Tibet: One diaspora, two paths

Despite its homogeneous appearance, two views have divided the Tibet movement: regional autonomy within a China framework or full independence, Denis Burke writes for ISN Security Watch.

Almost fifty years after the Dalai Lama left the region, Tibet's community in exile and the Tibet movement seem remarkably unified in their quest for independence. As soon as the International Olympic Committee announced that Beijing was to host the 2008 Summer Olympics, Tibet support groups began preparing for protests. The media attention afforded by an event of this size was simply too big to miss.

This was to be Tibet's year as much as China's if the support groups had had their way. In March unrest broke out across Tibet on a scale unseen for 20 years. Still, the Games went ahead without major disruption and were received in the international press as a triumph. Beijing conceded to more negotiations on the independence issue, enough to keep the international press off its back. Once again, Tibet had failed to successfully capture the spotlight.

The search for new strategies among the exiled Tibetans may end up bringing differences to the surface and jeopardizing the famed unity of the exiles.

With very occasional exceptions, pursuit of Tibetan self-determination is enacted through nonviolent means. The primary point where disagreement occurs is on the Dalai Lama's pursuit of increased autonomy within greater China and not independence. Though support for the Dalai Lama is practically universal, many Tibet groups continue to seek full independence for the region.

Aside from designs for Tibet's future, discontent among the diaspora has sprung from regional, historical and religious differences. Tibet was not a unified political entity prior to occupation by China. The reach of the Dalai Lama's government in Tibet was limited and a homogenous sense of Tibetan identity did not extend to the large outlying provinces of Kham or Amdo. Tibetans outside Tibet now find that the culture and language of U-Tsang - the province where the capital Lhasa is situated - have come to dominate the exile community. Tibet has traditionally been home to a wide variety of schools and sects of Buddhism, many of which have come to be underrepresented or marginalized in exile.

Nationalism at home

Nationalism within Tibet itself is difficult to measure. It appears that the devotion most Tibetans have always felt to the Dalai Lama continues unshaken. Of course there are Tibetans whose families benefited from the Chinese occupation and where their loyalties lie is a difficult guess. Judging from the stories of recently arrived refugees in India and Nepal, it seems that Tibetans in Tibet are aware of the actions and policies of the Government in Exile. However, such awareness and unshaken loyalty to the Dalai Lama do not always equal support for government policies.

The March 2008 unrest in ethnically Tibetan portions of China has led to fresh analyses of the prevailing will of Tibetans within Tibet. Barry Zellen's April Viewpoint external pagearticle for the Center for Contemporary Conflict echoed the prevailing thought at the time: The Olympic Games were rapidly approaching and, suddenly, it seemed that the patience of Tibetans on the ground had given out. According to Zellen, it is quite likely that this was the result of frustration with the lack of progress of any attempted negotiated solution to Tibet's half century of discontent.

Zellen, among others, wondered if the protests were linked to two other issues that had made the headlines in the preceding months: Kosovo and Burma (Myanmar). Kosovo had seceded from Serbia and Burma had briefly caught world attention when protests across the country spiraled out of control.

Though it is not impossible that news of the Burmese protests had filtered into Tibet, the chances that Kosovo had been widely publicized or discussed among Tibetans in Tibet seems less likely, as Zellen illustrates. Claiming a causal connection between these events is probably a stretch.

Nevertheless, the observation of a connecting theme of eroded patience is not so easily refuted. It is too early to speculate about the permanency or the extent of that frustration in Tibet but it does show a departure from the unified, Dalai Lama-centered nationalism that had characterized smaller protests in recent years.

The political agenda in exile

Outside of Tibet, the overwhelming majority of Tibetans support the Dalai Lama and the non-violent approach. The goals of almost all Tibet support groups (including non-Tibetan supporters) are broadly similar. Some disagreement stems from the Dalai Lama's political agenda as outlined 20 years ago before the European Parliament: the so-called Middle Way Approach.

The core point of the Approach is that it specifically demands autonomy within China and not independence. However, several key organizations such as external pageInternational Tibet Independence Movement, external pageFriends of Tibet and the external pageTibetan Youth Congress - which has often stood for the de facto voice of opposition to the elected government -  continue to campaign for Tibetan independence and explicitly state as much in their mission statements or press releases.

Even so, the Dalai Lama, many exile government ministers, and indeed the proponents of independence themselves, often argue that calling for independence rather than autonomy is not dissent: It merely suggests an effective multiparty democracy. 

Religion and politics, a questionable mix

But whether Tibetans are calling for independence or autonomy their political aspirations seem inextricably linked to religion. Wang Lixiong, a prominent thinker on the Tibet issue, has external pageexpressed concernthat the virulent links between Tibetan religion and politics must be a serious counterweight for any Chinese leader considering the autonomy question. Analysts of the Tibetan process of democratization such as external pageJane Ardleyhave suggested that true democracy will evade the exile community as long as the Dalai Lama is venerated as a deity.

It should come as no surprise then that the more controversial and divisive differences often spring from religious perspectives.

Typically considered third in line to the Dalai Lama, the Karmapa Lama is a figure who may end up playing a major role in Tibet's future. The lineage of the Karmapa Lama is older even than the Dalai Lama's. After the previous Karmapa died in 1981, two candidates were recognized as his successor. The Dalai Lama and a majority of others recognized external pageOgyen Trinley Dorje as his reincarnation. However, the authorities typically responsible for selecting the Karmapa (a process the Dalai Lamas traditionally had little involvement with) amongst a minority of others recognized external pageTrinley Thaye Dorje. Conspiracy theories and intrigues concerning the dual recognition abound.

Far more controversial are the recent actions of the Shugden Dorje sect. The current Dalai Lama has expressed concerns that the worship of the protector deity Shugden Dorje is inappropriate for a non-theistic religion like Buddhism and that the practices of the sect are cultish, sectarian and divisive. Both inside and outside of Tibet, the Dalai Lama's reservations, and later condemnation, of the group led them to lose support. The sect has responded with accusations of persecution. According to a Tibetinfonet external pagereport, during an April press conference, representatives from the Shugden Dorje sect compared the Dalai Lama's handling of the group to apartheid.

The group's supporters went even further, accusing the Tibetan Government in Exile for poisoning Chinese-Indian relations and alleging that the Dalai Lama had instigated the March violence, at times closely echoing Chinese media accounts of the events. The group is external pageallegedly funded by the Chinese government.

Unity first

Considering the size of the Tibetan diaspora and its relative lack of homogeneity before going into exile, its unity is remarkable. However, the political and religious divides mentioned above - not to mention accusations of historical revisionism on all sides - present a challenge to that unity today, particularly in light of the disappointments of 2008.

Many of Tibet’s most prominent activists spent the run up to the Olympics in prison. The next round of China-Tibet negotiations is due in October. In many ways, it is too early to measure the extent of the damage to the Tibet campaign in this Olympic year.

Noticing the impact that these events have had on unity and morale, the Dalai Lama has called an emergency meeting of prominent figures of Tibet's exile community for November. According to a Reuters external pagereport, the special session "would see wide-ranging discussions about the future of the Tibetan movement."
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