US: Full Speed Ahead with LCS

For approximately  the last fifteen years, the US Navy has been fairly consistent in its projections that a fleet of between 300 and 320 ships would satisfy its long-run mission requirements. The Navy’s current number is 313.

The Navy defines its requirements as the ability to support a major conflagration together with another skirmish elsewhere on the globe..

It periodically runs analyses from which it builds classified models that it uses to project its vessel needs, Robert Work, vice president of strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank, told ISN Security Watch.

The fact that Navy estimates of fleet strength have varied little over the last decade and a half shows that it is has likely employed a consistent set of assumptions over that period, Work asserted.

But the US Navy now operates only 280 ships, which means that it must embark on an ambitious shipbuilding and acquisition program if it is to reach its desired strength. In fact, the navy has plans to implement such a program over the next 30 years.

The problem is that, according to a external pagestudycall_made by Work released by the CSBA in February, given the budgets likely to be allocated to the Navy, these plans do not look realistic.

For the Navy to reach the level it aspires to, it would need to spend US$27 billion per year on shipbuilding for the foreseeable future, according to the Congressional Budget Office. By contrast, the Navy actually spent an average of US$11.1 billion a year for new ship construction between 2003 and 2008.

Work’s report assumes that the US Congress will allow the Navy to spend US$21 billion per year to augment its fleet. “Given that level of spending, the report discusses what the Navy’s options are,” he explained.

“It seems clear that the Navy needs to scale back its current plans,” he added. “They are simply too ambitious for expected future budgets.”

A Change in Strategy, And Ship

Even at lower budget levels, Work does not worry that the US will lose its global maritime superiority any time soon. “Even with only 280 warships,” he said, the US Navy is “still the most powerful naval force in the world by a wide margin.”

Work supports the Navy’s strategy to decelerate the acquisition of large naval platforms while emphasizing the development of smaller vessels that can operate in shallower waters. The Navy has a target of 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), high-speed vessels for operations in shallow waters close to shore. Work advocates ramping up production of the LCS to four per year and to sustain that rate even after reaching the 55-ship target.

The Navy’s shallow-water strategy, established earlier this decade, marked an about-face from the strategy the Navy pursued in the 1990s, when it ditched smaller vessels such as frigates in favor of large warships. The new strategy reflects a naval mission that places less emphasis on major engagements and more on regional conflicts and close-shore operations. As former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld external pageput itcall_made when he appeared before Congress in 2005, “Our country's potential foes currently have fleets that are regional, not international. The new challenge is to be able to project concentrated naval power more quickly to confront unexpected threats.”

The Obama administration has endorsed the principle of floating a higher number of smaller combatant vessels, according to Work, although it has not fleshed out that policy with many specifics.

Work’s support of the LCS may appear paradoxical at first blush, especially given his basic assumption that the Navy cannot afford to carry out its present shipbuilding plans: The LCS appears to be very expensive. The Navy is in possession at this point of a single prototype vessel which cost half a billion dollars, a fact that elicited howls of protest from congressional overseers.

Besides the base price, the LCS has encountered numerous developmental problems: cost overruns have led to delaying or cancelling parts of the program. The Navy actually awarded two contracts: one to Lockheed Martin and the other to General Dynamics. Both were tasked with building a competitive prototype from which the Navy would eventually choose. This approach, too, has been roundly criticized.

“To call this program troubled would be an understatement,” external pagesaidcall_made Democratic Congressman Gene Taylor of Mississippi, chair of the LCS congressional oversight subcommittee, during a recent hearing. “The fact of the matter is this program has so far delivered one ship.”

That ship is the Lockheed Martin prototype. The General Dynamics model is still under development.

Had the program proceeded according to the original plan, 13 LCSs should have been delivered by now, with six more in development, according to Taylor. He blasted the manufacturers for “transforming a realistic goal of achieving a 313 ship fleet into a very real disappointment.

“Neither competitor shows remorse for being a year late and hundreds of millions of dollars over budget,” Taylor added, “and neither competitor has a plan or even a desire to do any better because they can count on the navy throwing more money at the problem.”

Work: Criticism Misguided

According to Work, the LCS debacle is not as severe as it appears. “Everyone is focusing on the US$220 million for the seaframe,” the actual hull of the ship, he said. “What they should be looking at is the US$350 million to US$400 million the ships will cost with the mission modules plugged in.”

The LCS was designed to be equipped with interchangeable mission modules that allow the ship to support anti-submarine, surface, and mine warfare missions.

Seaframe costs, have indeed gone up, Work acknowledged, but the costs for the mission modules, in other words, the equipment that will enable the LCS to fulfill its three missions, were overestimated. The overall result, Work asserted, is not as bad as some critics claim.

“The Lockheed Martin prototype is in the water and is doing extremely well,” Work said. “It is doing everything the navy wants it to do.” The status of the General Dynamics model is uncertain at this point. Work advocates putting the Lockheed Martin version into “low rate initial production” while continuing to test the system.

“Provided the costs don’t get any higher, the program is going to survive,” he said. “If there is a surprise, it will be at risk just like any other program.”

LCS Program Still Afloat

Politically, the future of the LCS actually looks good. At the congressional hearing Taylor refused to call for an end to the program, instead advocating bringing “true competition into this program based on price, schedule, and quality.”

Key to implementing Taylor’s idea would be for the US government to possess “government purpose rights,” a form of intellectual property, for the vessel designs. At the hearing, a representative of the US Navy assured the congressman that the Navy indeed owns rights to the seaframe of both LCS variants and, as such, “can solicit full and open competition for either seaframe design.” The navy also owns rights to the technical data pertaining to the Lockheed Martin, but not the General Dynamics, combat systems.

Taylor appears more interested in restructuring and continuing the LCS program than in killing it, despite his fury over past mishaps. The reason is not a mystery: He represents a district which includes a large shipbuilding yard. If the program is re-competed, his constituents could benefit from increased business and jobs.

Robert Work has no political ax to grind. He believes that the LCS suits the US Navy’s current and future missions.

But the question remains whether Work’s plan, based as it is on a US$21-billion annual shipbuilding budget, is realistic. When asked for the Navy’s reaction to his report, Work replied, “They told me they won’t even be able to get the US$21 billion a year.”