NMD: A logical contrariety

Aside from that fact that the US NMD doesn't work, it antagonizes Russia and works against crucial arms agreements, but the damage done is not irreversible, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

US National Missile Defense (NMD) is misleading. It unnecessarily antagonizes Russia, optimizes US imperialism, strains the US government's budget - and doesn't work.

It is high time for the US to consider putting to use the pledge of dismantling its NMD system to reorient the US-Russia arms control agenda. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty stands at the center of this debate.

National Missile Defense employs complex technologies to intercept incoming ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. A powerful radar system that detects incoming missiles and a battery of countervailing missiles used to eliminate the threat comprise it – in theory, quite intriguing.

The idea of the NMD, first embodied by the Nike-Zeus program, has been floating around Washington since the late 1950s. However, until President Ronald Reagan's term, it received little priority. That changed on 23 March 1983 when Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative for the NMD. The media quickly dubbed the concept "Star Wars."

Reagan's policy initiative survives to this day. Its offspring is the NMD system President George W Bush built in Alaska/California and Poland/Czech Republic, and its deployment is inimical.  

Arms control is the centerpiece of US-Russia relations. The two states stockpile over 9,000 active nuclear warheads that amount to roughly 90 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal.

In 1972, the US and the USSR negotiated the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to limit the incidence of expensive and menacing arms races, the logic behind it being the following: If side A can block side B's missiles, then side B would have to build more missiles to overcome side A's NMD system. The inverse is also true. To mitigate potentially boundless spending and militarization, the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of NMD systems for either side's entire territory, and limits the testing of NMD systems in "ABM Mode" – the latter stipulation leaving room for interpretation.

The ABM Treaty plays a prominent role in the US-Russia arms control regime, which also includes the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the 1992 Treaty on Armed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and several Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (STARTs), among others.

President Bill Clinton roughly adhered to the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Albeit permitting research on NMD systems and advocating modification of the ABM Treaty itself, he maintained that the deployment of an NMD system was inopportune. 

Clinton's heedful tone, however, briskly changed with the 2000 election of George W Bush. The Bush administration's external pagenegotiation agenda in July 2001 was radical and obdurate.

His administration argued that in order to be able to protect US citizens from "rogue" state threats like Iran and North Korea, the NMD was necessary. Any ABM Treaty renegotiations that limited NMD deployment would be rejected.

Five months later, Bush acted by removing the legal impediments to NMD. On 13 December 2001, he announced the external pageUS' unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, effective six months later.

Putin did not respond warmly to Bush's decision. Russia declined to cooperate with START II treaty requirements following the US' unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The START III treaty failed to gain any traction at all.

Upon concluding that the US NMD installations planned for construction in Poland and the Czech Republic were in fact going to be installed, Putin additionally declared on 14 July 2007 Russia's intentions to suspend its cooperation with the CFE Treaty. He also threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty. In other words, following the US' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the US-Russia arms control regime began to fray.

For all of the trouble Bush's withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and deployment of a NMD system created, did any benefits ensue? Not really.

Russia has yet to buy the US argument for protection from "rogue" state threats like Iran and North Korea.

Also, the NMD simply does not work. Tests have yet to demonstrate the US NMD system's ability to ward off a nuclear strike. A small number of decoys, housed inside a ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead could easily overwhelm the system. The latest test conducted by the US military installed a guidance chip in the target missile to direct the destroying missile. This, at the very least, stretches the definition of "success."

So what is the point behind US NMD? Bertel Heurlin argues that the US NMD is a flagrant example of US strategic expansionism. The long-term implications of this philosophy are what concerns Russia.

Besides the fact that the US NMD does not work and antagonizes Russia, it is expensive. The US external pagespent an average of US$8.68 billion per year during 2006–2008 on the NMD, and it tops the list of US military expenditures for research programs.

Therefore, in a nutshell, the Bush administration spent tens-of-billions of dollars to deploy a system that doesn't work, against a threat that has yet to materialize, and the consequences of which resulted in the dissolution of key treaties in one of the most sensitive areas of US foreign policy.

The damage done is not irreversible. A deployed NMD system supplies the US with leverage. Pledging to consider its deconstruction – which could save money – could be used to draw Russia back to the negotiating table to start rebuilding the US-Russia arms control architecture.

Options exist. START II would limit each side to 3,000 to 3,500 active nuclear warheads. START III could bring this number down even further to 2,000 or 2,500 nuclear warheads. Russia's re-entry into the CFE Treaty and continued observance of the INF Treaty should also be addressed. The ABM Treaty requires recommitment.

Once Bush leaves office, changing course is a necessity. On 18 September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev used a rather external pageconciliatory tone toward the US at a ceremony for the new US ambassador to the Kremlin. His temperament stood in stark contrast to Russia's affirmative demeanor immediately following the South Ossetia war in August.

Although today's Russian leadership deserves little praise, nuclear arms control trumps these concerns.

The US NMD is not a good idea. Especially when it has still to prove its tactical utility.   
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