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The exploitation of space today is increasingly driven by the innovations of private actors. Confronted with Russia’s military aggression, Ukraine showed how nations with little or no space capabilities can leverage commercial space infrastructure for combat. The massive reliance on commercial actors to provide vital support for Ukraine’s military operations suggests a new round of the militarization of space, one that private actors increasingly dominate.

Fear of “Hybrid War”, a blanket term describing gray zone aggression short of all-out war, remains widespread. Many expect information technology to enable revolutionary gains in this strategic space. Yet, Hybrid War’s track record does not support these expectations. Consequently, it is crucial to conduct a more systematic assessment of the different instruments used under this umbrella term.

Following the example of Intrusion Truth, governments should substantiate their attribution statements that identify the perpetrators of malicious cyber operations with open-source intelligence, argues Eugenio Benincasa in this issue of the CSS Policy Perspectives series.

NATO has designated cyberspace as a domain of warfare and recognized that an adversarial cyber campaign could trigger the Alliance’s collective defense mechanism under Article 5. Given the complexities of cyberattacks and the difficulties of designing an effective response, it is unknown whether and what kind of cyberattack(s) might trigger a collective defense response from the Alliance, argues Sarah Wiedemar in this CSS Analysis.

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, cyber norms discussions at the UN have reached an impasse. Tensions between the US and Russia have stalled substantive progress, particularly on issues of cyber conduct during armed conflict. Yet, the continued existence of the UN working groups is a small but positive sign for the future, as is the growth of norm discussion venues beyond the UN, argues Taylor Grossman in this CSS Analysis.

Despite growing massively since the 1990s and its continued success, the debate about whether the Internet is losing its global nature is getting an increased amount of traction. The political future of the Internet is often discussed in terms of three archetypes: 1) a single global Internet, 2) a bifurcated Internet, split into a Chinese-led and an US-led Internet, and 3) a fragmented Internet, split into many national segments, argues Kevin Kohler in this CSS Cyberdefense Report.

States often struggle to develop a military cyber-force, as the time and resources required for an effective capability are much greater than often appreciated, argues Max Smeets in this CSS Policy Perspectives.

Evidence from Ukraine shows that cyber operations are either too slow, too weak, or too volatile to provide significant strategic value in hybrid conflict and war, argue Lennart Maschmeyer and Myriam Dunn Cavelty in this CSS Policy Perspective.

The “cyberwar” in Ukraine is internationalized and may persist for years. In an effort to urge operational restraint among belligerents, neutral countries should insist on financial compensation for collateral damage from cyberattacks, argues Kevin Kohler in this CSS Policy Perspective.

This CSS Studies in Security and International Relations edited volume by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger examines new and challenging political aspects of cyber security and presents it as an issue defined by socio-technological uncertainty and political fragmentation.

Governments are developing different policies to counter the increasing ransomware threat, addressing it either as a national security issue, or through law enforcement and multilateral cooperation. Few have publicly articulated a comprehensive approach. A public policy explicitly addressing ransomware can support coordination across domestic agencies and foster international cooperation, argues Nele Achten in this CSS Analysis.

CSS' Nele Achten’s report for the Geneva Dialogue of Responsible Behavior in Cyberspace provides an overview of public policies around the security of digital products. It summarizes the challenges that public policymakers are frequently facing in this context and the solutions that have been adopted. It also elaborates how the relatively new policy area of digital product security can be distinguished from cybersecurity regulations around critical infrastructure protection and data security.

This CSS Cyberdefense Report by Sean Cordey and Kevin Kohler provides a historical and technological background to neutrality and a breakdown of the legal debates regarding the application of the law of neutrality in cyberspace.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, awareness about vulnerabilities in the health care sector increased. Experts from governments, civil society, and industry called for more cybersecurity regulation that clarifies responsibilities and expectations. Regulation is one answer, but some issues require other policy solutions, such as further international cooperation, argues Nele Achten in this CSS Analysis.

This CSS Cyberdefense Report by Stefan Soesanto focuses on cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA), which is a doctrinal concept that was introduced by the US Army sometime around 2009/2010 to connect both domains at the hip. The report dives into the origins of CEMA, explains why and how the US Army and UK MoD adopted them, highlights potential CEMA tactics in the field and offers ideas on whether emulating CEMA is an option that ought to be adopted by other armed forces.

After the COVID-19 outbreak, China has made concerted effort to control the narratives about its own crisis response and create an image as a reliable international partner. Analyzing China’s influence efforts, this Cyberdefense Report cuts through questions of factual accuracy and seeks to focus on the longer-term interests and priorities that shape Beijing’s messaging. It looks at China’s tactical evolutions in social media use to further understand which capability developments may persevere.

Despite the increased use of offensive cyber capabilities in armed conflict, no guidance currently exists for peace practitioners on if, or how, peace processes may need to evolve with this trend. This CSS Mediation Resources represents one of the first attempts to address this gap, focusing specifically on how developments in offensive cyber capabilities might impact efforts to negotiate and implement ceasefires. It also sets out and analyzes possible adaptations and responses.

Over the last years, AI applications have come to play a role in many security‐related fields. CSS Director Andreas Wenger and Sophie-Charlotte Fischer show in this article that scholars who want to study AI’s link to power and security should widen their perspective to include conceptual approaches from science and technology studies (STS).

There is a pervasive fear that information technology enhances the effectiveness of destabilizing disinformation campaigns. Yet evidence from Ukraine, the paradigmatic case of “hybrid war”, indicates this threat is overstated, argues Lennart Maschmeyer in this CSS Analysis. Rather, traditional media remain far more influential. The prevailing focus on technology hampers both analysis and the development of effective counterstrategies

The initial hopes associated with the spread of the Internet have gradually diminished. Both in democratic and in authoritarian systems, Internet freedom is contested. The need for reform creates possibilities for new actors to shape the future version of the Internet, argues CSS Julian Kamasa in this CSS Analysis. A key challenge will be to prevent a splintered Internet.

This article by CSS' Matthias Leese analyses the current political re-​problematization of identity in the EU. Engaging the recently adopted interoperability initiative that is set to biometrically verify and cross-​validate identity records between all European border management, migration, and security databases, it argues that interoperability presents a shift from traditional modes of identity production at the border towards a digital space of identity management.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented spread of facial coverings while simultaneously accelerating the adoption of digital surveillance tools, including facial recognition systems (FRS). However, whereas the facemasks will disappear again, FRS are not only poised to stay, but to keep on expanding. Consequently, governments should address the issues of bias and robustness by testing and certifying FRS.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an explosion of digital tools for fighting communicable diseases. To cut through this complexity, this CSS Corona Blog by Kevin Kohler provides an overview of such tools for information exchange, contact tracing and monitoring compliance with physical distancing and quarantine measures.

Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to change cybersecurity in the coming years. It will likely enhance both cyber offense and defense, and contribute to shaping the cyber threat landscape. Governing these changes is challenging, particularly for state-related actors. It requires them to adopt adequate policy and normative frameworks, as argued by Matteo Bonfanti and Kevin Kohler in this CSS Analysis.

In this Journal of Strategic Studies article, Richard J. Harknett and CSS’ Max Smeets argue that cyberspace has opened a new dimension of power politics in which cyber campaigns could potentially become a salient means, alternative to war, for achieving strategic advantage.

What is taught in a course on cybersecurity? In this paper, CSS Senior Researcher Max Smeets, Trey Herr and Arthur Laudrain address this question by reviewing two dozen university syllabi to identify key literature in the field, create an overview of best practices, as well as identify core concepts and readings.

What implications does the US’ persistent engagement cyber strategy have for its allies and their intelligence collection? In this paper, CSS Senior Researcher Max Smeets addresses this question by evaluating the strategy and identifying potential negative consequences. Smeets also suggests several ways forward, including the creation of a new NATO-memorandum of understanding on cyber operations.

Over the last decade, cyber incidents have become more expensive, more disruptive and more political. This article by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Prof. Andreas Wenger introduces a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy on cyber security politics, providing a historical overview of this topic and the academic literature that developed with it.

With the number of politically relevant cyber incidents continuously rising, the correct attribution of these incidents becomes crucial as wrongly attributed operations might further increase tensions between rivals. This article by Miguel Gomez investigates how foreign policy elites evaluate cyber operations.

The public debate over military use of artificial intelligence (AI) mainly revolves around autonomous weapons systems. Looking beyond the specific ethical and political considerations associated with that issue, there are important questions relating to the organizational, technical, and functional integration of AI-enabled systems that determine the balance between potential benefits and risks.

In 2018, Switzerland released its second national cybersecurity strategy. To put the Swiss approach into perspective, this CSS study compares the strategies, policies and governmental structures of Germany, Finland, France, Israel, Italy and the Netherlands to highlight similarities and differences and to discuss the relevant challenges and further implications for Switzerland.

No disaster management practice has undergone as much change as emergency communication. One response to this rapid change has been the establishment of Virtual Operation Support Teams to monitor social media, support situational awareness, counter rumors and disseminate official communication. This paper by Florian Roth and Timothy Prior examines the evolution of these teams, including their use in seven countries.

This article by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Florian J. Egloff investigates the role of the state in cybersecurity. It finds six different roles of the state in cybersecurity: (1) security guarantor, (2) legislator and regulator, (3) supporter and representative of the whole of society, (4) security partner, (5) knowledge generator and distributor, and (6) threat actor. In addition, the article shows that cybersecurity policy is diverse and necessarily includes state, economic, and societal actors.

In this new CSS Analysis, Fabien Merz argues that state actors increasingly regard Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a key technology and a strategic resource. How are Europeans, in particular France and Germany, positioning themselves in the context of a global race for the supremacy in AI? Europe is proposing a model in which AI developments and applications are better regulated and ethically grounded.

This CSS Analysis by Florian J. Egloff and Prof. Andreas Wenger argues that cyber incidents are increasingly being publicly attributed to specific perpetrators. The public attributions issued by states and cybersecurity companies often lack both transparency and verifiability. Strengthening trust in public attributions requires institutional mechanisms at the international level as well as the engagement of the state, the corporate sector, and civil society.

In this CSS Policy Perspective, Sophie-Charlotte Fischer and Andreas Wenger warn that policymakers and experts increasingly view artificial intelligence (AI) within the narrow context of great power competition. The authors argue that international science diplomacy could help change this situation. What is needed is a politically neutral hub for basic AI research, committed to the responsible, inclusive, and peaceful development and use of the new technology.

This new journal article by Mark Daniel Jäger and Myriam Dunn Cavelty sheds light on the complexity and sensitivity of crowd-based intelligence in security governance. While the 'crowd’, as a special manifestation of ‘the public’, presents new challenges it also enables new forms of intelligence practices. The article traces how crowds in their various forms relate to how security agents approach them in their intelligence practices.

Cyberspace and cyberespionage represent a source of disagreements and tensions between the US and China. Nevertheless, in 2015, the two powers managed to find an agreement on cybersecurity to stabilize their relationship and reduce risks of misperceptions in cyberspace.

China aims to become a world leader in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. This goal is linked to Beijing’s efforts to make its economy more innovative, modernize its military, and gain influence globally. While the US currently retains an edge in AI, China’s ambitions are likely to set off a new technology race.

Cyberattacks must also be understood as a phenomenon of political violence and combated as such, says Myriam Dunn Cavelty.

In this interview with Crypto Magazine, Prof. Andreas Wenger talks about the political and military aspects of cyber conflicts.