The US and the Gray Arms Market
By Jody Ray Bennett for ISN
After nearly eight years in Afghanistan, US forces have failed to effectively oust the Taliban regime and are now confronted daily by insurgent forces that carry out suicide bombings, IED attacks and fire on coalition personnel.
To the extent that western intellectuals still believe that a victory can be achieved in the "Graveyard of Empires," the perception of a resilient insurgency has catalyzed debate and discussion over what such a victory would entail. In the pursuit of its definition, international relations scholars, security professionals, military personnel and independent journalists have attempted to identify insurgent successes where US and coalition forces have weakened or failed.
Indeed, US President Barack Obama's additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan begs the question as to why a larger and more technologically advanced military is seemingly unable to quell an insurgency considered to be under financed, less experienced and lacking any sign of a majority of support by the general public in comparison. It must further cause one to wonder from whom the insurgency garners financial and political support, from where it obtains arms and how it sustains a continued challenge for the US forces.
The Bush administration had repeatedly blamed various Iranian elements for harboring and supporting the insurgency in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, NATO external pageclaimed to have intercepted a shipment of weapons sent from the government of Iran directly to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Even after the Department of State later retracted some of its argument, Tony Blair soon external pagefollowed up in an issue of the Economist stating that "In Afghanistan it is clear that the Taliban is receiving support, including arms from [...] elements of the Iranian regime." Last year's release of the external pageUS Country Reports on Terrorism asserts that:
"Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism [and the] IRGC-Qods [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] Force continued to provide weapons and financial aid to the Taliban to support anti-US and anti-[C]oalition activity in Afghanistan. Since 2006, Iran has arranged a number of shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives, possibly including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), to the Taliban."
Similarly, the Iranian government has been accused of external pagefueling some of the insurgency in Iraq. Reports were surfacing as early as February 2004, just short of a year after the fall of Baghdad, highlighting US external pageconcerns of Iranian influence in Iraq. While evidence remains unsubstantiated with regard to Iranian influence in Iraq, little critique has been made concerning the bureaucratic structure of the US military in general, specifically how mismanagement in Afghanistan has fueled the growth of regional external pagegray and black market for arms, possibly to its own detriment.
According to a external pagereport issued the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), between the summers of 2005 and 2008, the Department of Defense "did not establish clear guidance for US personnel to follow when obtaining, transporting and storing weapons for the Afghan National Security Forces," resulting in the failure to "maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 US-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan." The 87,000 weapons include shotguns, rifles, pistols, machine guns, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and grenade launchers that are unaccounted for.
The GAO found that of the 87,000 weapons, the US military is external pageunable to provide 41,000 serial numbers of weapons included in the transfer. The report indicates that while the weapons are transported and audited by coalition forces, some US military personnel have attempted to shift the blame to the nature of the developing Afghani force. The GAO notes that the reasons it was given for these massive oversights were that Afghani forces remained unsuccessful in guarding weapons' caches due to "cultural and institutional problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance."
A similar external pageinstance occurred in Iraq last when reports released last August found that the US military lost track of 110,000 AK-47s and 80,000 glock pistols between 2004 and 2005. In one external pagereport, a senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information noted that "the Bush administration frequently complain[ed] that Iran and Syria are supplying insurgents but […] paid little attention to whether U.S. military errors inadvertently play a role." Again, US forces external pageblamed the debacle on "clerical errors" made by the Iraqi authority. By summer 2007, federal criminal investigations external pagebegan after "inquiries by federal oversight agencies […] found serious discrepancies in military records of where thousands of weapons intended for Iraqi security forces actually ended up."
Growth of the Gray Arms Market
Wherever these weapons have ended up, they might now be considered to be in a "gray area." The gray market trade refers to sanctioned, legal and approved munitions transfers that become lost or stolen while in transit. That is, the arms are not "born" illegally per se, until they are accessed or acquired for non-appropriated use. Transactions of arms between the US and other "friendly governments" occur regularly, increasing the chances for arms to be acquired in transit, especially given the recent inability or unwilling behavior of the Department of Defense to regulate and control its flow of arms.
A new internal external pagereport from the inspector general (IG) of the Department of Defense criticizes the Pentagon for not only failing to track weapons sent to Afghanistan and Iraq, but even failing to track weapons sent to 19 other "friendly" states. The report further criticizes the Pentagon for "accidentally" sending arms and munitions to governments that were "not authorized to have such weaponry."
The report states that between 2001 and 2006, "As many as 7,259 weapons, including M-16 rifles, M-60 machines, and armored personnel carriers were not properly tracked, safeguarded, accounted for, or reconciled […] as many as 291 weapons or parts were shipped to foreign governments not authorized to have such weaponry; and as many as 960 weapons or parts were shipped without the correct information regarding their demilitarization." Most striking is that the Department of Defense is required by law to transfer any excess military equipment to foreign governments under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. If the lack of oversight and loss of arms is indicative or systemic to the nature of a military bureaucracy, it could be argued that a legal mandate exists that ultimately creates a gray market for arms that eventually end up being traded or sold illegally.
So where do gray market arms and equipment wind up? In the street markets on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, everything from 19th century British field rifles to Soviet military uniforms are still bartered and sold. In the village of Peshawar, one reporter witnessed the newest product on the market among weapons and garb: US military technology. The report external pagestates, "U.S. military laptop[s][cost] $650 from a small kiosk, which is known as the 'Sitara Market'" and contain "restricted U.S. military information, as well as software for military platforms, the identities of numerous military personnel and information about weaknesses and flaws in American military vehicles being employed in the war in Afghanistan."
The lost weapons and other munitions by the US military over the last eight years just might be found in the back alleyways and market shop cupboards of Peshawar, thus fueling an underground economy that arms the very insurgent forces that are presenting challenges to the Americans in Afghanistan. If this is the case, even the most hardened of cynics might expect an endless cycle of violence in which the Americans indirectly arm the very enemy it seeks to suppress.