Understanding Bosnia, Part Two
By Vildana Skocajic, Anes Alic for ISN
Bosnia's three ethnic-based nationalist parties continue to successfully campaign on everlasting nationalist and religious sentiments without mention of the economy or EU integration in a country where poverty and high unemployment are the mainstays.
War wounds remain fresh thanks largely to nationalist politicians who wrench them open when doing so seems an expedient way to buy votes.
The 1992-1995 war, which ended with the international community-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement, left no winners and no losers. In schools, children learn three completely opposing versions of the war, threatening to create a new generation of intolerant nationalists.
Since the end of the war, with the exception of two years of rule by moderate parties, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been governed by officials who use ethnic tensions to mobilize their ethnically based constituencies to support them.
During pre-election campaigns, generally only 5 percent of their promises focus on poverty, unemployment and EU integration, not because they are afraid of failing to realize those goals, but because it is not enough to attract the masses of voters - particularly the under-educated voters who are especially vulnerable to the messianic messages of false prophets. Despite the fact that the fulfillment of election promises hovers at about 5 percent, voters continue to make the same choices, time and again.
So where does this leave Bosnia? And who is to blame, the opportunistic politicians or the voters who continue to blindly support them? Analyzing the outcome of elections, it is clear that the masses are not nearly as concerned about corruption, lack of economic development, high unemployment and low standards of living as they are about being given a false sense of ethnic security.
Skewed priorities
According to vox populi conducted on the streets of the capital Sarajevo by ISN Security Watch, many are unsatisfied with the situation, but skeptical that anything will change in the near future.
One young Sarajevo architect, who asked to be identified only as "JC," said that the only way to remedy the situation would be to start from scratch and revamp the entire political structure.
Speaking to ISN Security Watch, he suggested the "suspension" of the "massive administration where even secretaries have their own secretaries and deputies." But he remains skeptical that anything will be done.
"There is no one to change it, especially the international community, because Bosnian political and economical instability brings them more work here."
Similarly, "SE," a 31-year-old social worker, told ISN Security Watch she was thankful that she was employed, but concerned about the general state of affairs. "I can't say I'm happy to live in a country with three [ethnically rotating] presidents. They can't do much, nor do they have the will to, since they rotate every eight months. [They] have political wisdom for the period of time while their mandate lasts, while some activity is visible in election year, but even that doesn't bring any results," she said.
Others voiced similar sentiments, and a pattern has clearly developed: Those who would most likely vote for change - meaning against the nationalist parties - tend to let their skepticism keep them away from the voting booths on election day. At the same time, those who would normally vote for the nationalist parties, despite the obvious stagnation, are more than willing to get out the vote.
Getting out
Several months ahead of elections, ethnic-based nationalist rhetoric starts in full swing, creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats alike. But voter actions do not necessarily match their expressed opinions at other times, making it difficult to develop clear voting patterns.
According to the latest opinion poll conducted by the Gallup Balkan Monitor, more than half of Bosnian citizens would emigrate from the country if they had the opportunity, while nine out of 10 questioned were not satisfied with their lives.
When it comes to the political party and external pageelected officials and institutions, more than 60 percent of Bosnian Serbs said they did not trust the Republika Srpska entity government, while 75 percent of citizens in the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat-run Federation entity said they did not trust their government. In the same poll, every second citizen said they did not trust any of the country's political parties.
As such, the logical question is: Who is voting for the nationalist parties if polls show that they are largely not trusted?
The ethno-nationalist parties responsible for the war still maintain large followings and strong influence, with more or less the same figures rotating on the political scene.
Each election proves that the nationalist parties would have little chance of winning without each other. After months of ruthless obstruction and petty public pot shots, voters eventually decide to elect their own ethnic political representatives. In turn, those ethnic-nationalist parties then form a weak coalition on the state level (joining pre-election enemies together) but remain ethnically "pure" on the territory where their ethnic group is the majority.
Despite international community efforts to transfer power from the entities to the state, strong entity governments (run on clear ethnic bias) are undermining the authority of the central government, while nationalist politicians are blocking the strengthening of the state.
The international community, led by the external pageOffice of the High Representative (OHR) and the US Embassy in Sarajevo, has remained intensely involved in Bosnia's affairs. Many believe that its eventual withdraw from the country, due nationalist rhetoric, political obstruction and fragile central government, would further destabilize Bosnia and finally lead to the partition of the country along ethnic lines.
The OHR retains the power to impose policies and remove obstructive politicians; however, it does not make all decisions, and unlike previous High Representatives who imposed many laws and reforms, the current one, Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajcak, prefers to facilitate consensus rather than simply impose a position.
Previous High Representatives relied too heavily on their powers to force through legislation and sack hundreds of elected officials, who fomented further ethnic division in the country.
Pressured by recent calls from Bosnian nongovernmental and civil society groups to fire obstructive politicians, Lajcak sent a clear message, stressing that he had no attention of doing what he viewed as a "citizens job."
"You can't expect me to sack them so you can reelect them again," Lajcak said in a very poignant public statement, adding that in the last 14 years, Bosnian voters failed to demonstrate any will to change the situation themselves.
The OHR, created in 1995 to oversee implementation of the peace, had been due to close in mid-2007, but its mandate is continually extended due to lack of progress in quelling ethnic and political tensions.
Since 2006, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and the Bosniak member of the country's tripartite presidency, Haris Silajdzic, have been locked in a external pagemajor rivalry that has further fomented ethnic intolerance between the two entities.
Silajdzic based the election campaign for his Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) on an initiative to suspend, for good, the entity of Republika Srpska, saying that it had been created on the foundations of genocide. For his part, Dodik has warned that Republika Srpska could secede if Silajdzic continued to call for its abolition.
However, it should be pointed out that the mutual accusations flung back and forth between Dodik and Silajdzic were done so several months ahead of elections (certainly not afterwards) - a fact that metastasized ethnic animosity and gave both parties more votes that they had ever earned in the past. It was a brilliant, if not original, move.
The Bosnian Croats stayed out of the Dodik-Silajdzic tit-for-tat, but still saw a unique opportunity to renew their demands for the creation of a third entity, dominated by Bosnian Croats - an option rejected by the international community and most of the Bosniak leadership.
Yet, Republika Srpska officials continued with their public campaign to dissolve the state institutions of Bosnia and to establish a dominant Bosnian Serb entity. Dodik and his government officials advocate for a return of the jurisdictions taken from them by the international community and transferred to the state level - including taxation administration, the army and the judiciary. Republika Srpska officials claim that transferring jurisdictions from entities to the state will finally lead to the collapse of the Bosnian Serb entity.
Part of Dodik's strategy is to open new and maintain existing diplomatic offices in various European capitals (a powerful initiative given the Bosnian state's very weak demonstration of foreign policy measures). Dodik has also outshined the state by hiring major international lobbying firms to promote his cause and represent the interests of Republika Srpska, while the state sits back and watches.