin on 22 September, is the first sign of a recent increase in the French Legislature's rights to oversee government policies, most notably in the military realm.

In July, the Fifth Republic adopted a sweeping constitutional reform that, among other things, opened the possibility for a majority of French parliamentarians to decide on the fate of any military deployment to exceed an initial period of four months.

The upcoming vote falls under this new framework and is entering uncharted territory.

Heavy military commitment nothing new

NATO-watchers needn't worry, however, as France's mission in Afghanistan is unlikely to falter just yet.

Led into Afghanistan in the early aftermath of 9/11, the number of French troops there has increased ever since.

At first limited to a mere 15 soldiers based in the Afghan capital, Kabul, the French military has over the years conducted numerous ground and air operations throughout the country, including in the province of Kandahar and around the city of Jalalabad.

Today, approximately 3,300 French troops are committed to supporting the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the region, owing in part to President Nicolas Sarkozy's April decision to put 700 more boots on the ground.

Two main factors explain France's relative ease with its Afghan mission over the past six years - an ease that lasted up until this summer.

First, despite their sometimes bumpy relationship, Paris and Washington share a broadly common understanding of the world that surrounds them.

This was once illustrated by the famous column "We are all Americans" [ external pageFrench, external pageEnglish] published on 12 September 2001 by the director and veteran journalist of the leading French daily Le Monde, Jean-Marie Colombani.

To a large extent, this feeling of shared destiny remains valid to this day, as evidenced by Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Defense Minister Hervé Morin's declaration in a external pagerecent op-ed that: "We are delivering in Afghanistan a fight to defend what we hold as most precious: our values, our security and also an indispensable solidarity with our allies."

Equally key to the preservation of France's momentum in Afghanistan since 2001 was the fact that the French military has been - for the past 10 years at least - a fiercely independent one, and its fate largely cut off from the rest of the country's population.

There are no bumper stickers that invite fellow countrymen to "support 'our' troops" in France. And until recently, there were few, if any, reports from Afghanistan or any other frontline in the mainstream media, despite the country currently having some 12,000 soldiers deployed in various peacekeeping operations around the world.

Resisting the casualty effect, for now

This could have all changed last month when 10 French soldiers were killed and many more wounded in an ambush outside of Kabul.

Rather than show any sign of wavering in an external pageinterviewhe gave to the daily Le Parisien shortly after the events, Defense Minister Morin instead claimed that "there could be a dispatch of a few [more] special forces […] to improve intelligence in order to allow our troops to better apprehend the environment in which they find themselves."

Nonetheless, if the government's first reflex was not to indicate the likelihood of a possible withdrawal of troops, the tragic incident did have some traumatizing effects on the French population.

At the end of August, over half of all those interviewed by a leading polling agency said they were in favor of bringing the country's troops home from Afghanistan, something just a handful of political players - that notably include extreme-left party leader Olivier Besancenot - have called for.

This recent increase in NATO-skepticism was surely reinforced in early September as the notorious weekly Paris Match published several photographs of and an interview with the Taliban fighters responsible for the deaths of the French soldiers.

Though nearly all observers were prompt to call the pictures revolting, some have argued that they should serve as a wake-up call to stand against Afghanistan's insurgents, while others have attempted to use the controversy to promote a military withdrawal.

Several, though not all, socialist opponents of the majority right-wing government and parliament are likely to use the upcoming vote to prove their point about what they perceive as France's blunder in South Asia.

As Karim Pakzad, an associate researcher with the Paris-based Institute of Strategic and International Relations, told ISN Security Watch: "The opposition blames the international coalition for sacrificing Afghanistan's reconstruction, support for good governance, the training of an Afghan national army and the fight against drug trafficking […] in favor of military actions.

"The bottom-ground of the debate is that the Socialists feel that the struggle against terrorism cannot be led only by military force."

Overall, however, the Socialists are divided, with one historic party figure having declared, for example, that "we [the Socialists] want to fight terrorism as much as the right [wing ruling party]."

In any case, because the French right-wing - which notably includes Sarkozy's Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) - currently dominates the country's political landscape, its quasi-unanimous desire to stay on track in Afghanistan is sure to remain almost unquestionably safeguarded in the upcoming vote.

Soothe the French, or lose them all

Nevertheless, the fact that France's presence in Afghanistan will likely be prolonged for the next few months does not preclude the reality that the US might care to watch the French situation carefully, for it has all the attributes of a warning salvo.

Indeed, with major elections coming up in two other leading ISAF contributing countries - namely Germany and the UK - the debate over NATO's mission in Afghanistan could spread through a well-known domino-effect of psychological dithering, if it hasn't already.

Germany, which is set to hold federal elections next year, is a case in point.

As Simon Koschut, a leading NATO analyst at the German Council on Foreign Relations, told ISN Security Watch: "The danger that Afghanistan could become an issue in the coming elections is very real because of the unpopularity of the German involvement there. This would invite populism and forbid an honest and necessary debate about our engagement in Afghanistan while also leading us into confrontation with our allies."

One problem is that NATO-bashing has become an easy sell in a country where extreme-left affiliations have been on the rise for the past few years.

"Many, especially the Conservatives (CDU), fear that the Social Democrats (SPD) and Die Linke (a far left party that opposes the presence of German soldiers in Afghanistan) may use the issue to campaign on a 'peace ticket' by questioning Germany's involvement in Afghanistan. They remember well how Gerhard Schröder won the 2002 elections by opposing the unpopular possibility of a war in Iraq."

The long-term solution, many analysts point out, would be for the US and its allies' governments to improve their didactic skills in selling this far-away conflict to their people.

According to Koschut: "The German public does not understand the reasons for being in Afghanistan. Many view it as an American war that only marginally affects German interests. However, I believe that this is the wrong debate. The question is not why we are in Afghanistan but what exactly we are doing there."

This means that "the civilian efforts have to receive much more attention and funding."

But such a sell also implies improving the ratio of successes to failures.

As Christophe Jaffrelot, a leading French specialist of South Asia, recently external pagewrote: "[T]he problems of coordination between the armies - those of the Westerners and that of Afghanistan - need to be corrected. One must also, because it is tightly related, defuse the growing hatred of Afghans against Westerners.

"An anti-insurgency war is won only once the link between the insurgents and the local society is loosened, particularly when [the society] bases itself on the idea that the Westerners will leave the country sooner or later while the Taliban are there for a long time and are likely to conduct reprisals against the 'collaborators.'"

In sum, if the Pentagon expects to keep its allies going in Afghanistan, it will have two tasks on its list: first, review its strategy for ridding the country of its clinging insurgency; second, help Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and Gordon Brown - to name just a few - convince their voters of the need to fight on.

Reports indicate that US policymakers have understood the necessity of conducting the former, but even a brilliant new approach will meet an early demise if dispossessed of the partners it needs to be implemented.

It is often said that wars abroad are won or lost at home. With its military stretched thin and its morale wavering, however, the US will soon discover that its "good war" in Afghanistan could be won or lost on the Old Continent, of all places.
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