Jordan's tightrope walk
By Dominic Moran for ISN
The recent Israeli operation in Gaza has had a major impact in neighboring Jordan where the government has been forced to respond to popular opprobrium and the related re-emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable political force.
The collapse of the Annapolis talks and the Israeli government was a particular blow to Jordan. Securing a Palestinian-Israeli peace that allows the establishment of a viable Palestinian state in the neighboring West Bank is a crucial strategic interest for Amman in securing its own peace treaty with Israel and in preventing the rise of militant Islamic sentiment in the kingdom itself.
Amman and a number of other Jordanian cities saw a series of demonstrations, many of which drew huge crowds. A major demonstration on 9 January ended in clashes between riot police and demonstrators. The protests and repeated Jordanian denunciations of the Israeli assault sent a clear message to Israel of mounting unease and distress in Amman concerning what was interpreted as Israeli belligerence in Gaza.
"I think Jordan took a strong stand against what happened in Gaza. Jordan Times political correspondent Hani Hazaimeh told ISN Security Watch, noting that "Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel."
Jordan has played a significant, positive role in peacemaking in recent years, hosting Israeli delegations from both government and civil society organizations and is external pagerumored to have played a role in encouraging backdoor high-level diplomatic talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Brotherhood resurgence
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), again sought revocation of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty during the Gaza conflict and played a prominent role in demonstrations.
Al-Quds Center for Political Studies Director Oraib Al Rantawi told ISN Security Watch: "The first, direct impact of the war in Gaza […] is the increasing influence of Islamist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF."
"During the three-week war, hundreds of thousands of Jordanians demonstrated in the streets holding the slogans of the Muslim Brotherhood in demonstrations organized basically by the Islamist movement," Al Rantawi said.
Until recently, the fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood had appeared to be on the wane, with the IAF's parliamentary representation reduced from 16-17 to six MPs in the November 2007 Chamber of Deputies election.
Some analysts have expressed concerns that the marginalization of the Brotherhood within the Jordanian political system could promote greater radicalization and increase support for Salafi groups. This fear appears to have been assuaged somewhat by the Brotherhood's return to prominence in the Gaza demonstrations.
A sharp external pageexchange in the Chamber of Deputies in which the IAF and conservative opponents traded sharp denunciations indicates that the gloves may have come off. This impression has been bolstered by the recent government decision to prevent eight prominent Brotherhood members from preaching at Friday prayers.
According to Al Rantawi, the reinvigoration of Islamic movement organs through the group's role in the Gaza protests is a cause of concern among some decision-makers who have "started revisiting their approach toward the Islamist movement and rethinking the opening up that they started in the previous months when the intelligence department engaged in a dialogue with both Hamas and the Islamist movement in Jordan."
Lawsuit suspended
Jordanian parliamentarians' efforts to file suit against top Israeli officials involved in the decision-making processes of the Gaza war in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague appear to have been shelved.
The head of Jordan's Parliamentary Legal Committee, Mubarak Abu Yamin, was to lead an official delegation to present petitions on behalf of the Jordanian parliament this week, but the trip was called off, likely over palace concerns at a potential fundamental rupture of relations with Israel.
"The lower house [Chamber of Deputies] said it [lawsuit delay] is for procedural reasons," Hazaimeh said, adding "We are trying to figure out what was the reason behind delaying the departure of the MPs to the international court."
The planned petitions were greeted with a mix of incredulity and anger in Israel given that outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minster Ehud Barak, Kadima head Tzipi Livni and the head of the Israeli military Lieutenant-General Gabi Ashkenazi were all reportedly named in the suit.
This rather bizarre episode only serves to underline the depths to which Jordanian-Israeli relations sunk at the height of the Gaza crisis and the intense pressure on the Hashemite kingdom at the time to respond to the Israeli operation.
Hoary chestnut
The collapse of the Annapolis peace track is of profound concern to the Jordanian government in that it raises the prospects of the re-emergence of alternative visions for a resolution of the Palestinian refugee and statehood issues based on incorporation in the Jordanian state or a Jordanian role in the West Bank.
In Israel at least one group - whose origins and place on the right-left political continuum remains somewhat hazy - is pushing for a confederation of the West Bank, Israel and Jordan, a complete non-starter for the PA, Hashemite dynasty and Israel.
Oft-raised by elements of the Israeli right, efforts to promote the role of Jordan in fulfilling Palestinian suzerainty aspirations have been repeatedly rejected by the Hashemite dynasty, whose interest in a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been unshakable and adamantly maintained.
Amman has done considerably more than many other host governments in ensuring the incorporation of Palestinian refugees into society, which has been crucial in securing overall stability in the kingdom.
Al Rantawi recently attended an audience with the king in which the issue of whether Jordan would be a homeland for the Jordanians or Palestinians was raised by attendees. "And the king gave a concrete answer on this issue: 'There will never be a homeland for Palestinians. Jordan will never be an alternative homeland for anybody. Jordan for the Jordanians.'"
A Jordanian role in settling Palestinian claims for a sovereign state will clearly not be the stated policy of the incoming Binyamin Netanyahu government - with the Likud leader already committing to strengthen the local economy and PA security control in the West Bank.
"I believe Netanyahu wants Jordan to play a role in the West Bank," Al Rantawi said, while noting that this purported aim could only be achieved with Jordanian agreement.
Jordan looks set to eschew any direct involvement in the Palestinian territory for fear that the weakness of PA institutions and necessary involvement in day-to-day contacts with the Israeli military would foster increasing PA reliance on Jordan and blur the distinction between the nascent Palestinian state and Hashemite kingdom.
Amman and Hamas
Amman has engaged over the years in a delicate balancing act, seeking to prevent the domestic politicization of the Palestinian independence struggle while negotiating its own relationship to both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas.
Intelligence chief Major-General Muhammad Dahabi was dismissed in December after reportedly holding talks with Hamas official Muhammad Nazzal.
"I don't think he was removed because he conducted talks with Hamas. I think it was because he talked about these contacts with Hamas," Al Rantawi said.
Amman distrusts Hamas' intentions in the kingdom following a fundamental break with the Islamic militant movement over the discovery of a purported Hamas arms cache and designs to attack Jordanian targets in April 2006 - charges strongly denied by Hamas.
Hamas leaders were expelled from the kingdom in 1999. This, after the deeply embarrassing Mossad assassination attempt on Hamas political bureau head Khaled Meshaal in 1997 in Amman (the botched operation was used against Netanyahu in the recent Israeli election campaign).
Jordan is involved in US-sponsored efforts to train the PA National Security Force in an initiative designed to extend the reach of PA security services and, more importantly, to prevent an irreversible Hamas takeover of the West Bank.
Ultimately, Jordanian moves toward a substantive open dialogue with Hamas will be reliant on progress toward a Palestinian unity government and in the institution of direct Hamas relations with European states and the US.
"I think Jordan now is focusing on the Palestinian conciliation" process, Hazaimeh said. "It is important now to achieve some sort of conciliation between Palestinian factions before the government starts talks with Hamas or whosoever."
Regional balancing act
As a small, resource-poor state situated within a deeply unsettled regional power structure, Jordan is constantly seeking to balance its relations with larger neighboring states as it attempts to maintain both internal stability and a niche role in fostering dialogue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
It is reported that Jordan decided at the last minute not to attend a Qatari-hosted summit at the height of the Gaza conflict, attended by Meshaal, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart, Bashar al-Assad. King Abdullah attended a rival Egyptian summit shortly thereafter.
Qatari-Jordanian relations are drawing closer, with the two countries signing an agreement for a US$2 billion joint investment fund in late January. While Qatar is emerging as a diplomatic rival to the Saudis in the Gulf, it remains unclear what impact this tightening of the Doha-Amman bilateral relationship will have on Saudi-Jordanian ties.
Iranian regional moves also loom large for Jordan. Tehran is a key player in ensuring stability in neighboring Iraq - efforts that have a flow on effect for Jordan, which has struggled to cope with a mass influx of Iraqi refugees since the 2003 US-led invasion.
Of perhaps greater concern in the short term is the influence of any improvement in US-Iranian ties on laundering past work and encouraging progress in the Iranian nuclear program. King Abdullah announced Jordan's intentions to pursue a full nuclear energy program in January 2007, as the diplomatic stoush over the Iranian program intensified. Jordan has sought contacts with a number of states and nuclear industry players in a bid to realize a full atomic energy generation capacity.
"I think the US and the European community are more concerned about the Iranians than we are in Jordan or the region," Hazaimeh opined. "The new US administration is going to try a new approach with the Iranian government, so we're going to wait and see."
Prospects
Ultimately, Amman's foreign policy interests both regionally and on the wider international stage rely on ongoing US support and maintaining close ties with US-allied Arab partner states. The annual US grant of US$600 million continues to play a key role in securing the stability of the kingdom.
The US is unlikely to demand significant progress toward greater democratic reform in the short term, which would likely give succor to the IAF and could work to promote the independence of conservative tribal leaders. The latter are traditionally a pillar of Hashemite rule. However, a tribal parliamentary representation external pagereportedly showed a rare degree of divergence from palace policy in visiting Damascus at the height of the Gaza crisis.
The reverberations of the Israeli operation appear to have had a deeply deleterious impact at the highest levels in Amman.
Al Rantawi noted a new and worrying phenomenon among prominent participants in the recent royal audience: "They deal with Israel as the major and main source of threat, not for the Palestinians or for regional instability, but also for Jordanian national interests, security and stability."
"A clear majority of them deal with Israel as the enemy."