Saudi Ismailis' sectarian strife
By Dominic Moran for ISN
The sacking of a Saudi provincial governor has again drawn attention to domestic Shia-Sunni tensions, highlighted by a damning report charging systematic discrimination.
Saudi religious, security and governmental institutions have long been accused by opponents of systematic violations of the civil, religious and human rights of the country's Shia minority.
The stoking of domestic sectarian divisions is particularly jarring in light of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud's championing of interfaith dialogue, which reached new heights Wednesday with his address to a Saudi-backed UN conference in New York.
Ismaili-government tensions have been particularly high in southwestern Najran province in recent years.
Hundreds of Ismaili Shia were rounded up by the security services following clashes in the city of Najran on 23 April 2000. The violence appeared to be sparked by the closure of Ismaili mosques during a major religious festival and the subsequent arrest of a prominent Ismaili cleric, Hussein Ismail al-Makrami, dubbed a "sorcerer" by the authorities.
Two Ismailis and a Saudi officer died and several others injured in the violence according to competing accounts.
A series of royal pardons in December 2002, including then-King Fahd's decision to commute the death sentences of 17 Ismailis involved in the 200 disturbances to 10 year jail terms, appeared designed to promote an easing of tensions, but seems to have fallen flat in the absence of supporting reforms.
Controversial figure
According to official Saudi state media, the governor of Najran province, Prince Mish'al bin Saud bin Abd al-Aziz, was relieved of his position by royal decree last week, purportedly at his own request.
Dr Ibrahim Hamad Al-Quayid from the kingdom's only independent human rights organization, the external pageNational Society for Human Rights (NSHR), told ISN Security Watch, "The information we have is that the prince himself expressed his intention to resign a number of times."
Asked what the reasons for his decision were, he said, "We don't really know. We know that there were tensions in the past in the [Najran] region and there is probably some relationship between his resignation and these tensions."
Mish'al's importance and influence within the al-Saud dynasty remains unclear. There is little doubt that his tenure as governor in Najran has been marked by a sharp rise in Shia-government tensions. Repeated Ismaili protest petitions to the crown, Najran governate and the NSHR decrying state policies have often been accompanied by requests for his removal.
"He [Mish'al] is an instrument of the central government, or the central governments – there is no one government in Saudi Arabia," director of the external pageWashington-based Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, Dr Ali Alyami, told ISN Security Watch.
As governor, the prince was under the direct authority of Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz. To Alyami, Prince Nayef "is the most powerful man in the country. He is the one in charge of the religious establishment, the commission, and he is in charge of the secret police, he is in charge of the prisons. He is in charge actually of the country, internally."
Prince Mish'al's dismissal from the governorship – whether voluntary or otherwise – is a clear indication of government concern at the rise in tensions in Najran and perhaps signals royal recognition of the need for at least a symbolic change in tack on sectarian relations in the region.
Seeking redress
Ismaili Shia leaders and activists in Najran have complained of discrimination in housing, land allocation, employment, education and state funding, with alleged efforts to tip the demographic balance of the province in favor of Sunnis of particular concern.
One petition has also requested the return to Najran of hundreds of Ismaili government workers effectively expelled to other areas in the wake of the 2000 disturbances.
Prince Mish'al has been accused by Ismaili representatives of backing the seizure of lands near Najran city for the resettlement Sunni Yemeni tribesmen, who, they claim, are given citizenship in order to alter the basic sectarian and ethnic makeup of the region.
In April 1977, Najran "notables" presented a petition to the king demanding the prince's sacking and the cancellation of the resettlement plans. Shortly thereafter the head of the Ismaili delegation, Shaikh Ahmad bin Turki Al Sa'b, was detained by the intelligence services. He is still being held without charge according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Pressed on past complaints received by the NSHR from Narjan, al-Quayid said, "In recent months we have had some phone calls, we have had some reports, but recently we haven't had [any]. Most of the petitions and complaints spoke about the policies of the government. The communities are demanding more participation in public life."
The course of actual events in the remote southwestern province are difficult to gauge but facts on the ground, as presented in news reports and a September probe by the watchdog group Human Rights Watch (HRW), appear to bear out Shia complaints.
Damning report
The pressure for Prince Mish'al's resignation appeared to grow with the September release of a HRW external pagereport, which claimed that the 2000 violence was the culmination of rising tensions following his appointment in 1996.
According to HRW, official discrimination in Saudi Arabia against Ismailis encompasses government employment, religious practices, and the justice system.
The group reports that Ismaili lawyers are regularly prevented from appearing before the courts and that an Ismaili remains on death row for purportedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad, a charge he denies.
Sect members are blocked from attaining high level decision-making, government and military positions, the group alleges.
HRW also recorded the alleged torture of prisoners by Saudi intelligence services in the wake of the 2000 disturbances and the maintenance of repressive policies in the aftermath of the violence.
The report's writers were unable to confirm or deny Ismaili claims concerning official discrimination in land allocations.
Ismailis' religious freedoms are reportedly hampered by moves to delimit religious education and to prevent the building of new mosques. High level Wahhabi clerics and government officials have launched a series of virulent attacks on Ismaili religious practices.
The Council of Senior Religious Scholars, tasked with the official interpretation of Islamic faith, excoriated Ismailis as "corrupt infidels, debauched atheists" in April 2007, while Prince Mish'al referred to Ismaili mosques as temples in 2005.
Wider tensions
As in the wake of previous international rights group reports, Saudi academics and government officials united in defending the kingdom's treatment of Ismaili Shia against the charges outlined in the HRW report.
Importantly, some Saudi respondents interpreted the report as signaling a covert Iranian role in fomenting opposition to the state amongst Shia.
Quoted in the UAE's external pageGulf News, Mohammad Al Zulfa, a member of the consultative Shura Council, responded to the report by saying that Ismailis had held important official posts in the kingdom in the past and that "no one spoke of discrimination against them or the minorities before the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the awakening movement of radical Islamists in the early eighties."
Saudi fears of domestic Iranian influence have waxed with the development of the current contest between Riyadh and Tehran for influence in Iraq and Lebanon and with the development of the Iranian nuclear program, but appear somewhat overstated.
Alyami disagrees: "While the Ismailis of Najran have had very little contact with Iran historically, they are being forced into looking to Iran for help against their government and its religious establishment's religious persecution and discriminatory polices."
Despite significant coverage of the purported mistreatment of Shia in regional states by the Iranian media, Tehran clearly has no interest in fomenting the impression of interventionism and has made efforts to ease bilateral and multilateral tensions with Saudi Arabia, Gulf states and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
"The Ismailis are […] a special [Shia] sect and, to our knowledge, have no link to the Iranian form of Shiism," Gulf Research Council program director Dr Mustafa Alani told ISN Security Watch adding, "If there are any grievances they are basically local. I don't think there is an international or regional dimension."
Prospects
The ascent of King Abdullah to the throne has brought with it a cautious, gradualist approach to reform that, while significant, still falls far short of the experiments undertaken in some neighboring Gulf states in recent years.
"I think we have made great and giant steps in the last five years in reforms. We have municipal council elections, we have the King Abdulaziz Center for [National] Dialogue and also we have two human rights organizations," al-Quayid said. "We think that reforms are going in the right direction and we are really happy about this."
"Reforms, what reforms?" Alyami asks.
Efforts to ease tensions with Shia Twelvers in Eastern Province have occurred since the Iranian revolution, but, "Whatever relaxation there is in eastern Arabia it is due to the increased influence of Iran and Hizbollah," Alyami said, noting the presence of Saudi Hizbollah in the province which he believes maintains ties with Moqtada al-Sadr, Qom and Lebanese Hizbollah.
"I was watching the last national dialogue which was on television and I was surprised at the level of frankness […] this dialogue is apparently very open with a high degree of transparency," Alani said, referring to a series of national parlays instituted by the king.
Regardless of recent changes, a government commitment to the gradual incorporation of Ismailis within wider national discourses and regional and central governance processes appears sorely lacking.