Stopping the Iranian bomb
By Dominic Moran for ISN
An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, derestricted this week, provides further grist to the rumor mill surrounding the potential militarization of the Iranian nuclear program, without providing the basis for moves toward a robust sanctions regime.
Agency head Mohammed El Baradei told the IAEA Board of Governors meeting this week that, while able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, the UN nuclear watchdog "has not been able to make substantive progress on the alleged studies and associated questions relative to possible military dimensions to [the] Iran nuclear program," adding, "This remains of serious concern."
There is a significant lack of detail concerning the supporting documents and information on which the IAEA had premised the questions to Tehran addressed in the report.
There report notes that Iran continues to withhold information on a number of alleged experiments conducted on a missile re-entry vehicle, high explosives (suitable for an implosion type nuclear device) and multi-purpose detonators that could be utilized in atomic weapons fabrication.
At least some of the experiments appear intended to produce a modified warhead for the Shahab-3. Iran claims that some of the documents on which the claims are made are forgeries while and that acknowledged tests are on conventional weapons and thus fall beyond the purview of the IAEA's mandate, refusing IAEA requests to interview engineers and ostensibly civilian facilities involved in the work.
On Monday El Baradei called on nations that had provided intelligence documents on the Iranian program allow the same to be passed on to Iran – a request that the US and others may well ignore given repeated Iranian claims of forgery.
The IAEA is also seeking information on the potential militarization of the Iranian program via the involvement in R&D and production of companies and institutes with ties to the military.
Without a clear demonstration of militarization, the ongoing uncertainty concerning Iran's nuclear program is unlikely to create sufficient momentum for further concrete moves toward sanctions in the UN.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced Thursday that his country would not participate in a meeting set to discuss the Iranian program with foreign ministers from other P5 plus one nations, stating that further high-level discussions on the issue would only occur, "some time down the road." The parlay was subsequently called off.
US-Russian nuclear cooperation - crucial to the establishment of viable international mechanisms and guarantees for the repatriation of spent fuel and in building pressure on Iran - is now in serious question.
With the international response faltering, Iran remains adamant in its refusal to eschew or freeze uranium enrichment, viewed by Tehran as crucial to bolstering the future autonomy of its program.
Assessments differ as to the speed with which Iran could produce the highly enriched uranium required for use in nuclear warheads and there is no extant information alleging enrichment to the levels required for an atomic weapon.
It is clear that limited Iranian compliance with its 2007 pact with the IAEA - intended to answer outstanding questions pertaining to the potential militarization of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program - has severely undermined the agreement while blunting the US and European push for a more robust international response to Iranian intransigence.
The agreement also allowed the de-politicization of Russian nuclear fuel supplies to Iran's first energy reactor at Bushehr - which have occurred intermittently since December 2007. Russian officials reporting the plant will begin operations in February.
This as the military option has progressively fallen out of favor in the US and Israel, while not being officially taken off the table. An apparent shift in US naval forces from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, in support of US troops in Afghanistan, reflects a change in strategic priorities and speaks to the effective dropping of paper plans for an assault on Iranian nuclear facilities.
This impression was bolstered by reported backroom messages to Israeli officials in recent months that the US would not countenance an Israeli strike on Iran. An Israeli request for Boeing 767 refueling aircraft and the re-supply of bunker-busting bombs was initially refused, though the US now appears willing to provide the latter.
In Israel, the voices advocating utilization of the military option as a last resort have quieted somewhat during the current political crisis. There is no real political momentum for an attack as Israel looks to shore up its increasingly shaky position on the Iranian nuclear issue in multinational forums.
Moves to extend unilateral European and US measures aimed at encouraging divestment from Iran and targeting key individuals and bodies look on the cards in the short term but are unlikely to force a shift in the Iranian position.
A reappraisal of the revised incentives packages that brings it into line with actual Iranian needs remains the best option for defusing the crisis and discouraging Iran from pursuing atomic weapons.
A particular point of pressure has yet to be tried in negotiations: developmental aid in expanding Iran's oil refining capacity. Its current lack of refining facilities has forced the Islamic Republic to export unprocessed crude and import refined petroleum products, severely retarding the development of the economy and provoking civil unrest.
Plans are afoot for a US$22 billion expansion of Iran's refining capacity but significant outside assistance will likely be needed for the government to achieve its stated aim of surpassing Saudi Arabia's current refining capacity in coming years.
Importantly, a focus on non-nuclear energy cooperation may work to promote an improvement in Iran's relations with Western and Gulf states, allowing the gradual dissipation of intra-regional tensions. The floating earlier this year of the idea of a US interests section in Tehran was a positive move in this regard.
Given the uneconomic nature of nuclear energy production, which requires massive state underwriting, energy cooperation can also encourage the shelving of plans for future reactors, a positive development in preventing proliferation and a potential regional nuclear arms race.
Ultimately, with the Iranian political system united in support of the country's atomic program, the only way to discourage Iran from taking the precipitate decision to militarize its nuclear program is to address the threat perceptions on which such a move is based.
Agency head Mohammed El Baradei told the IAEA Board of Governors meeting this week that, while able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, the UN nuclear watchdog "has not been able to make substantive progress on the alleged studies and associated questions relative to possible military dimensions to [the] Iran nuclear program," adding, "This remains of serious concern."
There is a significant lack of detail concerning the supporting documents and information on which the IAEA had premised the questions to Tehran addressed in the report.
There report notes that Iran continues to withhold information on a number of alleged experiments conducted on a missile re-entry vehicle, high explosives (suitable for an implosion type nuclear device) and multi-purpose detonators that could be utilized in atomic weapons fabrication.
At least some of the experiments appear intended to produce a modified warhead for the Shahab-3. Iran claims that some of the documents on which the claims are made are forgeries while and that acknowledged tests are on conventional weapons and thus fall beyond the purview of the IAEA's mandate, refusing IAEA requests to interview engineers and ostensibly civilian facilities involved in the work.
On Monday El Baradei called on nations that had provided intelligence documents on the Iranian program allow the same to be passed on to Iran – a request that the US and others may well ignore given repeated Iranian claims of forgery.
The IAEA is also seeking information on the potential militarization of the Iranian program via the involvement in R&D and production of companies and institutes with ties to the military.
Without a clear demonstration of militarization, the ongoing uncertainty concerning Iran's nuclear program is unlikely to create sufficient momentum for further concrete moves toward sanctions in the UN.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced Thursday that his country would not participate in a meeting set to discuss the Iranian program with foreign ministers from other P5 plus one nations, stating that further high-level discussions on the issue would only occur, "some time down the road." The parlay was subsequently called off.
US-Russian nuclear cooperation - crucial to the establishment of viable international mechanisms and guarantees for the repatriation of spent fuel and in building pressure on Iran - is now in serious question.
With the international response faltering, Iran remains adamant in its refusal to eschew or freeze uranium enrichment, viewed by Tehran as crucial to bolstering the future autonomy of its program.
Assessments differ as to the speed with which Iran could produce the highly enriched uranium required for use in nuclear warheads and there is no extant information alleging enrichment to the levels required for an atomic weapon.
It is clear that limited Iranian compliance with its 2007 pact with the IAEA - intended to answer outstanding questions pertaining to the potential militarization of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program - has severely undermined the agreement while blunting the US and European push for a more robust international response to Iranian intransigence.
The agreement also allowed the de-politicization of Russian nuclear fuel supplies to Iran's first energy reactor at Bushehr - which have occurred intermittently since December 2007. Russian officials reporting the plant will begin operations in February.
This as the military option has progressively fallen out of favor in the US and Israel, while not being officially taken off the table. An apparent shift in US naval forces from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, in support of US troops in Afghanistan, reflects a change in strategic priorities and speaks to the effective dropping of paper plans for an assault on Iranian nuclear facilities.
This impression was bolstered by reported backroom messages to Israeli officials in recent months that the US would not countenance an Israeli strike on Iran. An Israeli request for Boeing 767 refueling aircraft and the re-supply of bunker-busting bombs was initially refused, though the US now appears willing to provide the latter.
In Israel, the voices advocating utilization of the military option as a last resort have quieted somewhat during the current political crisis. There is no real political momentum for an attack as Israel looks to shore up its increasingly shaky position on the Iranian nuclear issue in multinational forums.
Moves to extend unilateral European and US measures aimed at encouraging divestment from Iran and targeting key individuals and bodies look on the cards in the short term but are unlikely to force a shift in the Iranian position.
A reappraisal of the revised incentives packages that brings it into line with actual Iranian needs remains the best option for defusing the crisis and discouraging Iran from pursuing atomic weapons.
A particular point of pressure has yet to be tried in negotiations: developmental aid in expanding Iran's oil refining capacity. Its current lack of refining facilities has forced the Islamic Republic to export unprocessed crude and import refined petroleum products, severely retarding the development of the economy and provoking civil unrest.
Plans are afoot for a US$22 billion expansion of Iran's refining capacity but significant outside assistance will likely be needed for the government to achieve its stated aim of surpassing Saudi Arabia's current refining capacity in coming years.
Importantly, a focus on non-nuclear energy cooperation may work to promote an improvement in Iran's relations with Western and Gulf states, allowing the gradual dissipation of intra-regional tensions. The floating earlier this year of the idea of a US interests section in Tehran was a positive move in this regard.
Given the uneconomic nature of nuclear energy production, which requires massive state underwriting, energy cooperation can also encourage the shelving of plans for future reactors, a positive development in preventing proliferation and a potential regional nuclear arms race.
Ultimately, with the Iranian political system united in support of the country's atomic program, the only way to discourage Iran from taking the precipitate decision to militarize its nuclear program is to address the threat perceptions on which such a move is based.