US-Russia: Missile diplomacy

As the first several weeks of his presidency have made all too clear, one of Barack Obama’s first moves in office should have been to rehire any qualified Kremlinologists laid off over the past 20 years. Almost every day, it seems, Moscow acts in a manner designed to test Obama, even as Russian officials offer lofty words of a new beginning in relations. 

On 28 January, reports swamped media around the world that Russia had ditched plans to put Iskander (short-range) missiles in Kaliningrad, on the doorstep of the European Union. President Dmitry Medvedev had originally made the threat in his first state of the union address, one day after Obama won the November presidential elections.

The move was a response to US plans to place key elements of a missile defense shield in Moscow’s old stomping ground: a radar station in the Czech Republic and 10 missile interceptors across the border in Poland. Questioning US claims that the shield’s intention was to protect North America and Europe against “rogue states” (such as Iran), Moscow says the system is aimed at containing Russia and runs counter to the country’s strategic interests. 

The jubilation over Russia’s apparent attempt at reconciliation has since died down as it has become clear that not much has really changed - except that Moscow is taking more of a wait-and-see approach with the new administration. The offer to Obama has also become even starker.

"President Medvedev from the very start said very clearly and unequivocally that if there are no interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic as was planned by the previous administration, clearly, there will be no Iskanders in Kaliningrad," Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said in Munich last week, as reported by Reuters. He also raised the possibility of a joint assessment of threats and even joint development of a system to counter those threats.

For its part, the new administration in Washington has repeatedly stressed the notion of a fresh start to relations with Russia. In a widely quoted speech at a security conference in Munich on 7 February, Vice President Joe Biden described a “dangerous drift in relations” between Russia and NATO member states,” saying “The United States rejects the notion that NATO's gain is Russia's loss, or that Russia's strength is NATO's weakness."

Biden repeated the measured support for missile defense plans voiced by Obama and his advisers during the presidential campaign and in the months since his victory: If the technology behind the shield shows itself to be sound and cost-effective, then the administration would move ahead with development - but only accompanied by dialogue with Russia and Europe.

Despite additional Biden comments deriding the notion of "any nation having a sphere of influence" and asserting that "sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances," Russian officials said they were encouraged by the pledge to restart relations.

Yet once again, the nice words came amid Russian moves that could best be called conflicting. Last week, Kyrgyzstan decided to close the Manas air base, a key US refueling stop on the way toward delivering supplies to troops fighting insurgents in Afghanistan. The move was “coincidentally” announced in Moscow and took place as Russia was offering a massive aid package to Kyrgyzstan.

A few days later, however, Moscow said it had agreed almost immediately to allow the US military to ship non-lethal cargo across Russian territory. The bad cop-good cop routine appeared designed to remove the US from the Russian "near abroad" - an eternal Kremlin goal - while attempting to salvage any damage done to the war effort.

In addition, reports last week indicated that Russia had already started to implement its recently announced plans to establish military bases in the breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia, including a naval base at the Abkhazia Black Sea port of Ochamchira. As a result, western leaders find themselves, on the one hand, pushing for warmer relations with Moscow, while on the other, condemning Russian expansionism.

"I cannot see how we can have such a serious discussion of such a new [security] architecture, in which President Medvedev himself says territorial integrity is a primary element when Russia is building bases inside Georgia, a country that doesn't want those bases," said NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Munch conference, as quoted by Reuters.

Meanwhile, the Czech and Polish governments, who have invested so much political capital in signing unpopular agreements on the missile shield, continue to profess confidence that the US will push forward with the plans - even though a long delay might be in the cards.

The Czech online daily Aktualne reported on 9 February that Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, on his way to Washington for meetings, had told reporters of his skepticism over a quick decision about US missile plans. "I expect it will get postponed. And it might be five years," he said, adding "They want to test how many rockets the interceptors can catch.”

Most of the debate, however, continues to ignore the lingering problems that the Czech governing coalition will have in achieving parliamentary support for the already signed base agreements.

Last week, the Green Party teamed up with the opposition to postpone the debate indefinitely as party chairman Martin Bursik called on the government to wait until the Obama administration made its own plans clearer. Bursik has otherwise been a stalwart backer of the missile defense plans, but probably wants to avoid the possibility of a painful defeat if Washington now plans to delay implementation anyway.

With each passing day that appears an increasingly wise decision, but things certainly won't be as easy as using the missile shield as a bargaining chip in return for concessions across the board from Russia. Recent events suggest key disputes with the West on a wide range of security issues won't simply fade away even if the shield is scrapped.