Publication

This monograph examines the struggle of the world's political and military leaders with the "new" political-psychological aspects of unconventional conflict. Political-insurgency war is the most likely type of conflict to challenge the maintenance and enhancement of global and regional security over the near-to-long term. Through the analysis of the cases of Argentina (1969-79), Peru (1962-present) and Italy (1968-82), the author identifies the political-strategic challenges of modern unconventional conflict. He stresses the political complexity of insurgency and the broader implications for the promises of democracy, free market economies, and prosperity implicit in the mandates to civil-military forces that confront global and regional instability. These cases are significant because they address counterinsurgency as much as they do insurgency. As a consequence, this examination is a logical point from which to begin to understand how governments and international organizations might ultimately control or succumb to the strategic challenges of political-insurgency war.