Palestine's problematic parlay

Palestinian factional representatives will meet in Cairo early next month to mull a new national reconciliation accord and the formation of a transitional unity government.

Built on the ashes of a previous Egyptian-brokered factional deal in 2005, in which Hamas committed to involvement in Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the first time, the upcoming talks may yet prove an important step in easing tensions between the Islamic movement and Fatah.

The director of Palestinian civil society movement Panorama, Walid Salem, told ISN Security Watch that the Egyptian-sponsored talks will focus on "bringing the situation back to what it was before the 14 June 2007,"  when Hamas' Gaza conquest precipitated the collapse of the previous unity government.

Four other issues will also be dealt with, he said: restructuring the security forces; legislative and presidential elections; establishing a new government; and restructuring the PLO.

Differing agendas

Fatah and Hamas go into the Cairo parlay with sharply divergent agendas.

While agreeing to discuss all issues, Fatah will seek to delimit the scope and impact of any resultant agreement to prevent Hamas gaining a foothold in PA governance and security structures.

The fact that PA President Mahmoud Abbas appears willing to risk the short-term future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on reconciliation talks appears to reflect growing disenchantment within the Ramallah government concerning prospects for a final status deal.

"Abbas feels in a way cheated or betrayed by [Israel in] not really being offered anything tangible," in negotiations, Professor Basem Ezbidi from Birzeit University told ISN Security Watch. "Abbas is weak, he is unable to offer anything seductive to the Palestinians and his standing and image is really going down."

Salem believes that for Hamas the allure of a national reconciliation agreement is clear, "Hamas is squeezed, is under siege, it has not been able to deliver so it is in a mess and they want some way out of this difficult situation."

Abbas appears to be betting on a Fatah victory in fresh elections after a brief period of interim national unity government rule. He finds himself in a difficult position with the current political crisis in Israel leaving him with little prospects of tangible politico-diplomatic gains important to his prospects for a return to office and his party's chances in Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections.

He must strike fast in order to secure potential political gains before PA security force engagement in Israeli and US-backed efforts to strike Hamas in the West Bank squander the political capital won through Hamas' widely unpopular June 2007 conquest of Gaza.

"I think the formation of the [national unity] government will take place, but in practice when it is tested I am afraid that we will encounter new kinds of problems," Ezbidi said.

Ultimately, building trust between Fatah and Hamas could prove impossible in the short term and is only likely to emerge as a function of forced political cohabitation over time and with the end of mutual repression in Gaza and the West Bank.

In the meantime, the Cairo deal will be utilized as a stepping stone by both movements in securing factional gains ahead of potential fresh elections.

Building confidence

Of the issues on the table in Cairo, the incorporation of Hamas and other hard-line movements within the Fatah-controlled PA security services and PLO are perhaps the most intractable. 

In an apparent confidence-building measure ahead of the Cairo dialogue, Abbas fired his intelligence chief Tawfiq al-Tirawi on Tuesday. Al-Tirawi has been heavily involved in PA security service efforts to combat Hamas in the West Bank since last year.

In an effort to placate Fatah opposition, Abbas has given al-Tirawi control of the Palestinian Security Academy in Jericho, and he has named him as a presidential security adviser. However, the message in his ouster is clear: The current PA crackdown on Hamas members and purported Hamas-allied institutions in the West Bank is up for negotiation in next month's talks.

The demonstration of Muqata authority over the leadership of the PA's reconstituted security forces will likely play a role in undermining reported opposition to the planned incorporation of Hamas forces in the PA security services under the draft Cairo deal. This has reportedly met fierce opposition from top military commanders.

To Salem, al-Tirawi's ouster is part of an "internal restructuring of the Palestinian Authority security forces, which is related to the internal power struggle within Fatah and the PA."

Moves to integrate Hamas security force members and public service workers into PA structures are likely to be superficial at best given the importance of the patronage structures at stake.

Salem notes: "On the question of the security forces […] the possibilities are very poor because Hamas will call not only for restructuring but also for the development of what they call a Palestinian national security strategy, which includes no cooperation with the Israeli security forces. This will mean stopping the peace process," he said.

Regardless of promises made in Cairo next month, little genuine effort can be expected from Fatah and other secular movements to bring Islamic factions into the PLO.

To Ezbidi, "If the PLO is to be reformed in a way that pleases Hamas that will take at least a full generation."

Promoting discord

The collapse of the short-lived PA unity administration in 2007, encouraged by the US and Israel, led directly to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip and the reemergence of the previous, corrupt Fatah-controlled PA governance structure in the West Bank - at the root of popular disenchantment with the movement.

In a potentially fundamental break with the previous US refusal of all contacts with Hamas, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reportedly external pagesent a lettercall_made to Hamas' political bureau head Khaled Meshaal in Damascus recently praising the group's contribution to the current relative calm, according to movement sources.

A public acknowledgement of the letter or further US-Hamas contacts look extremely unlikely in the dying days of the George W Bush administration, with the identity of the incoming president likely to heavily inform prospects for a historic opening of channels of communication.

Hamas sources claim that movement officials have already been in contact with EU government representatives, severely undermining the US and EU isolation of the Gazan administration.

It is unlikely that the commitment to integration processes envisaged in the Egyptian unity deal will raise red flags in Washington given that previous commitments to this effect in previous Palestinian factional negotiations have not been worth the paper they were written on. 

The Rice letter may be designed to bolster the position of the political bureau and Meshaal in direct competition with radical elements within the Gaza movement, which gained cachet and significantly bolstered influence through the conquest of the Gaza Strip.

Ezbidi believes that it is hard to talk of clear divisions within Hamas, while allowing that "Hamas' internal structure will probably be affected by having some kind of deep differences between the conservatives and more moderate elements."
 
Within Hamas, "some people are entirely against the armed struggle, against violence [..] [while] other elements do not see any room to compromise on this issue," he explained.

He added that sharp differences of opinion also exist within Hamas on involvement in the PLO and on "external relations, [where] some want to maintain good relations with Iran, with Syria, and others have problems with that and want to be more moderate in order to deal with the whole world."

"All these differences will impact the political conduct of Hamas," he concluded.

Killing Annapolis?

For Israel, the incorporation of Hamas in a post-Cairo national reconciliation government is likely to be interpreted as signaling the end of the Annapolis peace process.

However, Ezbidi believes we need to wait to see the nature of Hamas' role in any reconstituted Palestinian unity government and the new administration's agenda before it is possible to gauge the likely US and Israeli responses.

Egypt's decision to promote Palestinian unity is both a sign of Cairo's disaffection with the pace of Israeli-Palestinian talks and with the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, which places tremendous domestic political pressure on the government of Hosni Mubarak to relent on its closure of the Rafah crossing.

Through its Gaza conquest, Hamas has significantly improved its negotiating position vis-à-vis Mubarak's government and forced Egypt into resuming a direct interceding role in the inter-factional Palestinian quagmire and to take the part of reluctant interlocutor in discussions with Israel over a prisoners swap.

The draft Cairo agreement states clearly that no agreement with Israel will pass without Hamas' explicit approval (as a member movement of a reformed PLO) - a proviso that provides Hamas with an important initial negotiating victory while fundamentally undermining the chances for future talks.

The US and Israeli bet on the rehabilitation of PA security services in the West Bank has failed to pay off despite significant security improvements in specific areas, running into a political dead-end with the resumption of  Palestinian unity talks.

Israel may yet succeed in encouraging a delay in the implementation of any Cairo agreement, but will need to make a fundamental shift in stance to continue the Annapolis negotiations.

For the moment, Kadima head and would-be premier Tzipi Livni appears to be keeping her powder dry on the Palestinian issue in the hope of drawing rightist ultra-Orthodox parties into coalition.

Election dangers

With Livni far from assured of success, new Israeli elections would create a dangerous politico-diplomatic atmosphere for Fatah and may act to discourage fresh polls in the PA. Abbas is already bucking Hamas demands to step aside in January - an issue sure to be discussed in Cairo.

Without the political capital provided by successful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Abbas would run a significant risk in agreeing to fresh polls in Cairo. Ultimately, he may choose to scupper the factional talks, while seeking to pin the blame for the collapse on Hamas intransigence and overreaching.

Asked if substantive reforms have taken place in Fatah that would allow it to improve on its disastrous 2006 PLC election showing, Ezbidi said, "No, I doubt it. I subscribe to the opinion that Fatah is done […] it cannot be revived."

He believes that in the wake of Yasser Arafat's death, "we cannot talk about a united, strong, effective movement, it [Fatah] is an aggregation of small interests fighting unchecked, ill-defined. So it has no ability whatsoever to compete with Hamas, which is much more disciplined much more powerful."