Mossad activism counterproductive
By Dominic Moran for ISN
Rightly or wrongly, responsibility for a series of attacks and assassinations in Iran and Syria in recent years and months have been laid at the door of the Mossad by the Israeli media.
Lauded by political patrons for his purported rehabilitation of the Mossad's operational arm, agency head Meir Dagan has sought a return to the activist stance eschewed by the agency in the wake of a series of embarrassing botched operations. He has reportedly ruffled feathers within the agency in the process through the change in focus and a series of dismissals of senior staff.
The Mossad has reaped the benefits in the form of a major boost in budgetary and human resources allocations, Haaretz external pagereports.
According to the daily, Dagan has succeeded in a push to tighten Israeli-US intelligence cooperation in the face of the perceived threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.
Under pressure since the 2006 Lebanon War, and in the absence of a viable military option against Iran, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has appeared to give the Mossad relatively free operational rein in his weekly Thursday meetings with Dagan and Mossad staffers.
The widespread domestic popularity of the Mossad's alleged recent operations was reflected in the decision by analysts on the country's most watched news program to vote Dagan their "man-of-the-year."
The "award" in itself is a reflection of the profound absence of domestic popular trust in both the political and, to a lesser degree, military leaderships in the wake of the Lebanon conflict.
The provenance of spy agency attacks is, of course, virtually impossible to demonstrate in the absence of substantive evidence or subsequent claims of responsibility.
A major bombing in Damascus on 27 September was blamed by Syrian officials on an unidentified Islamist group based in northern Lebanon. However, Italian news agency AKI external pagereported Syrian opposition figures as claiming that Brigadier General Abdul Karim Abbas, deputy commander of the Syrian military intelligence's Palestine Branch, was the intended target, raising the possibility of Israeli involvement.
Israeli commentators claimed that the blast further reflected the weakness of Syrian counter-intelligence efforts following the assassination of Hizbollah commander Imad Mughniyah in the Syrian capital in February.
This was followed by the assassination of Syrian General Mohammed Suleiman, who Israeli reports claimed was responsible for contacts with Hizbollah and the murder of Hamas political bureau head Khaled Meshaal's secretary Hisham al-Labadani earlier this month.
Lebanese reports that Suleiman was close to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and may have been a key witness in the probe into the death of former Lebanese premier Rafik al-Hariri further muddies the waters.
In July 2007, a reported blast at a Syrian military plant, purportedly used in the manufacture of chemical warheads, killed at least 15 soldiers. According to an ABC News external pagereport, the Mossad may also have either "turned" a worker or inserted a spy at the supposed Syrian nuclear site bombed last September.
In some cases Syria has accused Israel of responsibility for the attacks, with Israeli officials either responding with outright denials or staying mum.
The interests of Arab intelligence agencies and the Mossad clearly coincide in their desire to probe the inner workings and potential of the Iranian nuclear program.
Iranian state news agency IRNA alleged last month that recent Mossad successes were due to cooperation with a foreign intelligence agency. Hizbollah's Al Manar external pageidentified Saudi Arabia as the culprit.
The channel claimed that Saudi National Security Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan (who Israeli reports claim met Olmert in 2006) played a leading role in securing cooperation between Saudi and Israeli agencies. An alleged arms convoy, purportedly intended for Hizbollah, was blown up in a Tehran suburb in July.
The Iranian claims should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt but appear to reflect genuine fears amongst the Islamist Republic's leadership concerning the apparent ability of foreign agencies to secure access to sensitive research and other sites associated with the country's atomic program.
The case for ongoing Israeli espionage and spy agency interdiction efforts in Syria is far from clear given the potential for dialogue with the Baathist government.
Attacks against Syrian officials and facilities are likely to strengthen the cause of those within the al-Assad government and military opposed to the potential resumption of full peace talks with Israel in 2009.
The Bashar al-Assad government has clearly chosen to ignore the attacks so far, a fact that reflects the weakness of the country's diplomatic position both regionally and on the world stage - though ties with France and, to a lesser extent, the US, appear to be warming.
Nevertheless, the conduct of such operations places significant pressure on the Baathist government to respond - likely diplomatically - and has limited strategic import given that the rearming of Hizbollah is a virtual fait accompli.
Indeed, Israeli involvement in such attacks may force Syria to reverse seeming recent moves to create some distance between itself and Hizbollah and undermines the Syrian decision to risk its economically important relationship with Iran through indirect talks with Israel.
Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who will head the incoming Israeli administration should she avoid a breakdown of coalition negotiations, is known to favor the Palestinian peace track and has expressed doubts concerning Syrian intentions in the Istanbul parlay.
However, Livni has signaled that she is keen to promote the role of the traditionally moderate Foreign Ministry within her new government. This is clearly intended to facilitate diplomatic progress through diminishing the role of the security-political cabinet (which includes Dagan) in government peace and other diplomatic moves.
If she is serious about pushing ahead with the Syrian-Israeli track, Livni must exercise significant oversight over the Mossad, ensuring that it eschews further attacks on Syrian or Lebanese soil. These are of limited strategic import and undermine mutual confidence and the prospects for peace.
Lauded by political patrons for his purported rehabilitation of the Mossad's operational arm, agency head Meir Dagan has sought a return to the activist stance eschewed by the agency in the wake of a series of embarrassing botched operations. He has reportedly ruffled feathers within the agency in the process through the change in focus and a series of dismissals of senior staff.
The Mossad has reaped the benefits in the form of a major boost in budgetary and human resources allocations, Haaretz external pagereports.
According to the daily, Dagan has succeeded in a push to tighten Israeli-US intelligence cooperation in the face of the perceived threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.
Under pressure since the 2006 Lebanon War, and in the absence of a viable military option against Iran, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has appeared to give the Mossad relatively free operational rein in his weekly Thursday meetings with Dagan and Mossad staffers.
The widespread domestic popularity of the Mossad's alleged recent operations was reflected in the decision by analysts on the country's most watched news program to vote Dagan their "man-of-the-year."
The "award" in itself is a reflection of the profound absence of domestic popular trust in both the political and, to a lesser degree, military leaderships in the wake of the Lebanon conflict.
The provenance of spy agency attacks is, of course, virtually impossible to demonstrate in the absence of substantive evidence or subsequent claims of responsibility.
A major bombing in Damascus on 27 September was blamed by Syrian officials on an unidentified Islamist group based in northern Lebanon. However, Italian news agency AKI external pagereported Syrian opposition figures as claiming that Brigadier General Abdul Karim Abbas, deputy commander of the Syrian military intelligence's Palestine Branch, was the intended target, raising the possibility of Israeli involvement.
Israeli commentators claimed that the blast further reflected the weakness of Syrian counter-intelligence efforts following the assassination of Hizbollah commander Imad Mughniyah in the Syrian capital in February.
This was followed by the assassination of Syrian General Mohammed Suleiman, who Israeli reports claimed was responsible for contacts with Hizbollah and the murder of Hamas political bureau head Khaled Meshaal's secretary Hisham al-Labadani earlier this month.
Lebanese reports that Suleiman was close to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and may have been a key witness in the probe into the death of former Lebanese premier Rafik al-Hariri further muddies the waters.
In July 2007, a reported blast at a Syrian military plant, purportedly used in the manufacture of chemical warheads, killed at least 15 soldiers. According to an ABC News external pagereport, the Mossad may also have either "turned" a worker or inserted a spy at the supposed Syrian nuclear site bombed last September.
In some cases Syria has accused Israel of responsibility for the attacks, with Israeli officials either responding with outright denials or staying mum.
The interests of Arab intelligence agencies and the Mossad clearly coincide in their desire to probe the inner workings and potential of the Iranian nuclear program.
Iranian state news agency IRNA alleged last month that recent Mossad successes were due to cooperation with a foreign intelligence agency. Hizbollah's Al Manar external pageidentified Saudi Arabia as the culprit.
The channel claimed that Saudi National Security Council Prince Bandar bin Sultan (who Israeli reports claim met Olmert in 2006) played a leading role in securing cooperation between Saudi and Israeli agencies. An alleged arms convoy, purportedly intended for Hizbollah, was blown up in a Tehran suburb in July.
The Iranian claims should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt but appear to reflect genuine fears amongst the Islamist Republic's leadership concerning the apparent ability of foreign agencies to secure access to sensitive research and other sites associated with the country's atomic program.
The case for ongoing Israeli espionage and spy agency interdiction efforts in Syria is far from clear given the potential for dialogue with the Baathist government.
Attacks against Syrian officials and facilities are likely to strengthen the cause of those within the al-Assad government and military opposed to the potential resumption of full peace talks with Israel in 2009.
The Bashar al-Assad government has clearly chosen to ignore the attacks so far, a fact that reflects the weakness of the country's diplomatic position both regionally and on the world stage - though ties with France and, to a lesser extent, the US, appear to be warming.
Nevertheless, the conduct of such operations places significant pressure on the Baathist government to respond - likely diplomatically - and has limited strategic import given that the rearming of Hizbollah is a virtual fait accompli.
Indeed, Israeli involvement in such attacks may force Syria to reverse seeming recent moves to create some distance between itself and Hizbollah and undermines the Syrian decision to risk its economically important relationship with Iran through indirect talks with Israel.
Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who will head the incoming Israeli administration should she avoid a breakdown of coalition negotiations, is known to favor the Palestinian peace track and has expressed doubts concerning Syrian intentions in the Istanbul parlay.
However, Livni has signaled that she is keen to promote the role of the traditionally moderate Foreign Ministry within her new government. This is clearly intended to facilitate diplomatic progress through diminishing the role of the security-political cabinet (which includes Dagan) in government peace and other diplomatic moves.
If she is serious about pushing ahead with the Syrian-Israeli track, Livni must exercise significant oversight over the Mossad, ensuring that it eschews further attacks on Syrian or Lebanese soil. These are of limited strategic import and undermine mutual confidence and the prospects for peace.