Publication

This paper seeks to test the claim that WTO disputes over environment, health and safety (EHS) regulations are more likely to escalate than disputes over other issues. The theoretical underpinning of this hypothesis is that, relative to non-EHS disputes, gradual concessions by the defendant to the plaintiff and compensation to domestic interest groups in the defendant country in exchange for international trade concessions are harder to achieve in EHS cases. The authors develop and test this hypothesis with data on 506 dyadic WTO trade disputes in 1995-2003, using selection models. The results show that ceteris paribus, EHS disputes are less prone to escalation from the consultation to the panel / appellate body level, but more prone to escalation into compliance disputes once they have reached the panel / appellate body level. This finding suggests that escalation dynamics at different stages of the WTO dispute-settlement process differ across EHS- and non-EHS disputes and should be studied in greater detail in further research.