Trepidation in Tehran

Unlike most world capitals which are greeting the end of the Bush era with an undisguised sense of relief, even euphoria, Tehran's political establishment is approaching the inauguration of a new US president with a good deal of trepidation.

At the dawn of President George W Bush's tenure eight years ago, the mood in Tehran was surprisingly calm. Bush's early disparagement of "unnecessary involvements abroad" must have been soothing words to Iranian leaders' ears. Similarly, in the months before former US president Bill Clinton came to office, there were no outward signs that Iranian government leaders were overly concerned with future developments. Even in months prior to the inauguration of George HW Bush, the mood in Tehran was relatively unperturbed. Tehran was still in war footing and at the time, anybody seemed better than then-president Ronald Reagan. Not so with Barack Obama.

On 5 December, several thousand highly trained anti-riot special force units in military fatigues were deployed at major intersections in the greater Tehran region, ostensibly to direct traffic, but actually to prepare the public for possible permanent security police presence in the capital. Observers noted that it was the first time this had happened since the end of Iran-Iraq war nearly two decades years ago.

During Basij Week in November, when huge exercises are held by the 3-million-large paramilitary force, politicians of every stripe took turns extolling the virtues of the civil defense militia. In recent days, Iranian TV has run a number of highly critical programs on Obama, pointing to his alleged ties with the Israeli lobby and the military-industrial complex.  Bystanders near the University of Tehran were greeted to a new slogan chanted by the Basij students during National Student Day on 6 December: "Students are vigilant, they hate Obama."

But perhaps, the earliest sign that all will not be well between Iran and Obama came in two separate speeches by individuals critical of the policies of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The first was by former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, who stated that Obama "talked like Bush" and warned him not to continue on the outgoing president's path. The other was by Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, whose differences with Ahmadinejad over the nuclear policy led to his forced resignation more than a year ago.

Larjani stated: "Do not delude yourself into thinking that with the departure of Bush, the situation has changed much. The new American president has said that he would be tough on Iran because they are developing nuclear arms and support Hizbollah and Hamas." Larjani added, "There are many indications that Israelis and the Americans are set on starting a new adventure in the area except this time with a soft mien."

Three issues encapsulate the apprehensions of Iranian leaders: their nuclear program, geopolitical changes, and the worldviews of Obama and his team.

Two recent IAEA reports plus the general consensus of the experts' community point with a moderately high degree of certainty to an unavoidable conclusion: Tehran is fast approaching several important thresholds in its nuclear program. It is producing enough low-enriched uranium to allow it to make its first crude atomic bomb soon; and it is overcoming hurdles in warhead and delivery designs.

The first may be achieved in as early as a few months although the more likely scenario given is in a year to two years and a half. As for the warhead design, no one knows how developed the technology is since Tehran understandably does not allow unlimited access to its military R&D sites.

The public view in Iran of the nuclear program is obviously a pivotal issue both for the government and its adversaries. It is clearly not easy to gauge this factor with a high degree of accuracy but a general canvass shows a surprisingly high degree of support for the nuclear program and its military component even among the anti-government secular forces.

As for adverse geopolitical changes, the factors most often cited are: the sharp drop in oil prices, the stabilization of Iraq, the worldwide popularity of the new US leadership and the entry into the White House of a unified top team led by a highly intelligent and unideological individual.

When it comes to the makeup and general orientation of the next US administration, Tehran has much to worry about.  Secretary of State nominee, and former Democratic presidential primary candidate, Senator Hillary Clinton hawkish on Iran. The senator was one of the main supporters of a controversial Senate bill two years ago that branded Iranian Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization.

During her presidential primary campaign she stated: "In the next 10 years, during which they [Iranians] might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them." Later, she refused to backtrack on that comment even after she was criticized by the press.

Obama himself, after initially calling for unconditional talks with Iran, has slowly distanced himself from that position. Recently, he has recalibrated that view to allowing lower-level contacts and personally meeting Iranian leaders "if and only if it can advance the interests of the United States." He has called Iran's nuclear program a "grave threat" and has said: "I would do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon." The views of other principals, such as Defense Secretary Robert Gates and National Security Adviser nominee General James Logan Jones, on Iran's nuclear program are also well-documented.

Tehran's reception of the early warning signs from Washington are focused on calls for increases in military spending, NATO expansion, boosting intelligence agencies, strengthening of the "nation-building, democracy-promoting" National Endowment for Democracy, as well as Obama's efforts at reconstituting the old bipartisan Cold War consensus - not to mention what some people have taken to calling his "muscular multilateralism."

At the same time, most people in Tehran and Washington expect, in the early days of the new administration at least, an initial period of diplomatic flurries which might raise hopes of reconciliation between the two sides to unprecedented high levels as neither side can afford to be seen as harboring bad faith. In Obama's case, it is imperative to convince the world, and the Iranian public, that he genuinely means to break the decades-long impasse: In Iran's case, to divide the 5+1 group and to gain the support of the world public opinion.