Iran's true masters
By Kamal Nazer Yasin for ISN
For many years, Iran's traditionalist-oriented clergy (the majority of clerics) were the true masters of the country. As the political leaders of the anti-monarchical revolution and as the defenders of their country against Saddam Hussein's armies, they seemed to enjoy unlimited power and prestige among the populace. However, with the conclusion of the war, a different mood was set.
Ordinary Iranians were tired of war and bloodshed and were clamoring for tranquility and economic welfare; things that the country's rulers were not particularly adept at delivering. Thus began a slow but unmistakable diminution of the clerics' social and political stature.
The trend was further accentuated with the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. His call for reform opened up long-pent-up demands for political and social liberties of all sorts that often clashed with the traditionalists' sense of supremacy.
In 2005, a brand new coalition comprising "Young Rightists" (a euphemism for people with ties to the security establishment), hard-line fundamentalists and old-line traditionalists threw its support behind the relatively obscure mayor of Tehran, Mahmood Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad ran on a platform of clean government, economic populism and an end to all Khatami-era secularizing tendencies.
The traditionalist clergy could breathe a collective sigh of relief. Here was one of their own: a man who had proved his mettle both in peacetime and wartime and promised to a return to the glorious revolutionary days. Alas, the euphoria was rather short-lived.
In the three years since Ahmadinejad and his faction took power, a concerted effort has been underway to circumscribe the still-considerable power of traditionalist clergy - with mixed results.
The world of the new right
It is not difficult to see the reasons for this unexpected development. Despite their myriad differences in outlook and political strategy, the cadre of the former Revolutionary Guards members, which make up the new Iranian elite, have much in common: They all come from similar social and political backgrounds, are fast moving from lower echelons to the first-tier, firmly believe they are the most qualified to rule the country, and are adamantly opposed to interference from other power centers, including those belonging to the traditionalist clergy.
Publicly, Ahmadinejad and his circle of friends and advisers are quite effusive with praise and for the clergy. But when it comes to actual policy-formation or in symbol-laden public discourse, the situation is rather different.
For instance, according to Ayatollah Mohsen Doagoo, a prominent traditionalist, Ahmadinejad has broken with past tradition and refused to solicit the opinion of the traditionalist clergy in choosing his ministers or in other high-level appointments. Even Khatami had no choice but to take into account the views of the Combatant Clergy Association (CCA) and the Association of Theological Seminaries - the two pillars of traditionalists - in such matters.
Moreover, Ahmadinejad adroitly stokes popular resentment against the clergy by using politically loaded issues (like allowing women into stadiums or even a soft recognition of Israel) which raise the ire of the traditionalists and thus increase his popularity among educated voters.
Last June, one of Iran's vice-presidents, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai - also one of Ahmadinejad's top aids - created a terrific storm by declaring that Iran sought the friendship of the Israeli people. A great many traditionalists including some of Iran's most important Grand Ayatollahs immediately protested, demanding that Ahmadinejad fire the erring official. Not only did Ahmadinejad refuse to fire Mashai, he took him along with him to New York last September for his annual appearance at the United Nations.
Last July, one of his top advisors, Mohammad Norizadeh, castigated the clergy for their interference in government affairs. "Can you stay away from the work of the government and pay your collected funds (gathered from devout followers) to the Supreme Leader instead?" he asked in an interview.
Later, in his personal blog space, he asked Grand Ayatollah whether it was wise "for a great many Grand Ayatollahs to weigh in on a single issue" and create "confusion and anxiety" in the society.
But no issue has been more divisive and more irksome for the traditionalists than that of external pageImam Mahdi (Shias believe that their 12th and last imam, Imam Mahdi who disappeared in 874 AD will return one day to rid the world of vice and corruption).
The new right has basically hijacked the issue for its own legitimacy. Both Ahmadinejad and his faction often invoke the name of Mahdi as both protector and as a direct source of power for the government. Experts believe that doing so bypasses the intercession of the clergy as intermediaries between higher powers and ordinary mortals.
A subtle game
The new rightists realize they are risking a great deal by their cavalier attitude. Already, alarmed clerics are going on the offensive by threatening to put up a new candidate against Ahmadinejad in next year's presidential election.
According to Hussein Marashi, a prominent moderate pragmatist, discussions are under way between both the left and the right for a single moderate candidate to run against Ahamdinejad.
"Traditionalist clerics are not going to sit around waiting to be ousted completely," he told the newspaper Kargozaran.
To forestall a united clerical front from forming against it, the government is engaged in a multi-pronged strategy.
First, it is making huge increases in budgets to religious entities. In the last fiscal year, the total budget for all religious centers and institutes went up by 60 percent. The Minister of Guidance said recently that in the last three years since Ahmadinejad came to power, special allocations for mosques had gone up 20-fold.
Secondly, the government is paying for the creation of 30 new theological seminaries. This is unprecedented, since for at least the last millennium, no seminary has ever accepted money from a civilian government in Iran to avoid the risk of being beholden to them.
Thirdly, the government has entered into an unstated alliance with the followers of a hard-line cleric, the powerful Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi.
All these tactics have paid off, though it is too early to know what the final outcome may be.
In the last few months, some re-shuffling has taken place reflecting these realities. Last February, Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghadam, a clerical critic of Ahmadinejad, was forced to resign from his job as spokesman for the ACC. A few weeks later, the Chancellor of Qum Theological Center, Sayed Hussein Boshehri, also a critic of Ahmadinejad, resigned inexplicably one month before retirement.