Yemen's Political Impasse

The recent decision to delay parliamentary elections by two years raises questions concerning the prospects for Yemeni political reform as the government struggles to address pressing economic and security crises.

Despite lengthy negotiations, the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) coalition and President Ali Abdullah Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) were unable to find common ground on the holding of scheduled parliamentary elections this year.

The primary cause of the delay of the poll, initially scheduled for 27 April, was a failure to agree on the reform of electoral procedures and institutions, with the JMP's focus firmly on the GPC-controlled Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendums. Under the GPC-JMP deal, the parliamentary term will be extended from four to six years.

The JMP had threatened to boycott elections if their demands for comprehensive democratic reform were not met, clearly believing that a free and fair poll would see a significant boost in their representation in the 301-member Assembly of Representatives, the lower house of the bicameral legislature.

Speaking candidly in a Wednesday interview with ISN Security Watch, Yemen Observer Chief Editor Zaid Al-Alaya'a said, "Personally, I think it is the first time in my life I hear an opposition asking the ruling party to extend their power for two more years."

"I think it is a violation of the Yemen constitution. […] I think it is wrong. It is a breach of the rights of the people," he said, stressing that this was a personal opinion and not that of his newspaper.

Backing stability

While key allies the US and EU expressed concerns regarding the election delay, it appears that significant pressure was brought on the Saleh government behind the scenes to agree to a postponement in lieu of genuine electoral reform.

Yemen Post Editor-in-Chief Hakim Almasmari told ISN Security Watch, "The government was forced to abide by the opposition demands or delay the elections because the opposition had European and American support and the EU announced that it would not send election observers if the opposition did not participate in the election."

There appear to be concerns amongst agencies involved in building the capacities of both the GPC and JMP parties that considerable work still needs to be done in order to build viable political movements with developed policy platforms and the capacity to respond appropriately to constituent needs. Given the stakes, it is hard to envisage significant movement in either the government or JMP positions on democratic reform in the coming years.

"The government is very firm and is not changing. The opposition is also very firm in its demands. I don't expect any positive changes in the next two years at all," Almasmari said.

Surprising cohesion

While the JMP is unlikely to be in a position to challenge the GPC for power in 2011, the fact that the opposition coalition succeeded in forcing a delay of the poll indicates its growing influence.

The ability of the JMP to present a united front in the standoff with the government over electoral reform underlines that the covert ties between the government and opposition elements through which the GPC managed political challenges to its authority in the past are being progressively undermined.

The survival of the opposition bloc since 2002 - despite the absconding of some minor member movements - is in itself a considerable achievement given that the JMP is an amalgam of disparate Nasserite, socialist and Islamic parties.

Explaining differences within the JMP over attitudes to the government, Al-Alaya'a said, "Some of them were willing to accept a kind of compromise with the GPC: the moderate ones. The conservative ones continue in their attack against the government, criticizing everything they are saying."

The future of political reform remains moot in light of external pagereportedcall_made efforts to undermine the status of the parliament through constitutional emendations.

Given the JMP challenge, the GPC could well see the election postponement as a positive, preventing the opposition from benefiting from its perceived governance failures.

Fomenting divisions?

A former GPC ally, the Sunni Islamic Islah party, is by far the largest and most influential JMP movement with 46 MPs, 7 percent representation on governorate councils, and 12 percent of district level seats.  

Last year, former Islah spiritual authority Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, who retains significant cachet in the movement, established an apolitical organization dubbed the Authority for Protecting Virtue and Fighting Vice, a move interpreted by the external pageYemen Timescall_made as threatening the integrity of the party. This, because the authority's stances on rights issues and civil freedoms was likely to stand at odds with positions held by fellow JMP parties.

Almasmari disagrees with this assessment: "Most of the [authority] members are from both parties: the ruling party and opposition. So it is not party-oriented and it is not authorized by the government in any way, so it will not have any affect on the elections whatsoever."

Regardless, the government may seek to foment latent rifts between Islah moderates and conservatives in a bid to break up the JMP front - divisions managed in 2006 when al-Zindani openly touted his decisions to vote for Saleh in that year's presidential poll.

"Most analysts expect that by next year either a split in the Islah party itself or agreements between the al-Zindani group and the other more moderate groups in the Islah party [will occur]," Almasmari said.

Co-opted opposition

The main political opposition to the JMP-GPC election postponement deal came from the National Alliance Parties (NAP) bloc, which appeared set to gain from a JMP boycott of the polls.

"They threatened that they would file a suit against the Joint Meeting Parties and the GPC because they believed that what happened was a sort of suspicious deal […] and [that] nobody has the right to postpone the elections," Al-Alaya'a said.

The independence of the Baathist and other movements involved in the NAP is in serious question:

"These parties are really part of the government […] were formed by the government to make a coalition to go against the opposition," Almasmari said, adding, "This coalition has no power whatsoever in the country."

Northern rebellion flares

With the national political contest effectively on hold and the economy on the slide a further challenge has reemerged through the reinvigoration of the al-Houthi rebellion in the northern al-Sa'ada governate.

On 5 April, it was external pagereportedcall_made that fighters loyal to the Zaydi Shia militancy had taken over all governmental and security facilities and the central market and telecommunications facilities in the al-Sa'ada district of Ghamr.

Reconciliation and mediation efforts had failed to secure a ceasefire at the time of writing, though the state-run Saba news agency external pagereportedcall_made Tuesday the withdrawal of al-Houthi fighters from the seized facilities.

Little apparent progress has been made in either instigating planned reconstruction efforts in the governate or to deal with the plight of an estimated 77,000 internal refugees forced to flee their homes during the conflict which has flared sporadically since June 2004.

The current leader of the militancy, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, signed a Qatari-mediated ceasefire deal with the government in June 2007 (subsequently revised in July 2008). Under the agreement, the rebels agreed to disarm of heavy weapons and withdraw from seized positions. Both sides agreed to prisoner releases.

To Almasmari, the al-Houthi and government are now fighting solely "to show who has the upper [hand] and who will release their prisoners first and faster," he said, adding that an intensification of the violence was expected in coming weeks.

In a recent external pageinterviewcall_made with a Saudi paper, Parliamentary Speaker Himyar Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmer accused the Iranian takfeeri group of propagating extremist ideology and financing terrorist activities in Yemen and of links to both the al-Houthi and al-Qaida elements.

While careful not to single out a responsible country or movement, Al-Alaya'a said, "I think the Houthi rebels are being manipulated by others outside Yemen to destabilize and cause a sort of shake in Yemeni security and stability."

Almasmari said that most Yemenis believe the government claim of Iranian involvement lacks an evidentiary basis.
 
Managing relations

The resurgence of the al-Houthi rebellion is merely one of a myriad of security and governance challenges facing the government. A major government operation was external pagereportedlycall_made launched in late March to hunt wanted members of a splinter faction of the fundamentalist, militant Jama’at al Jihad movement in the Ja’ar district of the southern Abyan governate.

With the extent of government control sharply circumscribed in many areas, the Saleh government has been forced over the years to negotiate its relationships with powerful local tribal groupings and Islamic movements including militant groups, some of which have purported links to al-Qaida.

"The government has been doing very well compared with the past when negotiating with tribesmen," Almasmari said. "The relations are much, much better and the problems are probably 80 percent less than what they were years ago."

Al-Qaida external pageclaimedcall_made in January that Yemen had become the center of its activities on the Arabian peninsula. A fortnight later, the Yemeni government released 170 men initially held on suspicion of involvement in al-Qaida.

Disturbances in the south in 2007-2008 were ostensibly over the failure of the government to provide equal treatment to South Yemen army veterans, but bespoke a broader disenchantment with GPC rule.

Asked if there is a genuine secessionist movement in the south, Almasmari said, "Until now there is nothing concrete. There are just some people in the south who are   saying that, but their reach on this issue has no power whatsoever."

Poverty and instability

While political paralysis and security threats take the focus internationally, the root cause of the progressive undermining of the Yemeni state remains endemic poverty.

external pageSpeakingcall_made at a meeting of donors and government officials on 5 April, Prime Minister Ali Mujawar identified soaring food prices, flood disasters caused by climate changes, and the impacts of the global financial crisis as the "main challenges facing Yemen's development," alongside the Sa'ada rebellion and terrorism.

He also spoke of the pressure building on Yemen through an influx of refugees from Africa (total arrivals surged from 29,500 in 2007 to 50,000 in 2008).

Given the country's reliance on oil exports, the recent drop in oil prices is a major blow to the economy, with some officials speaking of a devastating halving of production ahead of an expected tapping of reserves by decade's end. Systematic planning for the expected end of oil production is sorely lacking and will only be impeded in coming years by the political stalemate.

In an indication of the direct impact of economic straits on the populace, wheat imports into Yemen fell by 49 percent in 2008. The country only produces a tenth of it annual wheat needs and has suffered drastic price rises in basic foodstuffs – now gradually easing. According to 2008 external pageUN figurescall_made, 40 percent of children in Yemen are malnourished and close to 50 percent of the population suffers moderate hunger.

Referring to the public interest in wider national issues, Almasmari said, "They have another thing to focus on more which is just trying to live."

While noting that the situation is expected to improve over time, he added that currently: "People are trying to survive the crisis but most families are not able to do so."