Iraq: Maliki beats out Najaf bosses

Although the full and final results of the Iraqi election will not be known for some time, over 90 percent of the tallies have been published, and, as predicted, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's alliance - which ran on a strong nationalist, bread-and-butter-oriented platform - did exceedingly well while religious-based parties suffered major setbacks.

The State of the Law coalition centered on al-Maliki's Dawa Party won majorities in a plurality of provinces it was running, though it fell short of winning governing majorities.

In the Shia heartland of Karbala, a moderate secularlist, Yousef al-Habubi, led with 13.3 percent of the votes. As a former deputy governor under Saddam Hussein, al-Habubi was fondly remembered by the residents for his urban renewal projects including the impressive developments constructed between the two famed shrines of Imams Hussein and Abbas.  

In addition to this, secular and nationalist parties did exceptionally well in all the four Sunni-majority provinces. In Anbar, the site of bloody carnage between Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaida-in-Iraq on the one hand and US and Iraqi government forces on the other, secular and tribal-based parties easily beat out the powerful Sunni fundamentalist Iraqi Islamic Party, which had dominated the state for the last four years.

Clearly, secular or independent forces would have fared much better had the electoral system been devised more equitably and democratically. As it is, the system is badly skewered in favor of larger, more established parties, which happen to be religious-based.

The bosses of Najaf
 
The holy city of Najaf is the nerve center of Shia religious politics. The city where Imam Ali, the founder of the Shia branch of Islam, is buried is also the spiritual home of the Shia clergy-- very much like the Vatican is for Roman Catholics.

Under Saddam, the city lost its pre-eminence to Qum, Iran. Now, with the end of repression against the Shia clergy and the general re-awakening of religious consciousness in Iraq, the city has gradually regained some of its former luster and grandeur. Control over Najaf, with its bustling religious tourism industry and its famous ayatollahs, is a much-coveted prize for Iraqi politicians. Until now, Najaf has been under the sway of one party: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

No party epitomizes the strange mix of religion and politics in today's Iraq more starkly than the ISCI. Created in the early 1980s by Iraqi exiles in Iran to open a second front against Saddam's Ba'athist regime, it came into an agreement with Bush administration officials on the eve of the US invasion, with secret Iranian approval, to aid the American project in return for receiving a piece of the action in post-Saddam state-building.

Partly because of this cozy arrangement and partly because of its considerable financial and organizational assets - including a mid-sized militia army trained by the Iranians - it quickly established itself as the dominant sectarian-religious grouping in Iraq before the crucial 2005 local and parliamentary elections.

The ISCI was led by a prominent Shia clerical clan - the Hakim family - and it boasted a high measure of support among the influential merchants and clergy in Najaf as well as in the capital. In the 2005 provincial elections, as inter-communal violence was reaching apocalyptic levels, the ISCI managed to win almost all the Shia governorates in the south - an advantage which was quickly translated into dominance over the security apparatus as well as the huge patronage networks.

"It was alleged that all Najaf ulema [clerics] supported the Supreme Council in 2005," Hussein al-Mousavi, a mid-ranking cleric in Najaf, told ISN Security Watch. "This was a false assumption."

The ISCI claimed at the time that its electoral slate had the backing of Iraq's foremost religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, a contention that was never officially reciprocated by the Ayatollah's office but which nevertheless helped change the ISCI's electoral fortunes dramatically.

As the highest Shia religious authority in Iraq and beyond, al-Sistani's edicts have the force of religious commandments on millions of devout followers. Reproof by the Ayatollah of a law could put the law's very viability in jeopardy.

In 2003, the American occupying authorities learned this lesson, first hand and the hard way. In the summer of that year, al-Sistani issued a fatwa rejecting US plans for writing Iraq's constitution before nationwide elections, thus torpedoing the Bush administration's strategy for Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization.

"His eminence single-handedly changed the political situation in Iraq by his wise and timely intervention," a cleric close to Ayatollah al-Sistani's office in Najaf told ISN Security Watch on condition of anonymity.

Although the cleric refused to comment explicitly on the ISCI's claims to speak for the Grand Ayatollah, he nevertheless said: "The Marjaya [political leadership] is beyond political trivialities."

Al-Mousavi had no qualms criticizing the ISCI's assertions, however. As a mid-ranking cleric who has lived most of his adult life teaching and studying in Najaf, al-Mousavi seemed to be speaking for many other Najaf clerics. He was highly critical of the ISCI's liberal use of Ayatollah al-Sistani's images and words on its party posters. The religious scholar was particularly incensed at one TV campaign ad run incessantly on the ISCI's private television channel, Al Forat, in which a theme song was played whose refrain "Seyed Ali" juxtaposed shots of al-Sistani with ISCI promotional footage.

"The ad insinuated that Ayatollah Sistani supported their aims or policies. But this is absurd. Mr Sistani has never endorsed any particular group in Iraq or anywhere else for that matter," he said. "These claims are unfortunate and deplorable."

Aside from political opportunism, the most common grievance of Najaf residents against the ISCI is cronyism and mishandling of the economy.

"They have had billions of dinars from the government and from the foreign pilgrims," Farhan Al-Myyah, a local restaurant owner, told ISN Security Watch. "What have they done with it? Nothing. Nothing."

Al-Myyah complained bitterly about the lack of basic services and insufficient attention paid to the schools and other infrastructure.

Another resident, a day laborer who only gave his first name, was even more specific. "They [ISCI] are corrupt to the boot," he said. "All they care about is lining their pockets."

Both men said they were devout Muslims. One voted for al-Maliki's nationalistic State of the Law, the other voted for the secular Sons and Tribes of Najaf, a situation that illustrates there is no longer a correlation between religious beliefs and party affiliation in Iraq.

In the 31 January elections, the ISCI lost not just Najaf but all the southern states with the exception of Maysan. In the two key contests of Basra and Baghdad, its seats went down from 36 percent and 39 percent of the votes, respectively, to 11 percent and 5 percent. In Najaf itself, which is the ISCI's adopted home base, its votes plummeted from 45 percent to 14 percent.

This is all the more remarkable since the ISCI had deployed all its formidable assets for a victory in the south, including two satellite TV channels, dozens of local newspapers, countless women's and student organizations and several hundred offices throughout Iraq.

So confident was ISCI party leader Abdul Aziz Hakim of an eventual victory that he had devised an elaborate plan for creating a semi-autonomous super-region for the southern states with Najaf as its political capital and Basra its economic powerhouse.

Al-Maliki's adroit maneuvering no doubt contributed to the ISCI's huge loss.

Last year, as the fear of a Sadrist electoral victory in the south subsisted, the tacit alliance between the two main Shia parties, Dawa and the ISCI, gave way to intense competition among them. In the months running up to the 31 January elections, and clearly aware of the general backlash against religious-based parties, al-Maliki shrewdly recast himself as a nationalist leader while playing down his own fundamentalist roots.

First, his party helped defeat the ISCI and Kurdish parliamentary opposition to the regional elections. Then Dawa deputies voted for the banning of religious displays in political electoral campaigns. Then, playing the ISCI at its own game, Dawa managed to lure an associate of Ayatollah al-Sistani to its State of the Law coalition.

To the ISCI's consternation, Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Al-Shahristani - who is believed to be a relative of the Grand Ayatollah - decided to join al-Maliki's camp rather than its rival.

At this point, no group has governing majority in the local councils. Already, an intense struggle for coalition-building is underway in all the 14 states that voted.

The usually reliable daily Sawat ul-Iraq newspaper reports of discussions between the ISCI and secular arch-rival Iraqi National List of former prime minister Iyad Alawi. The paper also reports of a the strong probability of a working coalition between al-Maliki and the Sadr movement who had fought each other in street battles last spring. Recent comments by Sadr spokesmen give credence to these speculations.

For example, Sheikh Ayid Mayahi, a Sadr leader in Basra - the site of a bloody war between Sadrists and al-Maliki forces last year - recently sent overtures to al-Maliki camp. "We are with our national leaders who call on uniting Iraq and have a central government  and national security force to protect Iraq from inside or outside," he was quoted as saying.

Whatever the future shape of local politics, the new alignments point to a more inclusive and less religious-based scenario in Iraq.