Assessing Hybrid War: Separating Fact from Fiction
Fear of “Hybrid War”, a blanket term describing gray zone aggression short of all-out war, remains widespread. Many expect information technology to enable revolutionary gains in this strategic space. Yet, Hybrid War’s track record does not support these expectations. Consequently, it is crucial to conduct a more systematic assessment of the different instruments used under this umbrella term.
For close to a decade, analysts and defense planners have now warned of the looming menace of “Hybrid War”. Yet, it remains strikingly unclear which instruments of power politics this involves, and the extent of a threat Hybrid War actually poses. Nonetheless, Western states have expended significant resources to fend off this threat. This year, the EU has announced an entire mission in Moldova tasked with countering “hybrid threats”, its first mission of this kind. Hence, it is both urgent and important to assess these threats.
Unfortunately, Hybrid War is notoriously ill-defined. Both policy debates and academia use it mostly as an umbrella term for all kinds of aggression short of all-out warfare. These include, but are not limited to, disinformation, sabotage, subversion, and cyber operations. Russia’s takeover and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its support of armed separatists in Ukraine’s Donbass region (including through unmarked troops of “little green men”), and a arge-scale cyber campaign were perceived to demonstrate the power of these instruments. Academic interest skyrocketed and many scholars have argued that such low-intensity aggression would become the future of warfare. Policymakers picked up these arguments and associated threat perceptions, and have shifted strategy and defense priorities accordingly.