Debating Nuclear Deterrence in Europe
A deepening rift in transatlantic relations has reignited debates on how to strengthen nuclear deterrence in Europe in the absence of credible US security guarantees. No exact alternatives exist or would even be desirable. In her CSS analysis, Névine Schepers argues that opportunities for enhanced strategic dialogue and cooperation with willing European allies could instead provide some reassurance and may shape further changes in doctrine and force posture in the long-term.
In just a few short weeks early in his second term, President Donald Trump has upended transatlantic relations by negotiating with Russia without including Ukraine or European leaders, embracing Russian narratives of the war, and threatening economic warfare on Europe. While he has not yet announced a withdrawal of US troops or nuclear weapons from Europe, these scenarios can no longer be excluded, bringing new urgency to European calls for greater defense autonomy including for nuclear deterrence.
“Enhanced dialogue and cooperation on nuclear deterrence among interested European allies can support overall credibility and prepare for a variety of responses.”Névine Schepers
Incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s remarks in late February, which openly questioned US assistance within the NATO framework and called for discussions with France and the United Kingdom on nuclear security, demonstrate the extent of the change of mindset in Europe.
Névine Schepers emphasizes that opportunities for enhanced strategic dialogue and cooperation among willing European allies should be seized to provide reassurance. She also highlights that European states and in particular France and Britain have a responsibility to uphold nuclear nonproliferation norms and ensure that any nuclear rearmament measures, should they be enacted, still leave the door open for arms control solutions. An assessment of the negative effects of any developments in European nuclear deterrence, including Russian responses, is imperative and should be supported by concrete proposals to reduce risks and a continued strong engagement in multilateral nuclear governance institutions.
“A more nuclear world is ultimately not a safer world, but one where the risks of nuclear use, whether intentional or unintentional, are higher.”Névine Schepers