Publication
Jul 2009
In the past, many WTO member states have liberalized their trade policies unilaterally. However, they were decreasingly prepared to guarantee these measures multilaterally, that is to "bind" them. This paper analyzes the background of this development by resorting to three political economy arguments pro multilateral binding: the terms of trade externality argument, the "tying hand" argument, that is to protect a government which is prone to liberalize against domestic lobby groups, and finally the argument that trade policies are instruments for general political targets.
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German (PDF, 33 pages, 299 KB) |
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Author | Rolf J Langhammer |
Series | Kiel Institute Working Papers |
Issue | 1533 |
Publisher | Kiel Institute for the World Economy |
Copyright | © 2009 Kiel Institute for the World Economy |