Publication
2008
Power-sharing arrangements aim to reduce the risk of civil conflict by guaranteeing potentially warring parties a role in a country’s government, thus lessening the stakes of political contestation. In this way, power-sharing reduces the risk that spoilers will resort to violence if they do not succeed in the process of democratic electoral contestation. While power-sharing can reduce the incentive of electoral losers to renege on their commitment to democracy, we argue that this depends on the nature of the relevant groups, as well as on the political institutions that are chosen.
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English (PDF, 4 pages, 3.0 MB) |
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Author | Scott Gates, Kaare Strøm |
Series | PRIO Policy Briefs |
Issue | 1 |
Publisher | Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) |
Copyright | © 2008 International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) |