Ukraine's NATO hopes dashed

Back in April at the Bucharest summit, NATO leaders had both good news and bad news for Ukraine. The good news was that the leaders officially agreed that Ukraine would eventually become a NATO member and supported the country's request for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The bad news was that a MAP invitation was not forthcoming.

Still, Ukrainian officials could leave Romania satisfied that NATO foreign ministers would review the country's progress already in December. And, optimists believed, if the answer was still negative, the Alliance might be looking for a triumphant way to celebrate its 60th anniversary in 2009. What better way than to invite Ukraine, a large country key to Europe's future security plans.

Now, six months later, those hopes appear dashed - though the Bush administration continues to spend its waning days in office pushing for Ukraine's entry into NATO. The Georgia-Russia conflict over South Ossetia has played a major role, but just as important has been Ukraine's domestic political turmoil, which has also served to heighten lingering concerns among Western European leaders about the country's overall readiness and stability.

The Georgia war has given plenty of ammunition to both sides of the "Ukraine in NATO" debate. On the one hand, Russia's heavy-handed invasion - condemned by many for its disproportionate use of force and the subsequent occupation of large chunks of Georgian land - vindicated those who "see a pro-western Ukraine as an indispensable bulwark against a neo-imperial Russia," as Dmitri Trenin from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace put it recently in a Newsweek article.

A Ukraine entrenched in the Atlantic Alliance would, supporters say, put an end to speculation that the Crimean peninsula, which houses Russia's Black Sea Fleet, is next on Moscow's list of places to provoke confrontation and move in aggressively.

Convincing as those points might be to some, in most western capitals, they pale in comparison to the major counter-argument that Russia is clearly capable of playing hardball and even violating international law in the name of furthering its strategic interests. So soon after Georgia - with the West still trying to come up with a plan for dealing with a resurgent Russia, but craving its energy exports - Moscow should not be provoked.

Using such a line of reasoning, Germany and France, among others, helped derail Ukraine's ambitions back in the spring. They have not shifted their stance since then. In fact, they have moved backwards and have become more recalcitrant. Earlier this month, German Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to not even wait for December. At a press conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in St Petersburg, Merkel said neither Ukraine nor Georgia would receive a MAP invitation at the foreign ministers' meeting.

On top of that, the already dysfunctional political scene in Ukraine has degenerated even further over the past few weeks, giving NATO members another reason for rejection. On 8 October, President Victor Yushchenko dissolved parliament and called for early elections. That came a few weeks after the breakup of the ruling coalition, the culmination of a long-running battle with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her recent decision to support opposition moves to limit presidential powers. 

The two former Orange Revolution allies have also sparred over accusations from the president's team that Tymoshenko took a neutral stance over the war in Georgia, refusing to denounce Russia in return for support for her presidential ambitions. Yushchenko, who quickly condemned Russian actions, has even claimed that Tymoshenko's behavior was contrary to the country's national interests and tantamount to treason.

It's hard to know whether detractors honestly believe the current political situation precludes a MAP invitation, or whether this excuse is rather a fig leaf for fears of provoking Russia. Some believe that the current "turmoil" is simply chaotic, unbridled democracy and political plurality at work.

"Political discussions are active, interesting, invigorating," said Ivan Lozowy, a journalist based in Kiev who runs the newsletter Ukraine Insider. "Political leaders have to deal with limitations, stemming from competition, on their power and ambitions. This is all good."

"Best of all would be a real reformist alternative, which we currently do not have, and if those in high government posts would stop trying to amass more power and use the power they have to benefit the average Ukrainian. But given Ukraine's history, it's a great thing to see this competition," he told ISN Security Watch.

Andrew Wilson, a Ukrainian expert at the European Council for Foreign Relations, put the likelihood of a MAP invitation in December at virtually nil. "There is a slight chance that some NATO members would offer Yushchenko something for domestic political purposes," he told ISN Security Watch. But with the president's political numbers running so low, Wilson thought NATO leaders would probably find it inadvisable to bet on the president in such a manner.

The question is also whether such a "gift" would gain Yushchenko points beyond his hard-core followers. NATO continues to prove a difficult sell to the population, even in pro-western parts of the country.

In a poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) on 30 August-8 September 2008, respondents were asked "Which military security option is the best for Ukraine?" While only 17.4 percent said joining NATO, 28.3 percent chose "joining a military union with Russia" (25 percent opted for not joining any bloc and 10.6 percent for a new EU-member-only system of collective security).

KIIS also asked Ukrainians how they would vote in a referendum "next week" on joining NATO. Around 22 percent said they would vote "Yes" and almost 65 percent said "No."

"The Ukrainian government has employed a small, not very noticeable and ineffective advertising campaign in favor of NATO, but, at least in this case, mud does stick," said Lozowy. "NATO has these distinct negative associations for the average Ukrainian: It is anti-Russia, it is aggressive, the Alliance bombed Yugoslavia, etc. On the other hand, if you ask the man on the street if they want Ukraine to 'be part of Europe's collective security system' a very high percentage of people would be ‘for’ such a choice."

The irony in all of this is that militarily, Ukraine is probably as ready as any new members in recent years have been. The country has been involved in Partnership for Peace activities since the program began in 1994, and in 1997, the country signed a "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership."

In December 1999 then-president Leonid Kuchma initialed a decree on defense reform that paved the way for NATO to monitor Ukraine's reforms and provide regular consultations and advice. In 2002, Ukraine officially declared its intention to join the alliance. In the past few years, real defense reform has taken place with sharp reductions in troops, an increase in readiness levels, and heightened transparency.

All of that will mean apparently little, however, when NATO foreign ministers gather in December, the same month the country goes to the polls to elect a parliament for the third time since Yushchenko's dramatic election in the winter of 2004-2005.