Bulletin 2022 on Swiss Security Policy
This year’s Bulletin on Swiss Security Policy starts with an interview with Federal President Ignazio Cassis. In the following five contributions, our authors address the use of drones in the military, Switzerland's security and defense policy cooperation in the shadow of the Ukraine war, Swiss priorities in its UN Security Council membership, the interconnections between peace mediation and climate protection, and the role of technology in monitoring ceasefires.
Read the Bulletin 2022 here (in German)
Interview
In this interview for the Bulletin 2022, Federal President Ignazio Cassis talks about the changing European security architecture in an increasingly multipolar world, increased security cooperation between Switzerland and the EU and NATO, and the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and the UN. While the OSCE, according to Cassis, is currently barely able to fulfill its role due to the Russian aggression, the UN Security Council seems to continue to function. Accordingly, Cassis looks forward to Swiss membership in the Security Council for 2023 to 2024. He sees this mandate as an opportunity to incorporate Swiss strengths and thereby make an important contribution to ensuring that the Security Council remains capable of action, even in times of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Discussion of Current Events
Militärische Drohnennutzung: Erfahrungen, Technologie und Schweizer Optionen
In this contribution to the Bulletin 2022, Constant Despont, Dominika Kunertova and Niklas Masuhr focus on the military use of drones, which have become an integral part of military operations. At the same time, however, it would be an exaggeration to speak of a military revolution caused by drones. Given the offensive potential of increasing autonomy of the systems, no purely technological solution to drone defense can be expected in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Despont, Kunertova and Masuhr argue with regard to Switzerland that drones are and will remain a responsibility of the state.
In this part of the Bulletin, Amos Dossi and Sophie-Charlotte Fischer deal with the possible implications of the Ukraine war for Swiss cooperation strategies in the field of security and defense. While Switzerland has been building a close-knit and institutionally firmly anchored network of multilateral relationships in the field of European internal security policy since the 1990s, it has limited its cooperation on defense policy to the military-political working level, relying primarily on bilateral and minilateral formats. This model worked well for a long time; However, the changed security situation and adjustments by partner countries suggest further development and diversification. Against this background and based on CSS internal analyses as well as external expert opinions, Dossi and Fischer outline concrete options for action.
Prioritäten der Schweizer UNO-Sicherheitsrats-Mitgliedschaft
In this contribution to the Bulletin 2022, Fabien Merz examines the opportunities and ambitions associated with the four thematic priorities of Swiss Security Council membership for the period 2023-2024. Merz shows what Switzerland has to offer in the areas of promoting sustainable peace, protecting the civilian population, climate security and increasing the efficiency of the Council. He argues that due to its foreign policy profile, Switzerland is well placed to offer added value in these areas and to be able to contribute constructively to the Council. When pushing ahead with its priorities, Switzerland will also have to ensure that it works together with other Council members in a solution-oriented manner and builds on what has already been achieved by other members.
Klimawandel und Friedensmediation: Die Natur in Verhandlungen einbeziehen
In this part of the Bulletin 2022, Simon J. A. Mason and Olivia Lazard discuss the interconnections between peace mediation and climate protection. The authors not only show possible synergies, but also the areas of conflict that can arise when environmental concerns are taken into account in mediation processes. They also talk about the effects of the interaction between these two areas on Swiss peace and security policy. During its 2023-2024 Security Council membership, Switzerland could combine the two priority areas of promoting sustainable peace and addressing climate security.
In this part of the Bulletin 2022, Alexander Hug and Simon J. A. Mason consider the role of technology in monitoring ceasefires. The findings of the chapter are based on the experiences of the OSCE observer mission in Ukraine, which began in 2014 and ended after the Russian attack on Ukraine in April 2022. The mission used technologies such as drones, satellite imagery and sensors, increasing and complementing the range and efficiency of human observers. Technology has thus contributed to the observation and verification of a ceasefire in Europe's most acute conflict. According to the authors, however, it must not be used in isolation, it involves risks and its embedding requires suitable structures and resources. Hug and Mason therefore discuss the consequences for actors such as Switzerland or other OSCE states in terms of experts, equipment and structures of the missions.
From the CSS
In this chapter of the Bulletin 2022, Christine Eriksen shows how the recent work of the CSS Risk and Resilience Team, in particular two publications, have contributed to the Federal Council having the current practice of forest fire fighting in Switzerland reviewed in 2021.
Optimierung des Schweizer Krisenmanagements
In this contribution to the Bulletin 2022, Andrin Hauri describes how the CSS supported the post-action process for crisis management during the corona virus pandemic in the canton of Graubünden.
Warum sich Staaten schwer tun, eine militärische Cyber-Truppe aufzubauen
In the final contribution to the Bulletin 2022, Max Smeets presents his book, which was recently presented at ETH. No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber Force shows the reasons why many countries that have established a cyber command or similar structures are struggling to develop an effective military cyber force.