Publication
Jul 2010
In this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected in the central train station of Kiel, Germany. A group ticket is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The bargaining behavior resembles the Ultimatum game to the extent that proposers request a fixed price for a shared ride and potential co-travelers usually accept or reject the deal. We observe that the prevailing price corresponds to the equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co-travelers.
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English (PDF, 31 pages, 4.0 MB) |
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Author | Israel Waichman, Artem Korzhenevych, Till Requate |
Series | Kiel Institute Working Papers |
Issue | 1638 |
Publisher | Kiel Institute for the World Economy |
Copyright | © 2010 Kiel Institute for the World Economy |