Yemen: Time to change tack

A significant shift in approach is required from foreign backers of Yemen to address systemic governance dysfunction, a burgeoning socio-economic crisis and a significant spike in militant attacks.

Assailants detonated a booby-trapped car and fired rockets at the heavily guarded US embassy in the capital Sana'a last week in the most sophisticated and audacious in a series of attacks on foreign diplomatic posts in the city in recent months. Eighteen people died in the attack.

The attack was claimed by the Organization of Islamic Jihad in Yemen, which threatened that potential future targets would include "western interests," Yemeni public figures and the Saudi, UAE and British embassies unless jailed militants were released.

Islamic Jihad leader Khaled Abdel Nabi was arrested in Jaar last month after five years on the run. It remains unclear whether the group, as claimed, has any relationship with al-Qaida.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government appears to be seeking to leverage the embassy strike to garner greater US counter-terrorism support. Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi claimed in the wake of the attack that current US assistance for such efforts was inadequate for dealing with the multiple militant threats his government faced.

The US greatly enhanced its security cooperation with the Saleh government in the wake of the 2000 USS Cole attack in Aden harbor. However, US officials have expressed ongoing concerns with Yemeni counter-terrorism efforts amid consistent rumors of the establishment of modus vivendi between the government and leading militants, some linked to al-Qaida.

These purported government-militant contacts have appeared on the verge of breakdown recently under consistent US pressure, leading to a marked increase in attacks on government targets and security forces and the country's oil infrastructure in recent months.

The crackdown on al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia and seeming success of Awakening Council groups in Iraq in driving foreign fighters from some areas may have led to the return or flight of fighters to Yemen, where security sweeps and attendant arrests and clashes have been less effective and pervasive.

Ignoring a major jail break of al-Qaida members in 2006, the US appears to be pushing ahead with talks with plans for the repatriation of Yemeni militants held at Guantanamo Bay, with discussions regarding the establishment of a reeducation and rehabilitation center underway.

The recent upswing in militant strikes comes as the government faces, what are for it, more serious challenges in the north and south.

The northern province of Saada, which has been wracked by months of clashes between Zaydi Shia al-Houthi rebels and security forces, now appears calm. Rebel field commander Abdulmalik Badraddin Al-Houthi has agreed terms with a mediating committee and pledged his allegiance to Saleh and the state, following a July announcement by the president that the conflict was over.

However, given security restrictions on media coverage and ongoing instability establishing a clear understanding of the situation in Saada province remains difficult.

This, as discussions continue within the political opposition on a potential boycott of national parliamentary elections, currently scheduled for April 2009.

Leaders of the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) coalition - which incorporates Nasserite, Socialist and Islamist parties - accuse the government of running a smear campaign that seeks to link the opposition to repeated bouts of demonstrations and rioting in southern towns and cities, the most recent in April.

The disturbances were ostensibly sparked by the government's alleged failure to carry through on promises made to former South Yemen army veterans following the reunification of the country in the wake of a 1994 civil war.

Citing government intransigence and an alleged desire to rig the April poll, JMP representatives have set an important precedent in refusing a presidential decree demanding their further participation in the Supreme Commission for Election and Referendum (SCER), a body formed ostensibly to decide and implement electoral reforms.

According to reports, the government has backed away from an earlier commitment to support JMP emendations cementing greater pluralism and proportionality in the electoral system.

As elsewhere in the region, western nations' support for authoritarian governance in Yemen has backfired, promoting the radicalization of dissent and the unhealthy closeting of necessary ties between the government and powerful sector and tribal interests.

Importantly, the multiple crises facing Yemeni society have been met by seeming government confusion. Here, an opportunity clearly exists for the Saleh government's allies to push for genuine social, political and civil reform.

In re-imagining Yemen's relations with the west it is important to recognize that this reform process is not a palliative for all societal ills.

With its endemic poverty and patchwork of tribal and religious affiliations and groups Yemen does not cohere as a unitary state. The centralization of power in a reformed polity will continue to rely on multiple and often competing networks of solidarity and affiliation which, of necessity, will continue to stand opposed to the interests of competing groups in ongoing client-patron and partnership relationships.

Nevertheless, the need for change is clear. The absence of true political contest and suppression of dissent effectively prevents the addressing of key structural issues that inhibit the functioning of the Yemeni political system and, by extension, state organs. This has promoted endemic corruption and the attendant ossification and impotence of state ministries and agencies.

The results are clear in the government's apparent confusion in dealing with the current economic crisis created by food and fuel price hikes, which has forced a growing number of citizens on to the streets and prompted the UN's World Food Program to announce an emergency food aid program this week.

Clearly, the failure of the government to deal in a unified and determined manner with the sudden incapacity of many citizens to make ends meet threatens to promote the interests of radical militant Islam in the absence of genuine political reform and the clear cooption of the government in the so-called war on terror.

A first important step that Yemen's allies can take is to build pressure for a genuine electoral reform process through demanding full opposition participation in a revived SCER.

In a supporting move, significant international pressure must be brought to bear on the Saleh government to end the use of political detention against opposition media and political figures.

The arrests and imprisonment of prominent journalist Abdulkarim Al-Khaiwani, comedian Fadh al-Qarni (Islah) and a number of Socialist party figures, including leader Hassan Baoum, are clearly intended both to intimidate and to disrupt opposition activities and media ahead of next year's poll.

The government appears sensitive to pressure on this issue with Baoum and al-Qarni released earlier this month on the basis of a government-JMP deal. Yemeni media reported Wednesday that Salah had also ordered the release of al-Khaiwarmi, imprisoned for six years in June for "insulting the president" and "demoralizing the military."

Such changes will not pose an immediate threat to the maintenance of the General Peoples' Congress' hold on power but will allow next year's poll to act as a truer expression of national sentiment, while strengthening moderate voices within religious political movements such as the Islah party - a JMP member.

The years since the Cole attack have demonstrated that an obsessive focus on counter-terrorism and bolstering security does not work in Yemen.

A change in approach is desperately needed.