Organizational Dynamics of Advanced Weapons Systems in Informal Alliances

A robust organizational structure is necessary to materialize military technological innovation as it impacts weapons’ utility, methods of production, development, operation, and the types of actors who can produce or gain access to new weapons, and, more generally, the state’s military strategy and foreign policy. On the other hand, major powers enter into new security arrangements to assure protection, enhance partners’ capabilities, and signal military cooperation against adversaries. This is evident in numerous bilateral and multilateral security alliances that are being strengthened (e.g., China-Russia’s No Limits partnership, the extension of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, and Finland’s NATO membership) and the growing number of security-based informal alliances that are being formed where members with similar values participate in joint-defense projects and security dialogues (e.g., AUKUS, QUAD, and European Sky Shield Initiative). Due to the military technological innovation and the multipolar international system, states are becoming more selective in whom to share weapons with, which allies are capable of managing and handling industrial levels of production and development of advanced weaponries, and which state also possesses an interoperable military.

This project explores why and how the production, development, and deployment of advanced conventional weapons systems contribute to the formation, management, and salience of informal security alliances. I argue that advanced weapons systems are a necessary function of alliance formation and evolution, where the level of industrial capacity of states and the degree of military interoperability between them determines the character of the informal alliance. In addition to exogenous factors such as threats and power balancing, capabilities via weapon systems also contribute to such alliance formation and management. Moreover, such necessary function is evident in informal types of security alliances, in which they are formed not solely due to bandwagoning or balancing reasons but also to enable less dominant and industrious states to participate in the industrial process of building advanced conventional weapons systems (production and development) and to use such weapons systems through interoperability mechanisms (deployment) as part of providing management and salience to the informal security alliance. In a broader sense, I also contend that alliance-making is modernizing alongside technological advancements, military imperatives, and strategy, in which quick response and military readiness are paramount. The demand for informal security alliances is driven by responding to present threats and future-proofing. It guarantees the presence of a high degree of military interoperability and provides an infrastructure for like-minded and industry-capable members to have confined diffusion of military innovation, helping to assimilate and exploit new and existing weaponries and technology quickly. Such informal infrastructure enables states to gain latent capable weapons systems as well as deploy appropriate weapons systems pertinent to the present threat faced by informal security alliance members.