France's Afghan dilemmas

France continues to increase its military presence in Afghanistan as part of Paris' contribution to the continuing NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.

Reports in early February spoke of additional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) being deployed to Bagram Air Base north of Kabul to support French Sperwer drones already in theatre. These pilotless aircraft will provide 24-hour reconnaissance and surveillance pictures to French troops on the ground.

The country's presence is also being beefed-up with the possible arrival of advanced Eurocopter EC-665 Tigre attack helicopters this summer, while Armée de l'Air (French Air Force) Dassault Mirage-2000D combat aircraft are being redeployed from Dushanbe in Tajikistan to Kandahar, southwest Afghanistan. This will shorten their flying time to possible trouble spots in the south of the country.

The increase in France's presence in Afghanistan follows the ambush of troops from the Armée de Terre (French Army) 8e Régiment Parachutiste d'Infanterie de Marine (8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment) in Sarobi province, north of Kabul last August, which left 10 troops dead and another 21 injured. This was the largest wartime loss of life for the French armed forces since 23 October 1983 when 58 troops were killed during a bomb attack on their barracks in Beirut. New BAE Systems RG-31 Nyala mine-protected vehicles are also on the way from the US to protect French troops from attack by mines and improvised explosive devices.

Hot on the heels of the attack, the Assemblée nationale (lower house of the French Parliament) voted 340 to 210 in September last year to continue the country's Afghan deployment, and also to authorize an extra 700 troops (to supplement the circa 2,500 soldiers France currently has in Afghanistan) along with additional attack helicopters, UAVs, artillery and logistical support.

Where 'freedom is being decided'

The intensification of France's involvement in Afghanistan follows a statement by President Nicolas Sarkozy in which he explained the country's motivations for remaining in Afghanistan, despite the misgivings of French popular opinion: "Why are we there? Because it is where a large part of the world's freedom is being decided. This is the place where terrorism is being fought. We are not there to fight against the Afghans but with them, not to leave them on their own to fight the dark forces of barbarity."

On the ground, French strategy follows a twin track, according to François Géré, president of the l'Institut Français d'Analyse Stratégique (French Institute for Strategic Analysis) in Paris.

"French troops continue to train and form the Afghan security forces as well as the army, and continue to help the population to protect itself in de-mining. We continue to have medical teams who are bringing healthcare to the population. On the other hand, the increase in French troops is aimed at becoming more offensive with the real commitment to engage the adversary where necessary. Not to avoid the fight," he told ISN Security Watch.

Despite the commitment of the French government to the Afghan operation, the intensification of France's effort is being performed against a backdrop of cutbacks for the country's armed forces. Last year's Livre Blanc (white paper) recommended the disbandment of 20 of the French Army's regiments and battalions. Although these reductions are not being drawn from front-line infantry units - instead being taken from support units such as logistics and engineer personnel, and signalers - the loss of these units could cause problems in terms of supporting a military operation being performed 5,579 kilometers from Paris. The cost of France's involvement in 2008 was reported at around €250 million (US$319 million), almost a 50 percent increase on the cost of the operation for 2007.

Room to maneuver

In the wake of last August's ambush, French opposition to the country's continued involvement in Afghanistan was reported to run at around 55 percent. That said, Gérè believes that Sarkozy and his government "face no significant and well-articulated political position" in opposition to its involvement in Afghanistan.

This has given Sarkozy considerable political room to maneuver in terms of increasing France's commitment in the country - a fact underlined by last September's vote in favor of continuing the French Afghan deployment. However, this political space may not be permanent.

"If we were to suffer additional significant casualties, the government would have to reconsider its position," Géré noted. "I'm not saying that the French government would decide to withdraw," he added.

In fact, some of the blame for the lack of French public support may lie at the administration's door: "The French government has not articulated very well the reasons why we are in Afghanistan and that is the reason why the [skeptical] public is in the majority."

Despite public opposition to the Afghan operation, the government may also be able to benefit from a degree of popular distraction. A general strike on 29 January in which between one and 2.5 million French workers may have taken to the streets to air a host of grievances ranging from disquiet over proposed education reforms to the government's handling of the economic crisis, has kept domestic issues firmly at the top of the political agenda for the time being.

"French people are much more concerned by unemployment and the credit crisis rather than Afghanistan," Géré said. However, we need to take into consideration that if the financial crisis in France aggravates, there could be questions about why we are spending money in Afghanistan."

Playing both sides

Following the inauguration of US President Barack Obama in January, France, along with several NATO members, may soon find themselves under increasing US pressure to pledge more troops to Afghanistan as the new administration embarks on a "surge" against the Taliban in the lead up to the presidential elections in the country in mid-August.

However, Obama and his colleagues may face disappointment in Paris. On 21 January, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin ruled out enlarging the country's military footprint in Afghanistan: "We have made the necessary effort. Considering additional reinforcements is out of the question for now."

Morin, however, also took the opportunity to reiterate France's reasons for its continued presence in Afghanistan, saying that the operation was "indispensable for the Afghans, who have the right to finally know peace. Indispensable for the French themselves because their security hangs in a great part on that region, one of the most instable in the world."

It is possible that Morin chose to tread a careful line in his interview with the Europe 1 radio station; on one hand reiterating his government's commitment to Afghanistan and the ISAF mission in general, while also reassuring skeptical parts of the French population that, even in light of a new US administration pledging a firmer effort in the country, France would not be increasing its commitment beyond the troop and equipment increases promised in September.

The end game

Moreover, there could also be financial motivations for the French government refusing to pledge anything more than what has already been promised. France's GDP is predicted to decline from 0.9 percent for 2008 to -1.2 percent for 2009, according to figures from the Economist Intelligence Unit. The government may be choosing to husband its cash flow as much as possible.

"If we increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, we will obviously need extra money to pay for them," Géré argued.

The only way such a move could be done without significantly increasing costs would be to redeploy some of the circa 2,000 French troops operating with the EU Peacekeeping Force (EUFOR) in Chad in support of the UN/AU peacekeeping efforts in West Darfur, Sudan.

Reducing the numbers of French troops in the EUFOR mission could send a message to President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan that France no longer places as much importance on this mission as it does on the Afghan operation. This could encourage the Sudanese government, armed forces and proxy janjaweed militias to increase their violence in the troubled West Darfur province while EUFOR attempts to redress the loss of French troops with fresh soldiers from other European nations.

A French reduction of its EUFOR presence could also send the wrong message as regards Paris' commitment to European security and defense policy.

Finally, Sarkozy and his colleagues would find that any increase in France's troop numbers in Afghanistan "would be very difficult to do without a debate in Parliament," said Géré.

The president may want to avoid such a move in the current turbulent economic environment, lest it gives opposition parliamentarians the opportunity to ask why money is being found for an increased Afghan commitment while the French economy remains in the doldrums.

France's Afghanistan endgame may not be as far away as the country's population might think. The current global financial crisis and France's economic woes could have a decisive effect on the Sarkozy government's desire and ability to keep French boots on the ground.

"My sense is that for financial reasons, we have no alternative but to stay for a maximum of two years and to transfer the responsibility for security to the Afghan government," noted Géré.

Furthermore, pulling French troops out by 2012 could have the accompanying benefit of avoiding some of the problems that might be caused by the cutbacks of support personnel recommended by last year's white paper.