Understanding Bosnia, Part Three

Bosnian foreign policy and international relations - though many would say they do not exist for all intents and purposes - relies primarily on ethnic concepts as a reflection of an ethnic-run state. Because of this, in terms of foreign policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks a coherent strategy, coordinated diplomacy and qualified personnel.

All Bosnian foreign policy achievements since the end of the war have been accomplished by the international community, in general, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the US Embassy in particular - both of whom have been the frequent initiators and supervisors of the country's post-war reforms.

Bosnian ambassadors and diplomatic staff, also appointed based on ethnicity and political connections, tend to be incompetent when faced with even the most basic of duties, such as speaking the language of a mission’s country and being diplomatically versed in the cultural necessities. Too often, Bosnian diplomats serve the interests of certain political parties and ethnic groups rather than the state.

The impossible presidency

In accordance with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, foreign policy falls under the jurisdiction of the state, as opposed to the country's two ethnic-based entities (the Bosnian Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Bosniak- and Bosnian Croat-dominated external pageFederationcall_made). Foreign policy decisions as well as diplomacy measures, such as the appointment of external pageambassadorscall_made, are made by the rotating, tripartite presidency, always composed of one representative from each ethnic group.

In order to see any decision through to its final phase, all three members of the presidency must agree - and it's a process that so far appears to be virtually impossible. In almost all cases, at least one member of the external pagepresidencycall_madewill perceive his ethnic interests to be in threat of violation.

As such, the external pageBosnian presidencycall_made has to date only managed to come to a consensus on two key issues: giving full support to the country's external pageNATOcall_mademembership and working toward external pageintegrationcall_madeinto the EU.

However, the EU will only grant membership to Bosnia after its officials demonstrate an ability to harmonize with Europe. This could be prove a bit tricky: In the past two years, state institutions managed to pass only 22 laws, almost none related to EU aspirations. The lack of any progress occurred in the absence of any real pressure from the international community, which was previously more aggressively involved in the reform process, firing obstructive officials and putting laws into action.

A recent EU external pageprogress reportcall_made on countries in the western Balkans expressed concern about political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while several western diplomats warned world leaders to pay more attention to the often forgotten country.

Manifest disunity

The disunity among Bosnian officials and the lack of a coherent foreign policy was highlighted most recently by how the country reacted to the Israeli offensive against Gaza. Bosnian State Foreign Ministry, led by a Bosnian Jew, Sven Alkalaj, urged Israel to urgently stop the attacks on Gaza, saying the matter could only be resolved through negotiations and peaceful means.

Hundreds of people in towns and cities in the parts of Bosnia where Bosniaks are the majority held peaceful demonstrations in support of Palestinian civilians.

At the same time, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik sent a letter of support to Israeli President Shimon Peres, expressing his understanding of Israel's position and offering full support to the Israel effort to "ensure security and peace" for the Israeli people. Dodik also stated in his letter that Republika Srpska did not support the anti- Israeli demonstrations and gatherings organized in the "other" Bosnian entity. 

Regional relations

Bosnia and Herzegovina's closest relations are with its immediate neighbors, Croatia and Serbia, but those links are often abused, with Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats relying on specific political support from Serbia and Croatia for their nationalist rhetoric.

At the same time, nationalist politicians in Serbia and Croatia proper often use Bosnia and Herzegovina's unstable ethnic situation to gain more political points in their home countries under such slogans as "all Serbs in one country" or "Greater Serbia," and so on and so forth.

Despite their histories, Serbia and Croatia themselves (when Bosnia is not thrown in the mix) are much more pragmatic, and have decent diplomatic relations, developed economic cooperation and significant trade exchanges, which are growing continually.

Serbia maintains political and economic contacts with Bosnian Serbs in Republika Srpska and Croatia influences Bosnian Croats in the Bosnian Federation. Both Serbia and Croatia privatized most of Bosnia's state-run companies, placing them in the hands of nationalist politicians who would be sure to serve their interests. Similarly, Bosniak officials welcome investments from Islamic countries on the territory where they form the majority.

The inflow of Serbian investment in areas dominated by Bosnian Croats as well as Croatian investments in Bosnian Serb-dominated areas is almost nonexistent, and this unwritten rule appears to satisfy most. Recently, when one Serbian company announced its plans to buy  shares in a Croatian company, including its franchise in Bosnia, it caused outrage and a boycott by Bosnian Croats.   

Furthermore, Serbia and Croatia still rely on Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat support during election time as most Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats are Serbian and Croatian passport holders and thus eligible to vote there as diaspora.

During the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats received financial, political and military aid from Serbia and Croatia. However, lately such political interference has declined. Croatia is trying to enter EU and has been warned by the international community to stay out of Bosnian political affairs. The same is true with Serbia, whose moderate leaders said that they would rather join the EU than support Republika Srpska's secessionist aspirations. 

However, the Dayton peace treaty, which ended the war, grants Republika Srpska the right to special and parallel relations with Serbia, as does the Bosnian Federation with Croatia.

Still, the three former Yugoslav republics - Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina - are about to encounter a new chapter of diplomatic conflict, which threatens to renew ethnic animosity by opening charges for genocide and war crimes at the Hague-based International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Both Bosnia and Croatia have sued Serbia for war crimes and genocide. In the case of Bosnia, the ICJ cleared Serbia of responsibility, while Croatia's case is just about to begin. Serbian officials filed a counter lawsuit for war crimes committed by Croatians against Croatian Serbs. At the same time, Bosnian officials, at least Bosniaks, will be closely monitoring the Serbia-Croatia case, hoping that new evidence will come out in order to renew their own lawsuit.

The case has caused mixed reactions in Bosnia, with Republika Srpska officials serving in state institutions doing their best to suspend the suit. When the ICJ ruled in February 2007 that Serbia was cleared of responsibility for the genocide of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, but that the institutions of Republika Srpska, and in particular its army and police, were responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian Serbs took to the streets to celebrate Serbia's "freedom."